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Summary 
Both practitioners and scientists regard entrepreneurship as an important driver of product and 
market innovation. Researchers have identified numerous strategies employed by entrepreneurs 
to successfully introduce new products and services in new markets. Most strategies employ 
prediction of future market characteristics as a key ingredient. “The business plan” has become 
a ubiquitous buzzword for entrepreneurial practitioners and scientists alike. 
In 2001, effectuation was presented as a radically different approach to entrepreneurship 
designed especially for highly uncertain environments. Derived from the study of expert serial 
entrepreneurs, effectuation focuses on controlling market outcomes rather than predicting them. 
Effectuation is a decision logic that – due to high uncertainty – rejects predictions about the 
future. Consequently, it favours working with available means over setting potentially 
unrealistic goals. Moreover, effectuation proposes to focus on the potential loss of a project 
rather than its expected returns. In addition, effectuation encourages seeing other market 
participants as potential partners, not as potential threats. Lastly, effectuation regards 
unforeseen contingencies as improvement opportunities rather than incidents to be avoided. 
Despite significant research attention, effectuation is still in a nascent state: processes are 
not yet fully understood, the discussion regarding guiding principles is still on-going. Bigger 
challenges still lay ahead: leading entrepreneurship researchers aim to transform 
entrepreneurship into a “science of the artificial” and recreate it as a set of methodologies that 
can be tailored and optimised for individual entrepreneurial scenarios. In order to qualify as a 
suitable approach, however, a deeper understanding of effectuation mechanisms is required. 
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A key component of effectuation is intersubjective1 interaction. The reliance on co-
creation and the inclusive attitude towards other market participants distinguishes effectuation 
from other entrepreneurial strategies. However, its processes, consequences, and circumstances 
were also identified as a key area in need for further research attention in effectuation literature. 
Consequently, this thesis investigates the implications of networks and interactions for 
effectuation from an intersubjective perspective. It reveals the importance of docile and 
persistent market participants, challenges classic entrepreneurial assumptions regarding 
network position and shape, and reveals docility2 as a precursor for successful entrepreneurship 
in highly complex environments. 
With computer simulation, this thesis uses a methodology that is starkly underrepresented 
in entrepreneurship research and in social sciences in general. Computer simulation fits the task 
of understanding complex, non-linear relationships between multitudes of individuals very 
well. Computer simulation allows the longitudinal study of a large number of individuals at 
high level of detail – far beyond empirical feasibility. Moreover, it allows testing current 
theories under boundary conditions by performing “virtual experiments” which contributes 
greatly to a better understanding of theory. 
Computer simulation requires a formal model of the subject under investigation. The 
creation of a model of effectuation combines available knowledge regarding principles and 
processes. It thus fosters more precise terminology and rigour in theory development. Hence, 
the formal model is an important theoretical contribution in itself. While results derived from 
computer simulation results require – like theoretical predictions – empirical validation, the 
methodology facilitates empirical research by providing well-grounded hypotheses.
                                              
1 intersubjective: „involving or occurring between separate conscious minds“ (Merriam Webster) 
2 docility: teachability or educatability 
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1 Introduction 
Entrepreneurship, the “process of creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1942), is widely 
recognised as a key driver behind the creation of radically innovative products and services. 
While regarded as a destructor of established markets and business models, entrepreneurship is 
seen as a core driver of improvement and economic welfare. Scientifically introduced by 
Schumpeter (1934), research on entrepreneurship as a phenomenon and on the entrepreneur as 
a person has developed into an important area of research in social sciences (Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000). 
While entrepreneurship research has made tremendous progress since 1934, even bigger 
challenges still lay ahead: the aspired transformation of entrepreneurship into a “science of the 
artificial” (Chiles, Gupta, & Bluedorn, 2008; Venkataraman, Sarasvathy, Dew, & Forster, 
2012). This means no less than to change the focus of entrepreneurship research from observing 
“who the entrepreneur is and what he or she does” (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000, p. 218) 
towards the definition of an “entrepreneurial method” (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011, p. 
125) that can be tailored to specific environmental preconditions and personal circumstances. 
One approach that has all the earmarks of becoming an integral part of this science of the 
artificial is effectuation. Introduced as an alternative entrepreneurial decision logic by 
Sarasvathy (2001), effectuation is seen as a potential building block by leading entrepreneurship 
researchers (Venkataraman et al., 2012). Effectuation relies on action-based guidelines, 
provides a teachable process, incorporates personal preferences, and does not hinge on 
“personal genius”, but is derived from the decision-making of expert serial entrepreneurs 
(Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011). It was designed to actively manage the uncertainty 
usually involved in disruptive innovation. Existing only for little more than a decade, 
effectuation is still in a nascent research stage (Perry, Chandler, & Markova, 2012 Table 1) and 
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requires significant further research effort to contribute to the goal of an artificial science of 
entrepreneurship. 
A key area of further research is “making the intersubjective a key unit of analysis” 
(Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011, p. 125) by exploring the “details of the numerous 
relationships and deals that entrepreneurs routinely negotiate with a wide variety of 
stakeholders” (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011, p. 126). The aim of this thesis is to 
contribute to this area of research by studying the collective and individual effects of interaction 
behaviour and the network between effectual entrepreneurs. 
Following the pioneering examples of renowned entrepreneurship researchers (Davis, 
Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2007; Ganco & Agarwal, 2009; Levinthal, 1997; March, 1991) this 
thesis uses computer simulation to derive the aforementioned contributions. Given the complex 
system formed by multiple interacting entrepreneurs, computer simulations “allow scientists to 
capture much more of the complex causality present in typical entrepreneurial settings” 
(McKelvey, 2004). While computer simulation as a method is commonplace in engineering and 
natural sciences, in the social sciences – especially business studies – it has yet to become a 
prominent method of research. Following in the footsteps of Schlüter (2012), this thesis also 
aims to promote this method for three reasons. Firstly, it is especially suited for “for advancing 
theory and research on complex behaviours and systems” (Harrison, Carroll, & Carley, 2007, 
p. 1). Given the implications of intersubjectivity, entrepreneurship research in general is likely 
to focus on more complex systems in the future. Secondly, computer simulation requires a high 
degree of formalization in order to transform concepts and processes into computable 
algorithms. Making entrepreneurship theory “computable” will therefore reduce ambiguity and 
foster the clarification of theoretical concepts and constructs. Lastly, the ability to test 
hypotheses prior to empirical research would allow “traditional” research to build stronger 
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hypotheses and reduce the effort of the creation (and answering) of surveys as researchers 
would exactly know what to ask for. 
1.1 Motivation and relevance 
In her seminal paper, Sarasvathy (Sarasvathy, 2001) introduced effectuation as a radically new 
entrepreneurial decision logic. Derived from experiments with serial expert entrepreneurs, 
effectuation was quickly picked up by the scientific community and is now – after only one 
decade – seen as an important building block for the development of entrepreneurship into a 
science of the artificial (Venkataraman et al., 2012). Presented as a juxtaposition of causation-
based entrepreneurship, it is “relevant to the areas of entrepreneurship research […] because it 
questions the universal applicability of causation-based models of entrepreneurship” and 
“represents a paradigmatic shift in the way that we understand entrepreneurship” (Perry et al., 
2012, p. 1,2). Moreover, it delivers a convincing explanation for the creation of “future goods 
and services” in the “absence of current markets” (Perry et al., 2012, p. 21; orig. Venkataraman, 
1997). 
Despite its high relevance and practical usefulness, effectuation as a scientific theory is 
still in a nascent state (Perry et al., 2012) and could significantly benefit from further research 
attention (Chandler, DeTienne, McKelvie, & Mumford, 2011; Perry et al., 2012; Sarasvathy & 
Venkataraman, 2011).  
While Chandler et al. (2011) and Perry et al. (2012) propose further research suitable for 
theory at an intermediate state regarding “the relationship between effectuation and other 
established constructs” (2012, p. 12), Sarasvathy and Venkataraman (2011) propose a more 
fundamental direction of further research. Considering, that after a decade of research the 
number of basic principles/differences is still not agreed upon (Chandler et al., 2011: at least 3 
dimensions; Dew, Read, Sarasvathy, & Wiltbank, 2008: 12 differences; Perry et al., 2012: 5 
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dimensions; Sarasvathy, 2001: 4 principles), they propose to strengthen the root of effectuation 
first. Consequently, they propose to make “the [i]ntersubjective a [k]ey [u]nit of [a]nalysis” and 
explore “how entrepreneurs transform bits and pieces of current realities into valuable new 
opportunities through productive interaction with others” (both 2011, p. 126). While initial 
(meta-)studies suggest that the effectual partnering approach has a significantly positive effect 
on performance (Read, Song, & Smit, 2009), the multi-actor mechanics at work and the effect 
of individual behaviour or the impact of network shape have not been clarified yet. 
A review of available descriptions of the effectuation process (Dew et al., 2008; 
Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b) reveals a rather “egocentric” interpretation of intersubjectivity: 
while “the effectuator” single-handedly manages uncertain situations, the other parties are 
merely “stakeholders” and assume a rather passive role. This, however, contrasts the idea of 
“partnering” and “co-creation” as described in Sarasvathy’s initial study (2001). Therefore, a 
review of the interaction between similarly active individuals seems appropriate. In conclusion, 
while aspiring to become an important building block of future entrepreneurship theory, 
effectuation requires significant research effort, especially regarding the impact of interaction 
including behaviour and networks. 
In addition to the relevance regarding the advancement of the effectuation theory, this 
thesis is also relevant from a methodological point of view. All currently available publications 
regarding effectuation and the overwhelming majority of studies concerning entrepreneurship 
in general neglect the utilization of computer simulations. In engineering and natural sciences 
on the other hand, the use of computer simulation became a commodity decades ago (Harrison 
et al., 2007). Prototypes of new machinery are stress-tested in simulations prior to 
manufacturing. Measurements in physical experiments differing from simulation data are 
usually the point of origin for theory advancements. In the social sciences, dedicated articles 
that promote the utilization of computer simulation and giving an introduction to the topic are 
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published in top journals, e.g., Academy of Management Review or Journal of Business 
Venturing (Davis et al., 2007; Harrison et al., 2007; McKelvey, 2004). However, examples of 
actual application of this method are rare, letting the potential of this method lie fallow. 
Computer simulation is “a powerful methodology for advancing theory and research on 
complex behaviours and systems” (Harrison et al., 2007, p. 1). The fully observable nature of 
computer programs allows for data collection at a level of detail and volume beyond empirical 
feasibility (Davis et al., 2007). The combination of repeatability and simple adjustment of 
parameters facilitates the analysis of boundary conditions simply impossible with other research 
methods. Combining these unique features provides a methodology that enables to go beyond 
mere dependency statements and to understand why and how an input parameter impacts the 
output. Taking the nascent state and the complex nature of intersubjective processes into 
account, computer simulation should provide an effective method to advance the understanding 
of effectuation theory. 
1.2 Research framework and research questions 
The research deficits are organised in a research framework as presented in Figure 1. Using a 
computer simulation as core for all research endeavours, this thesis delivers its contributions by 
using input parameters and measurements on three levels: effectual entrepreneur, network, and 
opportunity. The simulation core accepts varying interaction behaviour, initial network 
configurations, and levels of environmental complexity. The simulation allows for 
measurements on multiple levels at each simulation step enabling longitudinal observations on 
a large number of actors – a capability unmatched by (most) empirical methods.  
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Figure 1: Overview of research framework 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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(Dew et al., 2008; Dew, Read, Sarasvathy, & Wiltbank, 2010; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b) 
emphasizing different parts such as the iterative character, the inclusion of stakeholders, and 
the transformation of opportunities. While these overviews exemplified the different aspects of 
effectuation very well, a unified process model is yet to be created. Effectuation research would 
benefit from such a unified process model for multiple reasons. 
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“made”, “created”, “found”, or “discovered” (Alvarez & Barney, 2013; Shane, 2012; 
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2012, p. 28) or to “Mak[e] the Intersubjective a Key Unit of Analysis” (Sarasvathy & 
Venkataraman, 2011, p. 126) requires a precise process description and terminology as a 
vantage point for a deeper understanding of its parts. 
Thirdly, a precisely defined process model is essential to “transform entrepreneurship 
from a social science to a science of the artificial” (Venkataraman et al., 2012, p. 21) as 
proposed by leading entrepreneurship researchers. The level of precision required for artificial 
science is likely to meet the requirements for advanced research methodology like computer 
simulation. A well-defined repertoire of processes and parameters is a key requirement for the 
analysis of complex multi-actor interactions. 
The formal model derived to address this research deficit forms the basis of this thesis 
and is used in all three papers. A first algorithmic representation of Schlüter et al. (2011) 
focusing primarily on the exchange of pre-commitments served as a venturing point. 
 
Research deficit 2: The impact of effectual interaction behaviour on the shaping of emerging 
markets is unclear 
Effectuation has been proposed as a decision logic for the creation of new markets for 
new ideas (Dew et al., 2010; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b; Sarasvathy, 2003). A key instrument 
for both effectual (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b) and non-effectual market creation alike (Hite, 
2005; Jack, 2010; Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010) is the use of networks. A large body of 
literature indicates the positive effects of networking (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003) for 
entrepreneurs and initial empirical findings also support this view for effectuation (Read, Song, 
et al., 2009). However, the reasons how and why effectuation benefits from the interaction with 
others in networks remain opaque. The way how new ideas are disseminated in order to shape 
these emerging markets, as well as the impact that partners and the creator of an idea can have, 
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are yet to be revealed. Understanding how ideas propagate, why partners are important, and 
what the limits of influence are, is essential for making effectuation a more reliable toolkit for 
entrepreneurs. Moreover, these mechanisms need to be understood in order to make effectuation 
a crucial part of entrepreneurship as a “science of the artificial” (Venkataraman et al., 2012). 
Effectuation as an individual decision logic is concerned with three entities that impact success 
and therefore need to be investigated: the process itself, the “network”, and the individual 
entrepreneur. 
Firstly, the impact of the effectual interaction process is not yet sufficiently understood. 
Dew, Sarasvathy et al. (Dew et al., 2008; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b) provided a process-based 
scheme of effectuation: Dew et al. (2010) enhanced the process by describing transformation 
methods used by effectual entrepreneurs. Both processes were observed and described on an 
individual level. However, the impact of individual intersubjective interaction on a macro, i.e. 
market level is not properly understood yet. Secondly, “the network” has countlessly been 
recognised as a key success factor in entrepreneurship (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). Effectual 
interaction however focuses on intersubjective interaction, i.e. interaction with individual 
partners rather than “the network”. Therefore, the impact of and the reasons for successful 
shaping of emerging markets through interaction behaviour of network partners remain largely 
unknown. Lastly, the individual entrepreneur obviously plays an important role in the 
effectuation process. However, the extent to which an individual can actually shape an 
emerging market on its own is unclear. 
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The first paper therefore engages research deficits associated with the aforementioned 
entities. Through three research questions it aims to shed light on the impact of process, 
network, and individual entrepreneur:  
(1) How does the effectuation process contribute to the shaping of emerging markets? 
(2) How do effectuators in the network influence the shaping of emerging markets? 
(3) To which extent can the creator of a new idea influence the shaping of emerging  
 markets in its favour? 
 
Research deficit 3: The impact of position in and shape of effectual networks requires further 
research attention 
The positive impact of a favourable network position and shape for entrepreneurs has 
been confirmed by a large body of literature (see Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). The underlying 
reasons for successful effectual partnering, however, are yet to be determined (Read, Song, et 
al., 2009). Moreover, “[a]lmost the entirety of social networks research takes networks as 
mostly given and outside the control of human action” (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011, p. 
126), an assumption in direct contradiction with the claim of effectuation of an endogenous 
environment (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a). This contradiction warrants a closer look into the 
mechanisms that let effectuators benefit from networks and actively shape them to fulfil their 
needs. 
With respect to network shape, a widely recognised entrepreneurial networking theory 
(Burt, 1992) proposes to actively separate partners from each other in order to become a “tertius 
gaudens” and profit from brokering between the separated parties. This approach, however, 
significantly differs from the inclusive partnering and co-creation approach of effectuation that 
is rather following the approach of “tertius iungens” (Obstfeld, 2005) of bringing partners 
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together for their benefit and participate later. Consequently, a thorough review of the impact 
of network shape as well as the reasons behind it is required to understand the reasons for 
success of effectuation despite the contradiction of “conventional wisdom”. This includes the 
impact of the network shape on the entrepreneur as well as the impact of the entrepreneur on 
the network shape.  
Focusing on the impact of network position and shape as well as the Burt/Obstfeld 
network development contradiction, the second paper investigates three research questions: 
(1) How does the network position of an effectuator impact venture performance over time? 
(2) How does the shape of an effectuator’s network impact venture performance over time? 
(3) How do effectuators shape their social networks over time? 
 
Research deficit 4: The interaction of opportunities and effectual entrepreneurs remains 
opaque 
In their seminal review of entrepreneurship as a science of the artificial, Venkataraman et 
al. (2012) emphasize the importance of opportunities beyond a mere object developed by 
entrepreneurs. Instead, they review the findings on the “individual-opportunity nexus” (2012, 
p. 28). Initially proposed by Venkataraman (Venkataraman, 1997), the individual-opportunity-
nexus proposes the joint analysis of individual and opportunity as individuals usually choose 
opportunities that suit them for various reasons. Neglecting this leads to an incomplete 
understanding of the entrepreneurship phenomenon (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). 
Consequently, Shane and Venkataraman (2000) propose to define entrepreneurship as the 
“examination of how, by whom, and with what effects opportunities to create future goods and 
services are discovered, evaluated, and exploited” rather than as “who the entrepreneur is and 
what he or she does” (both Shane & Venkataraman, 2000, p. 218). Venkataraman et al. therefore 
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propose further research “looking deeper within simple and direct relationships […] between 
individual and opportunity (inner and outer environment)” (Venkataraman et al., 2012, p. 28). 
The deficit of joint research on opportunity and individual is especially critical for 
effectuation: the means-principle emphasizes the selection of opportunities which fit “[w]ho I 
am” and “[w]hat I know” (Sarasvathy, 2001, p. 253). Moreover, effectual opportunity creation 
is usually influenced by multiple stakeholders in an iterative process. The development of an 
opportunity is therefore a constant negotiation of personal and other preferences, making it an 
even more complicated – and less understood – process. A key driver of these complicated 
negotiations is “environmental complexity” the number of possible combinations of individual 
preferences in a joint product (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a). While effectuation teaches to 
“embrace contingencies” (Sarasvathy, 2001), i.e. profit from stakeholders with unusual 
preferences, the impact of environmental complexity and the interplay of individual, 
opportunity, and environmental complexity are yet to be disentangled. 
Focusing on the aspects of environmental complexity as well as the joint development of 
opportunities over time, the third paper engages the aforementioned deficits by investigating 
two research questions: 
(1) How does environmental complexity influence the creation of opportunities by effectual  
 entrepreneurs? 
(2) How do opportunities evolve over time under varying effectual stakeholder behaviour? 
  
12 
1.3 Aspired contribution 
This thesis aims to contribute to literature in four ways. Firstly, it presents a formal model 
of the effectuation process with a detailed review of the interaction of effectuators and 
stakeholders/market participants. Secondly, it deepens the understanding of effectuation theory 
by studying the impact of intersubjective behaviour. Thirdly, it introduces network theory, 
social network analysis, and theory on triads to effectuation. Lastly, it contributes through the 
utilization of computer simulation. As indicated in Table 1, the formal model and the computer 
simulation methodology form the basis of all papers. The analysis of behaviour, network, 
environment, and opportunity creation were executed in different studies. 
All research papers contain a detailed description of the literature on effectual processes 
and the description of the formal model core that is enhanced with additional measurement 
routines tailored to the respective research endeavour. While the formalization is a contribution 
in itself, the author is confident that future research will benefit from increased formality as it 
”enables the elaboration of rough, basic […] theory that is often derived from inductive cases 
or formal modelling into logically precise and comprehensive theory.” (Davis et al., 2007, p. 
481). Moreover, the formalised model “provides a different perspective on a research problem, 
and this fresh look often proves insightful in and of itself” (Harrison et al., 2007, p. 1232). 
The first paper aspires to contribute to the understanding of the spread of new ideas in 
effectual communities. The formal process model is used to investigate the spread of new ideas 
over time and the effect of transformation methods often applied by effectual entrepreneurs. 
Moreover, the paper investigates the impact of individual and collective interaction behaviour 
on the spread of ideas in effectual networks. To contribute a deeper understanding of the reasons 
that drive the spread of new ideas, the study observes the spread of one particular idea and 
records the reasons for the dismissal of this idea in each interaction of all participants for 
varying individual and collective interaction behaviours. The paper contributes a deeper 
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understanding of effectual partnering processes and provides an updated picture on the 
importance of partners regarding their behaviour in negotiations and in the propagation of new 
ideas. 
Table 1: Contribution to literature by paper 
Contribution Paper I Paper II Paper III 
Development of formal process and interaction 
model 
   
Implementation of formal model as computer 
simulation 
   
Impact of collective vs. individual interaction 
behaviour on spread of ideas in networks 
 
  
Analysis of the reasons for containment of ideas and 
the impact on occurrence of interaction behaviour 
 
  
Impact of network position and shape    
Classification of effectual triad behaviour (tertius 
gaudens vs. tertius iungens) 
 
 
 
Impact of environmental complexity and interplay 
of complexity and interaction behaviour 
  
 
Development stages of effectual opportunities    
 
The second paper aspires to contribute to the understanding of the effect of networks. The 
formal model is enhanced with routines to analyse the agents’ network positions and shapes. 
The paper discusses the impact of network position while treating the network as endogenous, 
i.e., changeable to the entrepreneur (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011). In addition the well-
known concept of “tertius gaudens” (Burt, 2004) – a strategy to actively keep network contacts 
apart to benefit from arbitrage and brokering – is discussed and contrasted with the concept of 
“tertius iungens” (Obstfeld, 2005) – a strategy to actively introduce contacts to each other and 
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benefit from increased information flow in the network. The study contributes a classification 
of the effectuation theory according to the gaudens/iungens concepts and provides insights on 
the benefits of the inclusive effectual partnering approach. In addition, a well-known measure 
for network shape (constraint) is normalised and applied to identify effectuation-friendly 
network shapes. 
In the third paper, the formal model is applied to study the effectuation process from an 
opportunity-based perspective. The study contributes an analysis of opportunity creation 
performance under varying levels of environmental complexity and varying intersubjective 
behaviours. This contributes to the deeper understanding of effectual interaction behaviour and 
proposes behavioural requirements especially for complex environments. In addition, the 
emergence of opportunities is observed from an opportunity-based perspective. This change of 
perspective allows for strongly requested (Venkataraman et al., 2012) and unique insights on 
the finalization of opportunities. It proposes a previously unobserved order of phases that an 
opportunity passes prior to finalization. 
In the triangle of contribution to method, theory, and context (2008) this thesis clearly 
emphasizes the method and theory dimensions. The application of computer simulation is an 
underrepresented method in entrepreneurship research and the ultimate goal of this thesis is 
further substantiation of effectuation theory. With respect to the “contribution continuum” 
ranging from “1) Straight replication” to “8) Develop a new theory that predicts a new 
phenomenon” this thesis ranges somewhere between “4) Integrative review” and “6) 
Identification of a new phenomenon”: the review of literature related to the effectuation process 
and its formalization qualify as an integrative review of effectuation literature. The proposition 
of a three-staged opportunity finalization or the testing of effectuation theory under boundary 
conditions leads to propositions not yet covered by effectuation literature and comes close to 
the identification of new phenomena.
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2 Theoretical and conceptual background 
The field of effectuation research is relatively young. Firstly mentioned in 2001 (Sarasvathy, 
2001), it is still in a nascent/intermediate state (Perry et al., 2012). This thesis aims to deepen 
effectuation theory focusing on one of the most critical avenues: intersubjective interaction 
(Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011). This chapter will provide a conceptual background and 
introduction to literature on the two main theories that were used in this thesis: the theory of 
effectuation and the analysis of social networks. The review of social network theory is 
particularly important in the context of effectuation. On the one hand, effectuation relies heavily 
on interaction. Consequently, a “good network” might turn out beneficial for an entrepreneur 
using effectual logic. On the other hand, social network researchers presented their idea of how 
entrepreneurs should use social networks in the past (Burt, 1992; Jack, 2005). These ideas, 
however, contradict the effectuation process to varying extents, hence, warranting a review of 
these theories from an effectual perspective. 
2.1 Effectuation 
Since its introduction in 2001, effectuation research has made significant progress. This chapter 
will provide a thorough introduction and classification, discuss its key principles and the 
environment it was designed for. In addition, effectuation is investigated from a process 
perspective which serves as a foundation for the application of computer simulation. 
2.1.1 Introduction and classification 
Effectuation is a control-based decision logic designed for the use in highly uncertain 
environments. The term “control-based” refers to the work of Wiltbank et al. (Wiltbank & Dew, 
2006) who classified entrepreneurial approaches with respect to the degree they emphazise 
“control” and “prediction”. Control in this context means seeing the market as endogenous and 
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actively shaping future outcomes. Prediction on the other hand refers to the use of planning 
tools in order to predict future outcomes. As depicted in Figure 2: Control-Prediction matrix, 
effectuation is classified as strongly emphasizing control. In her seminal paper, Sarasvathy 
(2001) introduced effectuation as a juxtaposition of “causation”, i.e., prediction-based 
entrepreneurship. The focus on control and the rejection of prediction delineates effectuation 
from most other entrepreneurship techniques. 
Figure 2: Control-Prediction matrix 
 
 
Source: (Wiltbank & Dew, 2006, fig. 2) 
Effectuation has few theoretical prerequisites: besides the assumption of docility 
(Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b), effectuation does not assume trust or certain personality traits 
(Sarasvathy & Dew, 2008a). Effectuation is teachable: principles and processes can be applied 
by any entrepreneur; no further skills or genius is required. Effectuation is practical: its 
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principles and processes were derived from successful serial entrepreneurs, not from a 
theoretical model. 
Especially the last property leads to a noticeable downside of effectuation: effectuation is 
not complete. It consists of best practices for entrepreneurial action under high uncertainty, but 
its theory is currently not necessarily exhaustive or self-contained. While research has identified 
initial relevant dimensions (Chandler et al., 2011), it is not a self-contained theory with a set of 
axioms and propositions (Sarasvathy, 2001), such as, e.g., transaction cost theory. 
2.1.2 Key principles 
Both the effectuation process and its principles were presented as a juxtaposition of “classic” 
prediction-based entrepreneurship approaches, which Sarasvathy referred to as “causation” 
(2001). The guiding principles of effectuation (see Table 2) exemplify the inherently different 
approaches of effectuation and causation. They are referred to as “Pilot in a plane”, “Bird-in-
hand”, “Affordable loss”, “Crazy quilt”, and “Lemonade principle”. 
Pilot in a plane refers to the different approach towards future outcomes. Causation-
based entrepreneurship approaches regard the market development as given and proposes to 
predict the future in order to favourably position their enterprise in this future. Effectuation, 
however, regards the market development as influenceable and proposes to control future 
outcomes by controlling the market creation through action – much like a pilot that refuses to 
trust the autopilot and takes control. 
Bird in hand characterises the different approaches regarding available means and goals. 
While prediction-based entrepreneurship proposes to define a goal first and acquire required 
resources subsequently, effectuation proposes to use available means including resources and 
personal preferences as a starting point for venturing. These means should then be used to let 
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the goal / the opportunity emerge over time. The proverbial bird in hand refers to the available 
means and the unmentioned pigeon on the roof to a goal. 
Affordable loss emphasises the alternative investment decision rule of effectuation. 
While prediction-based entrepreneurs usually choose the opportunity that promises the highest 
expected returns, effectuation proposes to only pursue opportunities whose loss is affordable in 
case of failure to ensure long term survival in an uncertain market. 
Crazy quilt refers to a patchwork quilt that is woven by stitching together pieces of cloth 
that do not seem to fit, but create a unique and useful outcome. Consequently, effectuation 
proposes to see other market participants as potential partners that can help to jointly create and 
define a market. Causation usually sees other market participants as a threat that needs to be 
analysed, e.g., using the SWOT-approach. This principle also exemplifies the differing attitudes 
towards networking: effectuation implies a rather dense network that facilitates the exchange 
of ideas. Causation proposes ego-centric networks to gather resources in order to pursue a 
predefined goal. 
Lemonade principle: “If life gives you lemons, make lemonade!” As the English 
proverb, effectuation proposes to embrace contingencies when they present themselves. 
Causation, however, calls for action to get “back on track” in the event of unforeseen events in 
order mitigate these contingencies. 
While these five principles are widely accepted in effectuation literature, they are neither 
universal nor proven to be exhaustive. In scale development, Chandler et al. (2011) propose 
slightly different dimensions: “experimentation”, “affordable loss”, “flexibility”, and “pre-
commitments”. Brettel et al. (Brettel, Mauer, Engelen, & Küpper, 2012) focus on “means”, 
“affordable loss”, “pre-commitments”, and “contingencies”. Dew et al. (2008) list 12 
differences of effectuation and causation. While in line with Sarasvathy’s initial principles, they 
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extend them with respect to individual action. Perry et al. (2012) propose research along the 
dimensions mentioned in Table 2. However, they differ from the initially four principles 
“affordable loss”, “partnering”, “contingencies”, and “control” in Sarasvathy’s initial study 
(2001). Altogether, these findings underline the nascent state of effectuation theory and 
highlight the need for consistency and more precise terminology. 
Table 2: Principles of effectuation and causation 
Source: (Dew, Read, Sarasvathy, & Wiltbank, 2009, p. 290 Table 1) 
The inherently different approaches and their explicit juxtaposition are not limited to key 
principles. As depicted in Figure 3 also the application to domains like marketing result in 
opposing approaches to the same target: “Classic causation” follows the well-known approach 
to start with “market definition”, “segmentation”, “targeting”, and “positioning” to reach the 
customer. Effectuation, however, proposes to define multiple markets, add partners and 
segments, define possible customers, and identify these customers afterwards. 
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Figure 3: Causation vs. effectuation in market creation 
 
 
Source: (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a, fig. 1) 
2.1.3 Effectual problem space 
Sarasvathy depicts effectuation as an approach to introduce “new products” for “new markets” 
(Sarasvathy, 2003, fig. 1). Consequently, effectuation is designed to work in environments of 
high uncertainty. More precisely, the effectual problem space is characterised by Knightian 
uncertainty, Marchian goal ambiguity, and environmental isotropy (Dew et al., 2008). 
Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921) describes a level of uncertainty that does neither allow to 
estimate all possible outcomes of a decision nor to estimate the likelihood of their occurrence. 
Marchian goal ambiguity implies that “participants in a relationship not only do not know each 
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other’s motives; they are not quite sure of their own future preferences either” (Sarasvathy & 
Dew, 2005a, p. 401). Environmental isotropy “refers to the fact that in decisions and actions 
involving uncertain future consequences it is not always clear ex ante which pieces of 
information are worth paying attention to and which not” (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b, p. 539). 
These considerations can be seen as a fact of life and would most likely not be noteworthy 
to such great detail for empirical work. As this thesis uses computer simulation as research 
method, these environmental conditions become highly important as they have to be 
implemented in the formal model of effectuation. Otherwise important prerequisites for the 
effectual design space would not be met, thus, invalidating the simulation results. 
Consequently, the formal model used in all three papers pays close attention to the correct 
implementation of all three preconditions. 
2.1.4 Effectuation from a process perspective 
Besides guiding principles, understanding effectuation from a process-perspective is imperative 
for the use of computer simulation. Without a process scheme, there is not much left to actually 
simulate. Effectuation literature provides three key sources for the creation of an effectual 
process model: “the two dynamic cycles” (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b), the “behavioral theory 
of the entrepreneurial firm” (Dew et al., 2008), and the description of effectual transformation 
processes (Dew et al., 2010). 
“The two dynamic cycles” (see Figure 4) is the first process description of effectuation. 
Effectuation is presented as a process that iteratively enhances a project’s resource bases and 
drives artifact finalization through accumulation of stakeholder constraints at the same time. 
Moreover, interaction with other individuals and the negotiation of pre-commitments is 
prominently represented and part of each process cycle. 
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Figure 4: The two dynamic cycles of effectuation 
 
Source: (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b, fig. 1) 
The behavioural theory of the entrepreneurial firm as portrayed in Figure 5 enriches 
the initial process by explicitly associating process steps with theory/principles and the 
introduction of a key concept: docility. Initially conceptualised by Simon (1990), docility 
“refers to the tendency to depend on suggestions, recommendations, persuasion, and 
information obtained through social channels as a major basis for choice“ (Simon, 1993, p. 
156). Simon added that “[w]e are highly susceptible to social influence and persuasion, 
susceptibility that I will call docility. I use the term ‘docility’ here in its sense of teachability or 
educatability – not in its alterative sense of passivity or meekness” (Simon, 1997, p. 41). 
Unfortunately, despite the theoretical importance no efforts regarding the development of a 
docility construct or scale for empirical research have been made yet. 
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Figure 5: The behavioural theory of the entrepreneurial firm 
 
Source: (Dew et al., 2008, fig. 1) 
Effectual transformations are a rather recent contribution to the process development 
of effectuation. The overview of Dew et al. (2010) presents mechanisms of opportunity 
development beyond negotiation with new stakeholders. As presented in Table 3 these 
transformations are based on best practices of expert serial entrepreneurs and not well integrated 
into effectuation theory. Those mechanisms are both invoked by external stimuli (e.g., 
“Deletion and supplementation”, "Free associating”) and internal demand for improvement 
(e.g., “Manipulation”, “Deformation”).  
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Table 3: Effectual transformation mechanisms 
Transformation mechanism Description 
Deletion and supplementation This is the closest to the process of recombination 
Composition and 
decomposition 
The central idea here is reorganizing material that is 
already there 
Exaptation The basic idea is that a technique that was originally 
selected for one trait, owes its later success and survival to 
another trait which it happens to possess 
Manipulation Manipulation involves market or product transformations 
analogous to physically inverting, mirroring, twisting and 
turning something inside out 
Deformation Treating the original idea as an elastic platform from 
which other business ideas are launched 
Localization, regionalization, 
globalization operations 
Transforming the scope of the market by narrowing or 
enlarging it 
Prototyping Involves using the original product market as a prototype 
and then transforming it into a different product that shares 
the same basic features of the prototype 
Stereotyping Use of certain simplified or standardized transformation 
processes that lack originality or inventiveness 
Free associating Transformations that appear to be essentially 
idiosyncratic, i.e., based on the experts’ prior knowledge 
and experience 
Source: (Dew et al., 2010, Chapter 5) 
2.1.5 Current state of effectuation research 
Since its introduction in 2001, effectuation research has made significant progress towards 
taking the theory from a nascent to an intermediate level (Perry et al., 2012). What began as 
thought experiments (Sarasvathy, 2001) quickly turned into theory development (Sarasvathy & 
Dew, 2005b), process definition (Dew et al., 2008) and refinement (Dew et al., 2010). In the 
meantime adjacent theory was introduced and discussed, e.g., trust (Goel & Karri, 2006), and 
Austrian economics3 (Chiles, Bluedorn, & Gupta, 2007). The notion of prediction/control-
                                              
3 Austrian economics: economic phenomena are the result of individual choices 
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based approaches (Wiltbank & Dew, 2006) allowed a proper classification and showed 
similarities with and distinctions from other entrepreneurial approaches. In addition 
effectuation was tested empirically (Read, Song, et al., 2009; Wiltbank, Read, Dew, & 
Sarasvathy, 2009) and scale development was initiated (Brettel et al., 2012; Chandler et al., 
2011). Currently, effectuation is seen as an important building block of turning 
entrepreneurship into a science of the artificial (Venkataraman et al., 2012). 
In the following subchapters we will present the progress of effectuation research in the 
categories of conceptual and qualitative research and quantitative empirical research. 
2.1.5.1 Conceptual effectuation research 
Effectuation was first conceptualised by Sarasvathy in 2001. Enhanced versions of principles 
and process (Dew et al., 2008; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b) and additional transformation 
techniques (Dew et al., 2010) followed over time. Effectuation was conceptualised as 
prediction-based (Wiltbank & Dew, 2006) and further refined using case studies (Dew, Read, 
et al., 2009) with debatable results (Baron, 2009). Read et al. (2009) even proposed an 
application of effectuation to marketing. Given the newness of the concept, Dew et al. prepared 
an article on “What effectuation is not” (Dew, Read, Sarasvathy, & Wiltbank, n.d. submitted 
2011) to discuss and clarify important aspects of effectuation. Literature identified effectuation 
as a person-centric research approach (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011; Sarasvathy, 2004a, 
2004b) focusing on individual preferences (Dew, Sarasvathy, Read, & Wiltbank, 2009; Read 
& Sarasvathy, 2005) seeing firms rather as an instrument than a unit of research (Sarasvathy & 
Venkataraman, 2011). 
Besides conceptual development of core theory, the interaction of effectuation and other 
concepts was discussed intensely. The comparison to Austrian Economics (Chiles et al., 2007, 
2008; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2008b, 2009) and trust (Goel & Karri, 2006; Karri & Goel, 2008; 
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Sarasvathy & Dew, 2008a) led to lively debates regarding conceptual similarities and 
delineations. Concepts like innovation (Dew & Sarasvathy, 2007), organisational design 
(Sarasvathy, Dew, Read, & Wiltbank, 2008), March’s technology of foolishness (Sarasvathy & 
Dew, 2005a), and bricolage (Archer, Baker, & Mauer, 2009; Fisher, 2012), however, were 
integrated or regarded conceptually close with more ease. 
Effectuation strongly benefitted from the discussion in context of other theories. Since 
2011, effectuation is also used to contribute to other areas of research. Research regarding 
disruptive innovation (Chandra & Yang, 2011), innovation in large companies (Svensrud & 
Åsvoll, 2011), co-creation (Read & Sarasvathy, 2012), marketing (Mort, 2012), and identity 
(Nielsen & Lassen, 2012) now draw from effectuation rather than informing it. 
With respect to conceptual research, scholars are currently discussing how to proceed in 
the future. The latest research is focusing on the general direction which effectuation research 
should take (Perry et al., 2012; Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011) and how to integrate it into 
general entrepreneurship to move forward towards a science of the artificial (Sarasvathy, 2003; 
Venkataraman et al., 2012) – a designable approach that can be tailored to specific 
entrepreneurial situations. 
2.1.5.2 Quantitative empirical research 
While theory development – informed by case studies – started shortly after the introduction of 
effectuation, the first quantitative study on effectuation was not publicised until 2009. Wiltbank 
et al. (2009) analysed the impact of control- and prediction-based control strategies in business 
angel investing using scenario-based questioning. In the same year, Read et al. (2009) presented 
a meta-analysis of the performance impact of effectual behaviours per principle (“means”, 
“partnership”, affordable loss”, “contingency”).  
27 
The development of an effectuation scale started even later. In 2011 Chandler (Chandler 
et al., 2011) presented a four-dimensional scale containing one dimension (flexibility) not 
explicitly mentioned in effectuation theory. A year later, Brettel et al. (Brettel et al., 2012) 
contributed another four-dimensional scale containing only dimensions explicitly mentioned in 
theory. The study reveals a positive performance effect of effectuation in highly uncertain 
environments, i.e., in R&D departments. 
Overall, the intensity of effectuation research is impressive. However, leading researchers 
are now realising that further refinement of the effectuation logic requires a deeper 
understanding of effectuation theory and effectual behaviour as well as empirical analysis on a 
level closer to intermediate than nascent state research (Perry et al., 2012) . This thesis aims at 
contributing to the former by integrating available effectuation theory and exploring the 
mechanisms at work. 
2.2 Social networks 
The interaction of effectual entrepreneurs through social networks is a key concept of this 
thesis. Thus, an introduction to social networks and social network analysis is presented here. 
The concept of a “social network” as a web of ties between individuals was developed by the 
British anthropologists Barnes (1954), Bott (1955), and Mitchell (1969). Since its introduction, 
the methods developed by Mitchel using mathematical graph theory have been successfully 
applied to research areas as diverse as mobility, urbanisation, politics, and belief systems (see 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The basic concepts of social network analysis used in this thesis 
were drawn from the definitive book on social network analysis by Wasserman and Faust 
(1994). 
In entrepreneurship, the analysis of social network has been used successfully since the 
1990s (Greve & Salaff, 2003; Hansen, 1995; Larson & Starr, 1993). A recent review (Hoang & 
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Antoncic, 2003) reveals significant progress since then dividing the field into the categories 
“Content”, “Government”, and “Structure”. With respect to structure, Hoang and Antoncic 
identified two key measures to characterise entrepreneurial social networks: position within the 
network and shape of the network. While more current literature identified further beneficial 
uses of entrepreneurial networks (see Jack, 2010) and even developed a rough industry-level 
development cycle (Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010, fig. 1), “theory building is [still] a challenge 
for entrepreneurship researchers” (Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010, p. 34). Effectuation on the 
other side offers a process model to build and maintain networks from an individual perspective. 
Therefore, studying the effect of social networks using effectuation processes provides a novel 
perspective for entrepreneurial social network research altogether. 
Within the field of network structure, two prominent theories are often employed as 
research paradigms: position and shape. Position refers to the position of an individual within 
a social network. Position is usually measured as degree centrality, i.e. the number of social 
contacts an individual maintains. Shape is a more advanced construct as is does not only regard 
direct ties but also the network of ties between known contacts, i.e., indirect ties. Burt (1992) 
introduced the concept of “structural holes” referring to holes in the social fabric – much like 
electron holes (Weller, 1967) in solid state physics. Moreover, he introduced “constraint” as a 
measure to what extent an actor can benefit from a “holey” network shape. Burt’s work also 
subsumes Granovetter’s often cited idea of the importance of weak, i.e., less used, ties 
(Granovetter, 1973) under his theoretically and mathematically enhanced “structural holes” 
paradigm. 
The subsequent subchapters will give an introduction to the paradigms of position and 
shape and highlight the contradiction with current thinking on effectuation. 
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2.2.1 Analysis of network position 
A large variety of beneficial effects has been attributed to a favourable network position in 
literature. Most findings, however, entertain a common idea: a beneficial network position 
allows access to resources beyond the entrepreneur’s direct reach. A favourable position 
increases quantity (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Batjargal, 2003) and variety (Greve & Salaff, 2003; 
Greve, 1995) of available resources. Consequently successful acquisition of funding (Vanacker, 
Manigart, Meuleman, & Sels, 2011; Zimmer & Aldrich, 1987), workforce (Freeman, 1999), 
and information (Semrau & Werner, 2013) is facilitated. Besides tangible resources such as 
money and goods, intangible resources accessed through networks include information (Birley, 
1985), emotional support (Brüderl & Preisendörfer, 1998), production capacity, and 
distribution channels (Brown & Butler, 1995). While the network is mostly seen as an 
exogenous resource, some studies also analysed the development of networks as a consequence 
of entrepreneurial activity (Aldrich & Reese, 1993; Larson & Starr, 1993; Slotte-Kock & 
Coviello, 2010). However, they focus on market-level development and leave out the actual 
development mechanisms. 
Studies regarding network position usually argue that improved resource access enables 
entrepreneurs employing prediction-based logics to gather better intelligence on customer 
preferences and to ease organization of exploration and exploitation of these preferences 
(Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). Control-based entrepreneurship depends on resources as well. 
However, it first and foremost employs them to shape an emerging market collaborating with 
known contacts which provide ideas as well as resources and are part of the emerging market 
themselves (Dew et al., 2008). Consequently, it is unclear whether more contacts always equal 
greater success given the higher individual involvement and need for interaction with each 
contact or stakeholder. Latest empirical effectuation research reveals an inverted-U-shaped 
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relationship of position (degree centrality) and venture performance (Heuven, Semrau, 
Kraaijenbrink, & Sigmund, 2011). 
Network position is usually measured as centrality. Wasserman and Faust (1994) list 
degree, betweenness, and closeness centrality as the most common measures. Moreover, they 
propose the simultaneous use of all three to ensure the validity of findings. 
Degree centrality denotes the number of known contacts. To compare multiple degree 
centralities, the measure is usually normalised by the total number of actors within a network. 
Size was defined by Hoang & Antoncic as “the number of direct links between a focal 
actor and other actors” (2003, p. 171), which is equal to non-normalised degree centrality. 
Closeness centrality “focuses on how close an actor is to all the other actors in the set of 
actors. The idea is that an actor is central if it can quickly interact with all others.” (Wasserman 
& Faust, 1994, p. 183). Closeness centrality, therefore, measures the average path length to 
other actors. It is defined as the sum of the length of all geodesics, i.e. shortest paths between 
focal actor and other actors. The measure is usually calculated as the reciprocal of this sum. 
Betweenness centrality measures the centrality of an actor with respect to information 
flow. Assuming that information usually takes the shortest path through a network, betweenness 
centrality calculates how many shortest paths an actor is part of. Here, a path consists of existing 
ties between actors. Betweenness centrality notes all shortest paths between all network 
participants and counts the number of paths the actor under study is part of. 
2.2.2 Analysis of network shape 
Literature reviews on entrepreneurial social networks (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Slotte-Kock 
& Coviello, 2010) identify two key theories with respect to network shape: “weak ties” 
(Granovetter, 1973) and “structural holes” (Burt, 1992). Granovetter proposed that “bridging 
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weak ties”, i.e., loose ties with acquaintances otherwise unrelated to other immediate contacts 
are likely to provide non-redundant information. Granovetter’s ideas were mathematically 
improved and extended by Burt’s structural holes paradigm. Structural holes describe the 
absence of network ties between two actors. Building on Simmel’s work on triads (Simmel, 
1896) – network configurations of three actors – Burt proposed for entrepreneurs to keep their 
networks efficient – keep acquaintances separate in order to profit from brokering and arbitrage 
– and effective – focusing on contacts with many structural holes (Burt, 1992). While Burt’s 
theory is empirically supported (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Krackhardt, 1995; 
Zaheer & McEvily, 1999), the implied behavioural strategy called “tertius gaudens” contradicts 
the inclusive ideas of effectual social networking warranting further investigation.  
Obstfeld (2005) proposed an alternative networking approach called “tertius iungens”. 
Revisiting Simmel’s work on triads, Obstfeld identified this alternative approach that actively 
closes structural holes and benefits from collaboration and the emergence of innovation through 
co-creation. This approach is conceptually much closer to effectuation. While both concepts 
and resulting network shapes have merits, it is unclear how a network shaped in (dis)favour of 
a tertius gaudens affects effectual venture performance. 
Burt proposes two key measures that will be used in this thesis to measure the shape of 
networks: efficiency and constraint. 
Efficiency4(Burt, 1992, p. 53) is the degree to which ties of an agent are non-redundant. Thus, 
in an efficient network, an agent is acquainted with contacts that do not know each other but 
are well connected themselves. In a network with low efficiency, all known contacts only 
provide access to agents that can also be reached through other ties as well, rendering the 
network largely redundant. Burt argues that entrepreneurs benefit from an efficient network. 
                                              
4 Definitions of efficiency and constraint taken from (Jansen, 2013) 
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Constraint is a measure that captures the extent to which acquainted contacts impede the 
exploitation of structural holes. Whereas efficiency measures the extent to which direct ties 
are redundant, constraint measures the degree to which contacts are acquainted. Burt proposes 
that the acquaintance between known contacts – the absence of a structural hole between them 
– impedes the application of arbitrage and competition for information. Therefore, a low 
constraint level indicates an abundance of structural holes resulting in many opportunities for 
arbitrage and competition for information or resources. 
Burt defines Ci as the measure of constraint for actor i as indicated in equation 1. 
 
 









ji jiq
qjiqiji pppC
2
        (1)
 
The term pij represents the relative share of energy actor i invested in the relationship with j. 
For simplicity, we assume that actors divide their energy equally among known contacts. 
Altogether, the literature concerned with social networks of entrepreneurs reveals two 
key findings that warrant a closer investigation: firstly, it focuses on input-output relationships, 
thus neglecting the impact of network position and shape on the underlying mechanisms. The 
disconnect of individual decisions and their consequences for the network requires further 
investigation, especially for effectuation as a decision logic focusing on individual action. 
Revealing the individual mechanisms at work and linking them to network-level consequences 
could enable a more informed, hence, more successful application of it. Secondly, leading social 
network researchers propose a networking strategy based on keeping network contacts separate 
(Burt, 1992, 2004). This starkly contradicts the inclusive character of effectuation (Sarasvathy 
& Dew, 2005a). While there may be more than one strategy to benefit from social networks, a 
review of these contradicting approaches is necessary to deepen the understanding of the 
beneficial use of social networks by effectuators. 
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3 Research methodology 
Simulation is a legitimate, disciplined, and powerful approach to scientific investigation, 
with the potential to make significant contributions to management theory. 
         (Harrison et al., 2007, p. 1243) 
This thesis uses agent-based computer simulation as a research method. While computer 
simulation became a commodity in natural and engineering sciences decades ago, in social 
sciences this research method is still underrepresented – despite multiple propositions of its 
adoption in the last decade. Thus, this thesis promotes simplicity and usefulness of computer 
simulation in this and subsequent research efforts. A detailed introduction of the employed 
formal model can be found in each paper in part B. Moreover, appendix A gives a quick 
overview on the structure of the implementation. 
3.1 Introduction to computer simulation 
Computer simulation is a research method that uses computer-executed formal representations 
of real-world systems to derive novel insights (Harrison et al., 2007). Most common uses 
include prediction (weather forecast), optimization (production capacity of factory), and 
discovery (identification of novel effectuation theory). A formal model is a stylised version of 
a real-world system that contains algorithmic representations of all key processes and formal 
data representations of relevant real-world objects (Davis et al., 2007). The focus on key 
processes and object is necessary to ensure the model is comprehensible and has sufficient 
explanatory power. Over-simplification, however, leads to “toy models” of either limited 
explanatory value or limited novel insights (Davis et al., 2007). Three types of computer 
simulation are most common in social sciences: agent-based models, systems dynamics models 
and cellular automata models (Harrison et al., 2007). 
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Agent-based models usually focus on behavioural aspects of multi-actor systems that 
influence each other through interactions. These models elegantly allow to study the impact of 
actor-level behaviour on the system. The model consists of one or more actor representations 
that are instantiated multiple times and simulates their interaction under varying conditions. 
The clear representation of real-world objects, e.g. customer is represented by customer agent, 
allow for comprehensive modelling and easy derivation of possible impacts of mechanisms 
under study in the real world (Harrison et al., 2007). 
System dynamics models usually model the system as a whole rather than representing 
individual actors. They are especially useful when relationships can be modelled as formulas 
or abstract systematic representations, i.e., arrows and boxes. Consequently, they are the default 
modelling approach in weather forecast, but can also be used for the study of organizational 
change or innovations (Harrison et al., 2007). 
Besides the theoretical fit, this thesis uses agent-based modelling for another practical 
reason: with Repast Simphony (North, Howe, Collier, & Vos, 2007) a tool for efficient 
implementation, verification, and execution of agent-based models is available. 
Besides induction and deduction, computer simulation is seen as a “third way of doing 
science” (Axelrod, 2003, p. 1). It allows the study of complex, intertwined, and non-linear 
processes beyond empirical feasibility (Harrison et al., 2007) and is especially suited for further 
development of simple/nascent theory (Davis et al., 2007). Computer simulation allows 
performing “virtual experiments” (Carley, 1999, p. 2) under boundary conditions and therefore 
generates insights hardly obtainable otherwise. Consequently, it “capture[s] much more of the 
complex causality present in typical entrepreneurial settings” (McKelvey, 2004, p. 314). 
Moreover, computer simulation simplifies data gathering on all levels (individual, system-
wide), especially in longitudinal settings. Given that “about half of what people report about 
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their own interactions is incorrect in one way or another” (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 57) 
this is an important advantage especially for the study of social networks. 
Lastly, computer simulation requires a formal model of the subject under study. These 
models “serve to keep scientists honest by forcing them to zero in on the most critical variables” 
(McKelvey, 2004, p. 314) and therefore foster precise definitions and concepts in theory. 
Despite its advantages, computer simulation as a research tool has three major drawbacks. 
Firstly, the model employed represents a stylised version of the real world and is incomplete by 
necessity. As a consequence, the “correct” modelling is usually at the heart of most critical 
reviews. Secondly, the output and derived insights are hypothetical and subject to empirical 
validation before acceptance. Thirdly, the plausible pre-selection of parameter values is critical 
for valid results. However, empirical results are often hard to translate into abstract parameter 
values. Consequently, the discussion and careful selection of parameter values is of importance 
to avoid “garbage in – garbage out” situations. 
Given the unique advantages, computer simulations have been successfully applied in 
entrepreneurship research in the past. In the following, five well published examples that 
inspired the author during the construction of his model are listed. 
Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham (2009) use stochastic process modelling to investigate 
the relationship of the amount of structure of an organization, its environment, and performance. 
They develop a computational model of organization consisting of rules and the environment. 
Davis et al. reveal that entrepreneurial organizations should build organizational structure in 
both predictable and unpredictable environments. 
Ganco and Agarwal (2009) use an artificial fitness landscape to study the interplay of 
firm characteristics such as experience, environmental turbulence, and industry live cycle stage. 
They simulate the co-evolution of all firms under different levels of environmental turbulence 
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and differences in entry characteristics. Ganco et al. conclude that in highly turbulent 
environments, diversifying entrants, i.e., firms that existed before market entry, outperform 
start-ups without previous experience. However, start-ups that learn about these environments 
later outperform diversifying entrants by far. 
Yim (2008) uses a combination of secondary data analysis and computer simulation to 
investigate rapidly growing start-ups. Using a discrete-choice racing model he demonstrates 
that focusing on technology and product innovation enabled these start-ups to outperform their 
competition and that it was not indeed “pure luck”. It is particularly noteworthy that Yim 
derives part of his simulation parameters from secondary industry data. 
Minniti (2005) uses agent-based computer simulation to study the impact of network 
externalities, i.e., social environment on the level of entrepreneurial activity. Analysing the 
interplay of wage increase when labour is in demand by entrepreneurs and the ambiguity created 
by entrepreneurship, she concludes that entrepreneurship agglomerates geographically and that 
individuals tend to choose what others in their vicinity have chosen. 
Minniti (2004) uses agent-based computer simulation to investigate the impact of 
alertness and available information on the decision to become an entrepreneur. She identifies 
entrepreneurship as path-dependent and shows that asymmetric information distribution leads 
to the emergence of entrepreneurship clusters. Using a model borrowed from quantum physics, 
Minniti reveals that the level of entrepreneurial activity is higher when information is 
asymmetrically distributed. 
3.2 Methodological fit for entrepreneurship research 
Literature lists certain prerequisites for theory in order to advance it with computer simulation 
(Davis et al., 2007; Harrison et al., 2007). As presented in Table 4, five requirements are 
commonly proposed that need to be fulfilled by the field under study. 
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The availability of simple theory is an important prerequisite for the application of 
computer simulation. If no theory is available, formal modelling is impossible or highly 
ambiguous due to a missing base. If theory is too advanced, simulation is still possible, but 
unlikely to reveal “novel theoretical insights” (Davis et al., 2007, p. 495). Effectuation is in 
such a nascent state (Perry et al., 2012). Moreover, a basic understanding of micro-level 
processes is required. Otherwise, there is too much ambiguity regarding the agents’ tasks in a 
simulation. For effectuation, sufficient actor-level process descriptions exist (Dew et al., 2008, 
2010; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b) though this area is still subject to research (Sarasvathy & 
Venkataraman, 2011). 
As for all research endeavours, an intriguing research question is of the essence. For the 
application of computer simulation, however, Davis et al. recommend questions targeting 
“substantial theoretical issue” (Davis et al., 2007, p. 483). Effectuation fulfils this criterion as 
demonstrated in chapter 1.2. In addition, the data required to answer these questions should be 
hard to obtain, otherwise the use of empirical research is preferable. This is true for effectuation 
as well, given for example the lack of scales for docility, or the need for detailed data on social 
network to compute the measures proposed by Burt. Moreover, the process is highly non-linear 
and based on intertwined multi-agent interaction, which is hard to capture by empirical 
methods. 
Lastly, computer simulation is required to end at a certain point in time. While this end 
can be predetermined, e.g., “three days” for weather forecasts, an equilibrium state is preferable. 
Fortunately, the effectuation process provides an end for opportunity development as 
effectuators can “[d]eclare the effectual transformation complete” (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b, 
p. 549). 
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Table 4: Requirements for the application of computer simulation 
Requirement Fulfilment by effectuation theory 
Availability of “simple theory” 
(Davis et al., 2007, p. 482) 
According to Perry et al. (2012) effectuation 
is in a nascent/intermediate state 
Understanding of “micro-level processes” 
(Harrison et al., 2007, p. 1231) 
Sufficient process descriptions given (Dew 
et al., 2008, 2010; Sarasvathy & Dew, 
2005b) 
Intriguing research question regarding 
substantial theoretical issue 
(Davis et al., 2007, p. 483) 
Impact of intersubjective interaction 
behaviour fundamental yet unclear (Perry et 
al., 2012; Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 
2011; Venkataraman et al., 2012) 
Difficulty of empirical measurement 
(Harrison et al., 2007, p. 1230) 
Lack of docility scale despite theoretical 
importance (Dew et al., 2008) and 
challenging acquisition of network data 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Moreover, 
multi-agent, non-linear, intertwined 
processes at work 
Fulfil “equilibrium assumption” 
(McKelvey, 2004, p. 317), i.e. simulation 
can reach a stable state 
Effectuators can “[d]eclare the effectual 
transformation complete” (Sarasvathy & 
Dew, 2005b, p. 549) providing a stable state 
Source: Own illustration 
3.3 Simulation creation process and nature of outcomes 
Davis et al. (Davis et al., 2007) offer a clear roadmap for the creation of a simulation for theory 
development. Using the proposed process provides interesting, relevant, and valid research 
using computer simulation. Starting with an intriguing research question, researchers should 
subsequently identify simple theory and choose a suitable simulation approach. Afterwards, a 
formal model needs to be created and validated. Once the model is complete, experimentation 
(including validation) can start. 
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The most crucial part of computer simulation research is the development of the formal 
representation of the real world. It is more of an art than a skill and needs to balance out the 
demands for simplicity and comprehensiveness, for understandability and complexity (Harrison 
et al., 2007). It has to be simple, so proposed effects can be unambiguously attributed to certain 
inputs and processes. It has to be comprehensive in a way that all vital parts of theory are 
represented. It has to be understandable to be regarded as valid by the researcher community. 
Lastly, it has to be complex enough to produce counter-intuitive and novel insights into the 
underlying theory. Consequently, formal modelling itself is already a contribution as it 
“constitutes an exercise in theory development” (Harrison et al., 2007, p. 1233) and “serve[s] 
to keep scientists honest” (McKelvey, 2004, p. 314). 
In a broader context, simulation alone is insufficient to further theory development. As 
visualised in Figure 6, computer simulation experiments are part of an iterative cycle and 
symbiotically coupled with empirical research. Computer simulation is informed by theoretical 
and empirical research and delivers propositions that, in turn, inform theory development and 
empirical research to validate the propositions of computer simulations. 
Figure 6: Interaction of computer simulation and theory development 
 
Source: (Harrison et al., 2007, fig. 1) 
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4 Summary of Research Papers 
This thesis consists of three research papers on the effects and implications of effectual 
intersubjective interaction. This section provides a summary of each paper and points out 
important contributions individually. The complete papers are available in Part B. 
All papers are built on a jointly used computer simulation of effectuation. While the core 
stayed the same throughout the research effort, the model was extended by more sophisticated 
measurement or initialization functions for each paper. Given the controversial reception of 
studies that “only” provide a formal model (and consequently lack data analysis of any kind) at 
research conferences, the author refrained from drafting a methodological study first and 
subsequently referencing it. Instead, the model is presented and motivated in each paper. 
Paper I focuses on the impact of individual and collective effectual interaction behaviour 
on the creation of new markets for an idea. It reveals the importance of docile and persistent 
partners and the surprisingly small impact an individual entrepreneur can have. Moreover, it 
underlines the importance of transformation mechanisms for effectual logic. 
Paper II is concerned with the impact of network position and shape on effectual venture 
performance. Using centrality measures drawn from social network analysis and Burt’s 
measures of network shape (Burt, 1992), it reveals the limited importance of centrality at the 
beginning of venturing. Moreover, it shows that Burt’s idea of efficient and effective network 
correlate negatively with effectual performance. 
Paper III provides an opportunity-based perspective on effectual entrepreneurship. 
Studying the interplay environmental uncertainty and intersubjective interaction, it reveals the 
increasing importance of docility for the successful development of more complex 
opportunities in more complex environments. In addition, it reveals an order in which effectual 
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entrepreneurs complete an opportunity: firstly, the core features are fixed, secondly, additional 
features are added, and thirdly, the stakeholder group is finalised. 
4.1 Paper I: Individual vs. Collective Control in Effectual Social Networking: A 
Simulation Study 
Paper I investigates on the impact of process, individual, and collective behaviour of 
entrepreneurs using effectual logic on new market creation. 
What do we know? Social networks are of high importance for successful entrepreneurs 
(Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). A large body of network-related studies reveals that networks serve 
as access channels to resources and thus improve venture performance. Effectuation as an 
alternative decision logic also heavily relies on interaction with other market participants. 
However, it proposes a different approach to networks focusing on co-creation and control of 
market development (Sarasvathy, 2001). 
What do we not know? As the basic principles of effectuation are widely accepted, the 
mechanics for their market-level impact become the focus of research attention, especially the 
impact of intersubjective interaction (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011). It is unclear, how 
actor-level interaction impacts market-level developments. Docility was identified as one 
important component of interaction behaviour (Dew et al., 2008). However, the reasons for 
market-level impact are yet to be determined. Moreover, it is unclear which other behavioural 
parameters are relevant. In addition, transformation processes were only recently recognised as 
an important building block of effectuation (Dew et al., 2010). Consequently, the mechanics of 
market-level impact are opaque.  
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Why is it important to know it? Understanding the inner works of effectuation and the 
impact of actor-level behaviour can have on markets is critical for multiple reasons. Firstly, 
effectuation emphasises the joint development of opportunities while prediction-based 
entrepreneurship usually portraits “the entrepreneur” as the one mastermind that coordinates all 
activity. A review of these contradicting views will put the impact of “the entrepreneur”, 
stakeholders and the process into perspective. Secondly, to support the effort of developing 
entrepreneurship as a science of the artificial requires a detailed understanding of processes and 
consequences. In order to become an important building block, effectuation has to be studied 
in the aforementioned detail.  
What are we doing about it? Using computer simulation, this paper analyses the 
complex, non-linear multi-actor processes at work and determines the impact of process, i.e., 
transformation, individual, and collective interaction behaviour. Using the creation of new 
markets as scenario, the simulation tracks the dissemination of a specific idea in the network of 
effectuators and end customers. It tests the impact of parameter variations, (dis)allowing 
transformation processes while tracking the dissemination of the idea under study as well as 
reasons for non-dissemination.  
What do we contribute? Paper I makes four contributions to literature. Firstly, it 
contributes a formal model of effectuation. The model unifies available descriptions of the 
effectuation process, effectual principles, and views. It allows the study of intersubjective 
interaction and its consequences on arbitrary levels of detail even under boundary conditions. 
Besides docility, it reveals the persistence to approach potential stakeholders as another relevant 
behavioural parameter. Secondly, this paper reveals the importance of transformation 
mechanisms for effectuation. Allowing the propagation of new ideas beyond project borders 
has a “trigger effect” on the creation of new markets: Although rarely used, it significantly 
increases the adoption rate of the idea under study. Thirdly, this paper contributes the 
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significance of collective interaction behaviour. Both the levels of collective docility and 
persistence have a significantly positive impact on the creation of a new market for the idea 
under study. Moreover, tracking the reasons for non-dissemination of the idea under study 
reveals that high docility improves negotiation success and helps to include customer 
preferences more successfully. Lastly, Paper I contributes the relatively little impact of the 
interaction behaviour of an individual. Increased persistence to approach stakeholders has little, 
increased docility no measureable impact on the creation of new markets. “This contrasts with 
the image of the persistent entrepreneur who holds on against all odds and against all skepticism 
to bring an idea to fruition” (Wood & McKinley, 2010, p. 71). 
4.2 Paper II: Entrepreneurial Mingling Secrets: Investigating the Performance Impact 
of Network Structure for Control-based Entrepreneurship using Agent-based 
Simulation 
Paper II investigates the impact of network position and shape on effectual venture 
performance. 
What do we know? Networks are an essential tool for successful entrepreneurs (Slotte-
Kock & Coviello, 2010). A large body of literature lists countless advantages of being “well 
connected”. Most of these studies entertain a common theme: networks extend the reach of 
entrepreneurs thus making resources accessible otherwise beyond their grasp (Hoang & 
Antoncic, 2003). Picturing “the entrepreneur” as the centre of action, these studies usually argue 
and show that being in a more central position increases quantity and variety of resources an 
entrepreneur can access (Jack, 2010). With respect to shape, network literature proposes for 
entrepreneurs to apply the “tertius gaudens” approach, keep acquaintances separate, and benefit 
from brokerage and arbitrage (Burt, 1992).  
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What do we not know? Effectuation proposes a networking approach radically different 
from “classic” prediction-based entrepreneurship (Sarasvathy, 2001). Consequently, it is 
unclear whether network position plays an equally significant role for effectual entrepreneurs 
and how the effectual process uses it. Moreover, the “tertius gaudens” approach proposed for 
entrepreneurs by Burt (1992) directly contradicts the inclusive partnering approach of effectual 
entrepreneurship. Consequently, an analysis of shape and performance as well as network 
development over time is required. In addition, an alternative theoretical foundation is required 
for effectual networking. 
Why is it important to know it? Given the prediction-based conditioning of 
entrepreneurial network research, the development of a control-based alternative broadens the 
view on entrepreneurial networking and the range of options for practical application. 
Moreover, the lack of process-oriented studies on the use of social networks effectively blocks 
effectuation research – and entrepreneurship research in general – from developing 
entrepreneurial and effectual network theory. In addition, Burt’s tertius gaudens approach 
proposes a networking methodology that contradicts the effectual approach more or less 
directly. Consequently, an analysis of these contradictions is required to understand how and 
why effectual networking works. Moreover, this analysis is required to unravel the 
contradicting empirical evidence of successful effectual networking on one side and Burt’s 
“tertius gaudens” approach on the other side. 
What are we doing about it? Based on the formal model of effectuation, paper II uses 
computer simulation to measure the network position and shape of each agent in each time step 
of the simulation. In addition, the simulation measures the level of demand satisfaction, the 
extent to which an agent’s business opportunity is compatible with all other agent’s conscious 
demands (reflected in their respective business opportunities). Moreover, a literature search 
reveals an opposing theoretical networking foundation called “tertius iungens” (Obstfeld, 
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2005). This approach proposes the creation of a dense network in order to profit from the free 
flow exchange of ideas and information. 
What do we contribute? Paper II contributes three major insights regarding the impact 
of network position and shape of effectual entrepreneurs. 
Firstly, demand satisfaction is positively related with degree centrality, i.e. the number of 
known contacts. While the initial degree centrality has a limited positive impact, the final degree 
centrality is clearly correlated with demand satisfaction. Consequently, effectuators profit from 
good initial positions, however, they can mitigate the disadvantage of initial position to a great 
extent. However, being well connected afterwards as a result of good networking has a clearly 
beneficial impact on success. Consequently, initial betweenness centrality, i.e. being on the 
shortest path between many individuals, means a beneficial starting point for effectuators. 
However, if an effectuator’s betweenness centrality is still high in the end, she or he was not 
able to become obsolete by weaving a dense network around her or him. Consequently, final 
betweenness centrality is negatively associated with performance. 
Secondly, paper II shows that low efficiency and high (normalised) constraint are 
positively related with performance for effectual entrepreneurs. Consequently, Burt’s proposed 
negative impact of these measurements does not hold and rather confirms Obstfeld’s “tertius 
iungens” approach.  
Thirdly, this paper contributes a longitudinal analysis of degree centrality, betweenness 
centrality, efficiency, and (normalised) constraint. Based on the aforementioned arguments, this 
analysis confirms the increase of degree centrality and decrease of betweenness centrality due 
to the effectual networking process. Moreover, the analysis reveals that the effectual networking 
approach decreases network efficiency and increases normalised constraint over time. These 
results indicate that entrepreneurs using effectual logic not only profit from a network position 
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and shape suited for “tertius iungens” approach, but actively shape their network in a way that 
these shapes emerge. 
4.3 Paper III: Out of Thin Air? Simulating Entrepreneurial Opportunity Creation 
and the Impact of Environmental Complexity and Stakeholder Behavior 
Paper III investigates the interplay of environmental complexity and stakeholder behaviour on 
opportunity creation, with respect to success and the emergence of patterns in the creation 
process. 
What do we know? Effectuation is an alternative decision logic for the creation of 
opportunities under high uncertainty. Derived from experiments with expert serial 
entrepreneurs it provides an entrepreneur-focused process for the interaction with other market 
participants and the joint creation and manipulation of opportunity and market at the same time 
(Dew et al., 2008). 
What do we not know? Current entrepreneurship research usually focuses on 
entrepreneurs and pays less attention to the opportunity itself (Shane, 2004). Consequently, the 
opportunity as well as the interplay of opportunity and entrepreneur has received insufficient 
research attention (Venkataraman et al., 2012). Research regarding opportunities still targets 
basic questions. Currently, a lively debate whether opportunities are created or discovered is 
still questioning most essential assumptions (Alvarez & Barney, 2013; Shane, 2012). The 
interplay of opportunity and entrepreneur is similarly under-researched. While the impact of 
complexity of environment/opportunity (Sarasvathy, 2004a) or the impact of entrepreneurial 
behaviour (Dew et al., 2008) have been discussed separately, the interplay of both have neither 
been researched nor been theorised about yet.  
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Why is it important to know it? Both the emergence of opportunities and the interplay 
of opportunity are mentioned as critical areas of research for the development of 
entrepreneurship into a “science of the artificial”, a toolbox for entrepreneurs that can be 
tailored to specific entrepreneurial scenarios (Venkataraman et al., 2012). While the creation or 
discovery of opportunities are the causes of entrepreneurship in the first place, few studies are 
concerned with the development of opportunities from an opportunity perspective. This limited 
perspective obscures the understanding of opportunity development and thus hinders 
effectuation research. Moreover, entrepreneurship needs to be understood as the interplay of 
entrepreneur and opportunity (Shane, 2004). Otherwise, the underlying interplay, hence the 
mechanics at work, remain opaque, blocking the way to a deeper understanding of when to best 
use which entrepreneurial strategies, and why. 
What are we doing about it? Using computer simulation, we analyse the interplay of 
entrepreneur and opportunity as well as the emergence of opportunities in two series of 
experiments. Starting with the interplay of entrepreneur and opportunity, we analyse the 
interplay of entrepreneurial interaction behaviour and the complexity of opportunity/ 
environment. Using demand satisfaction as performance measure, we test the impact of various 
levels of docility and various numbers of available features and variants at the same time. Our 
second series of experiments measures the time to completion of three stages of opportunity 
development. 
What do we contribute? Paper III contributes two discoveries regarding opportunity 
development using effectuation: firstly, it reveals different impact of different kinds of 
complexity. While increased numbers of features have no impact on successful opportunity 
creation, the increased availability of alternative variants per feature does significantly decrease 
successful development of opportunities. Moreover, the negative impact is strongly dependent 
on effectual interaction behaviour. Setups with highly docile effectuators experience 
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significantly less negative impact of increased availability of alternative variants per feature 
than setups with non-docile effectuators. Secondly, the evolution of opportunities follows – 
regardless of effectual behaviour – a fixed scheme: core completion, feature completion, 
stakeholder completion. Core completion refers to the fixation of variants for available features. 
While initial interactions create change in variants of features, these changes are completed first 
resulting in a fixed core. Next, the addition of new features is finalised. These new features are 
the result of further interaction. Given the balance of power in negotiations, new stakeholders 
can add new features easily, but hardly change the opinion of a whole group of incumbent 
stakeholders regarding previously negotiated features. Lastly, the stakeholder group is 
completed. While in theory these last stakeholders could still change the opportunity 
completely, they find themselves mostly in a “take it or leave it” position. Interestingly, this 
order opportunity completion does not change regardless of, e.g., the general level of docility. 
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5 Overall implications 
The research presented in this thesis contributes to literature in many theoretical and – to a 
lesser extent – in practical ways. Moreover, it opens up important areas of further research for 
quantitative empirical confirmation, qualitative empirical understanding of process details, and 
formal/ mathematical model improvement. 
5.1 Theoretical implications 
Beyond the conclusions and implications presented in chapter 1, the research presented in this 
thesis has broader implications for the fields of effectuation research, entrepreneurship research, 
and research in adjacent theories. Moreover, this thesis identified areas of further research 
requiring qualitative, quantitative, and computer simulation methodologies. 
The overall implications of this thesis for effectuation research are manifold. The 
development of a formal model, the impact of individual and collective behaviour, the analysis 
of transformation, the impact of network position and shape, the tertius iungens approach, the 
interplay of environment and interaction behaviour, and the analysis of opportunity creation 
have broad implications beyond their individual contributions. 
The developed formal model of effectuation serves as starting point for the improvement 
of terminology and process descriptions. Formal models “serve to keep scientists honest by 
forcing them to zero in on the most critical variables” (McKelvey, 2004, p. 314). Consequently, 
formal modelling helps to overcome the current nascent state of effectuation (Perry et al., 2012). 
Focusing on intersubjective interaction, the formal model employed in papers I – III already 
contributed to the deeper understanding of docility and identified “persistence” as an important 
part of entrepreneurial intersubjective interaction. Moreover, the formal model of effectuation 
enables the analysis of market-level consequences of actor-level behaviour and provides 
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detailed theory-based reasoning for them. While most studies either study individual action 
(Dew et al., 2008, 2010; Dew, Read, et al., 2009; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b; Sarasvathy, 2001) 
or market impact of effectuation (Brettel et al., 2012; Chandler et al., 2011; Read, Song, et al., 
2009; Wiltbank et al., 2009), the formal modelling approach provides a unique perspective to 
relate both levels beyond empirical feasibility and foster theory development. In addition, the 
provided formal model allows the study of effectuation under boundary conditions hardly found 
in reality. These “virtual experiments” (Carley, 1999, Chapter 2) allow data collection in 
extreme cases, which is nearly impossible in empirical research. While these cases have limited 
importance for real world scenarios, they are essential for theory development (see Davis et al., 
2009). Altogether, the formal model developed in this thesis provides a novel and fruitful 
approach for the development of effectuation theory. 
The analysis of individual and collective intersubjective interaction behaviour yields 
implications for effectuation research. First of all, the analysis underlines the view of “docility 
as a fundamental behavioral construct” (Dew et al., 2008, p. 49). In addition, it deepens the 
understanding of its application in effectuation and differentiates between individual and 
collective impact of this actor-level parameter on market-level impact. Given the limited 
individual and significant collective impact of intersubjective interaction parameters, paper I 
implies a paradigm shift from ego-centric to group-based research on effectuation. It contracts 
the all-too heroic view of “the entrepreneur” as the single source of success, single-handedly 
orchestrating passive stakeholders and stoically pushing through ingenious ideas. In line with 
literature (Wood & McKinley, 2010) these results rather propose to see effectuation as a 
collaborative process where collective benevolence trumps individual stubbornness. 
The analysis of transformation holds several implications for effectuation as well. This 
thesis contributes a first rough formal process and provides a link to intersubjective interaction. 
Thereby it sets a starting point for further differentiation of transformation processes and their 
53 
inclusion into the effectuation process. The overwhelmingly positive impact of transformation 
demonstrated in paper I underlines its “practical” importance for effectuation and calls for a 
reinterpretation: beyond the optimization of an opportunity (Dew et al., 2010), the inclusion of 
external ideas via transformation is a mechanism to disseminate ideas in order to create a market 
for them. 
The longitudinal analysis of network position and shape holds crucial implications for the 
further development of effectuation theory. It analyses the complex bidirectional interplay of 
position, shape and intersubjective interaction. Thus, both the development of networks through 
effectual processes and the impact of networks on effectual processes is demonstrated and 
explained. Contributing integrated “process- and outcome-oriented research” (Hoang & 
Antoncic, 2003, p. 165) this thesis fosters theory development sorely lacked on network (Hoang 
& Antoncic, 2003; Jack, 2010; Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010) and individual (Sarasvathy & 
Venkataraman, 2011) level. In addition, the inclusion of the “tertius iungens” networking 
approach (Obstfeld, 2005) broadens the effectual theory foundation and poses yet another 
difference between effectuation and causation. Moreover, it delivers a successful application 
example of Obstfeld’s theory and shows that Burt’s measures of efficiency and (normalised) 
constraint (Burt, 1992) work to identify networks suitable for effectuators. It also reasons why 
the tertius iungens approach works and explained mixed empirical results finding successful 
applications for both models (see Burt, 2004; Obstfeld, 2005). 
Lastly, the interplay of environment and interaction behaviour and the order of 
opportunity development – analysed in paper III – contributes a novel perspective to 
effectuation research. Available effectuation literature is usually actor-focused treating 
opportunities merely as the output of the actor-based entrepreneurship process. This approach, 
however, neglects the nexus of individual and opportunity (Sarason, Dean, & Dillard, 2006; 
Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Venkataraman et al., 2012). The “nexus of individual and 
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opportunity”-idea proposes that individual and opportunity require a certain level of congruence 
– otherwise they do not fit. In 2012, Venkataraman et al. proposed to develop this nexus further 
and research in the “[a]ction and [i]nteraction” (Venkataraman et al., 2012, p. 28) of 
entrepreneur and opportunity. This study provides a significant contribution in this direction by 
analysing the interaction of entrepreneur and opportunity for various levels of environmental 
complexity and interaction behaviour (docility). 
Consequently, this research also contributes to the advancement of entrepreneurship 
research in general. Effectuation was proposed as one important entrepreneurial technique 
(Venkataraman et al., 2012) and the deeper understanding as well as the formalization, thus 
contributing to the development of entrepreneurship into a science of the artificial. The 
development of an artificial science requires both a deep understanding and a high level of 
formalization of the employed techniques. These preconditions are necessary to devise optimal 
processes and parameter choices, e.g. required level of docility, for specific entrepreneurial 
scenarios. In addition, this study contributes to the development of the “entrepreneurial 
method” (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011, p. 113) by contributing a deeper understanding 
of the intersubjective. While most entrepreneurship studies focus on individuals or teams, “no 
journal article on details of the numerous relationships and deals that entrepreneurs routinely 
negotiate with a wide variety of stakeholders” (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011, p. 126) is 
available. Hence, knowledge on this aspect fosters understanding and theory building for 
entrepreneurship. 
Moreover, a deeper understanding of effectuation also fuels the discussion regarding the 
validity and normative superiority of “classic” prediction-based and control-based 
entrepreneurship (Baron, 2009; Chandler et al., 2011; Sarasvathy, 2001; Wiltbank & Dew, 
2006). While the positive impact of effectuation has been shown empirically for situations of 
high uncertainty (Brettel et al., 2012; Chandler et al., 2011), it is still unclear what other factors 
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promote or demote the application of either prediction- or control-based entrepreneurship. 
Assuming that Burt’s examples of “tertius gaudens” entrepreneurship (Burt, 1992, 2004) 
focused on prediction-based entrepreneurship, this thesis contributes network position and 
shape as an environmental condition that impacts normative superiority. 
This thesis also has implications for adjacent fields of research, namely social network 
theory, social network analysis, and organizational innovation. Social network theory often 
takes “networks as mostly given and outside the control of human action” (Sarasvathy & 
Venkataraman, 2011, p. 126). Hoang and Antoncic propose further research on “how network 
[…] structure emerge[s] over time” (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003, p. 165) and criticise a lack of 
process-oriented studies. The longitudinal analysis of the impact of position and shape based 
on a formal model of the effectuation process contributes novel insights that can help form a 
theory on the development, growth, and impact of social networks especially for 
entrepreneurship. 
Paper II uses Burt’s efficiency and constraint measures to analyse the impact of network 
shape on effectual success. Burt’s constraint measure precisely reflects two ways to reduce 
constraint: keep acquaintances separate and increase the number of known contacts. However, 
it is hardly suited to compare the degree of constraint-ness of two ego-networks of different 
sizes. With exactly that task at hand, paper II proposes a method for the normalization of Burt’s 
constraint measure: the normalised constraint. It normalises the number of known contacts and 
makes the relative constraint-ness of two actor-networks comparable. 
Lastly, this thesis contributes to the originating field of Obstfeld’s “tertius iungens” 
approach (Obstfeld, 2005), organizational innovation. While the application of the “tertius 
iungens” networking strategy qualifies effectuation for the development of innovative 
opportunities, effectuation also reflects back on organizational innovation: it strengthens 
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Obstfeld’s arguments by providing numerous successful practical examples of the tertius 
iungens methodology (e.g. Read, Song, et al., 2009) and a complete theoretical concept 
(Sarasvathy, 2001) that is based on it. Moreover, the successful application of effectuation in 
R&D-departments (Brettel et al., 2012) and its connection to the development of innovation 
through tertius iungens may imply that the development of highly innovative products is – 
besides high uncertainty – another antecedent for normative superiority of effectuation. 
5.2 Areas of further research 
The findings presented in this thesis warrant further research regarding effectuation. 
Besides a validation of the theoretical propositions, paper I-III open individual new areas of 
research both theoretical and empirical. Moreover, the formal model itself holds important areas 
of further research in itself, both theoretical and empirical as well. 
Firstly, an empirical validation of the propositions presented in paper I-III is in order. 
While simulation can contribute to theory development and postulate relationships, an 
alignment with the “real world” is required to see whether these propositions hold. Given the 
comprehensive discussion of each proposition, computer simulation can simplify empirical 
research as it provides strong hypotheses. Considering the often non-linear nature of 
relationships, this is a strenuous undertaking; however, it is necessary to validate the proposed 
findings and the formal model of effectuation. 
Prior to empirical validation, scale development for docility and persistence is required. 
The persistence parameter is conceptually close to the “proactiveness” construct of 
entrepreneurial orientation (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996), thus the items proposed for it might be a 
first proxy. Despite its conceptual importance, so far the development of a scale for docility has 
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not taken place at all5. Given the significant recent development of effectuation scales (Brettel 
et al., 2012; Chandler et al., 2011) and the significant theoretical work on docility (Dew et al., 
2008; Dew, 2003; Simmel, 1896), the need for such a scale goes beyond this thesis. 
Besides empirical validation, papers I-III opened up individual research areas – 
theoretical and empirical – with respect to individual and collective behaviour (paper I), 
transformation mechanisms (paper I), network position and shape (paper II), and environmental 
complexity and opportunities (paper III). 
Paper I analysed the impact of collective and individual intersubjective behaviour, 
focusing on either one or all but one actor. Consequently, the study of the impact of groups with 
respect to their size and their group behaviour on the creation of new markets could provide 
further details in this area of research. Is there a minimum group size required in order to have 
significant impact? How does the level of docility and persistence of groups impact new market 
creation and how does group size moderate it? In addition, further qualitative empirical research 
is necessary to better understand the negotiation process itself and the behavioural parameters 
relevant for it. As “[e]ven the literature that is directly focused on negotiations has mostly 
neglected new venture creation processes” (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011, p. 126), a 
deeper understanding is essential to further theory in this crucial area. 
Paper I also investigated the impact of effectual transformation processes. The results 
underline the importance of these techniques. While the formal model only incorporated one 
abstract method, the detailed study and incorporation of further methods could contribute to the 
works of Dew et al. (2010), helping to evaluate when to use which method most effectively. In 
addition, qualitative research is required to understand process parameters for each method. 
                                              
5 Excluding the works on docility of cattle (Burrow, Seifert, & Corbet, 1988)  
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Paper II investigated the impact of network shape and size of individuals opening multiple 
areas of further research. Firstly, the paper focuses on individuals, leaving the analysis of group 
impact to further research. While social analysis provides measures for the position of groups 
as well (Everett & Borgatti, 1999), the concepts of shape (efficiency and constraint) are 
currently not applicable to groups necessitating a network theoretical endeavour beforehand. 
Secondly, the formal model assumes equal strength of all ties between all actors. In reality, 
however, effectuators are likely not to interact to an equal degree with all their contacts. 
Consequently, an investigation on the effects of tie strengths could contribute to the 
development of entrepreneurial networking theory, also adding a new perspective on the 
importance of weak ties as proposed by Granovetter (1973). While measures of position and 
shape already support different tie strengths, empirical research regarding tie strength and 
impact on behaviour is required to improve the relevance of this line of research. Lastly, the 
theoretical stereotypes “tertius gaudens” (Burt, 1992) and “tertius iungens” (Obstfeld, 2005) 
warrant further research. While leading effectuation researchers generally question the 
compatibility of Burt’s ideas and effectuation (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a, 2005b), both 
Obstfeld and Burt (Burt, 2000) argue that superiority of these strategies is conditional. 
Consequently, the identification and description of a possible application scenario of “tertius 
gaudens” for effectuation is an area for both empirical and theoretical research. 
Paper III studied the interplay of complexity and effectual intersubjective interaction 
behaviour in order to analyse their impact on opportunity creation. Moreover, the creation 
phases of opportunities were analysed longitudinally. Both experiments opened up further areas 
of research. Firstly, the interplay of collective docility and environmental complexity 
repositioned the idea of docility from a merely personal attitude towards a free parameter for 
optimizing the effectual approach. While this is definitely in line with the idea of 
“entrepreneurship as a science of the artificial” (Sarasvathy, 2003; Shane, 2012; Simon, 1996) 
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the almost threshold-like decrease of success in opportunity development due to docility calls 
for further investigation. Firstly, through case studies regarding repeated interaction in more or 
less docile environments, and subsequently theoretical with more detailed computer simulation. 
The combined approach is necessary to detect the deeper reasons for this step-change in 
performance. Secondly, the emergence of order in opportunity creation is a novel (theoretical) 
observation. Consequently, it opens up new areas of research in opportunity creation: How does 
interaction behaviour impact (not change) the speed of order creation? How do different 
negotiation processes impact creation order? Does this or another stable creation order also 
emerge from other entrepreneurial techniques? Again, both theoretical and empirical research 
is needed for theorizing, validation, and the gathering of facts for model building. 
Besides the areas of research informed by the results of paper I-III, an equally important 
area of research was informed by the formal model itself: the affordable loss conundrum. The 
implementation of the affordable loss criterion poses three challenges, yet to overcome by 
effectuation research: process implications, optimization implications, and resource 
implications. Firstly, while the idea of keeping the loss affordable seems straightforward, the 
process of doing so is quite unclear. While extant literature analysed the implications of 
affordable loss to great extent (Dew, Sarasvathy, et al., 2009), the processes of determination, 
adaptation as well as relevant parameters for affordable loss levels remain opaque. The level of 
affordable loss is simply attributed to an individual decision. Consequently, qualitative 
empirical research regarding process and parameters is a prospective area of further research. 
Secondly, the affordable loss principle was formulated as a juxtaposition of the prediction-
based idea of returns maximization. However, the affordable loss principle does not contain 
any superlative, hence is a constraint, not an optimization criterion. Hence, the ultimate goal of 
effectuation is unclear. Additional theoretical research is required to present an alternative 
optimization criterion. Paper I speculates that the maximization of market size may be such a 
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criterion, but the presented arguments can only serve as a starting point. Lastly, from a formal 
model point of view the implementation of the affordable loss criterion requires the 
implementation of a complete resource life-cycle simulation. This includes the attribution of 
costs to actions. The multitude of actions require a precise selection of “correct” values and 
ratios to ensure that the simulation does not produce invalid results. Consequently, a significant 
research effort regarding resource consumption of effectual action is required beforehand. 
Moreover, simple questions such as “Under which conditions is effectuation/causation more 
resource-efficient?” require the calibration of costs among various entrepreneurship approaches 
as well. 
5.3 Managerial implications 
As a theoretical study, the number of practical implications is limited. Moreover, the presented 
results of virtual experiments are yet subject to empirical validation. However, three practical 
implications for entrepreneurs considering the use of effectual logic are to be considered: 
Paper I presented the difference of collective vs. individual impact on the creation of new 
markets. From a practitioner’s perspective, this implies that the search for a proper environment 
is paramount. Regardless of the amount of potential stakeholders, practitioners should ensure 
an environment that is sufficiently docile, otherwise the creation of a new markets – relying on 
others – is hard to achieve. Moreover, the implantation of key ideas into transformation 
processes of non-related projects helps to gain additional support in shaping an emerging 
market without the need for additional pre-commitments. 
Paper II implies that practitioners can usually achieve success regardless of their initial 
network position and shape. However, active optimization of one’s network following the ideas 
of tertius iungens – by fostering information exchange and collaboration – is essential to 
improve both success and network position over time. Even if the introduction of non-related 
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acquaintances deprives entrepreneurs of the options of brokering and arbitrage, they will gain 
from this form of “intelligent altruism” (Simon, 1990) through co-creation in the long run. 
Paper III underlines the importance of increased docility, especially in complex 
environments. While entrepreneurship literature usually portraits “the entrepreneur” as overly 
persistent holding out against all struggles (Wood & McKinley, 2010), the results of paper III 
imply that practitioners need to be extra docile in complex environments. Moreover, they have 
to make sure that potential stakeholders are sufficiently docile to ensure the successful 
development of complex opportunities. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A – Overview of simulator structure 
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Appendix B – Simulation source code 
AdvancedAnalyses.java 
package jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator; 
 
import java.util.Map; 
import java.util.concurrent.ExecutorService; 
import java.util.concurrent.Executors; 
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit; 
 
import edu.uci.ics.jung.algorithms.importance.BetweennessCentrality; 
import edu.uci.ics.jung.algorithms.metrics.Metrics; 
import edu.uci.ics.jung.algorithms.scoring.ClosenessCentrality; 
import edu.uci.ics.jung.graph.Graph; 
import repast.simphony.context.Context; 
import repast.simphony.context.space.graph.ContextJungNetwork; 
import repast.simphony.engine.environment.RunEnvironment; 
import repast.simphony.engine.schedule.ScheduledMethod; 
import repast.simphony.essentials.RepastEssentials; 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.Network; 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.RepastEdge; 
 
public class AdvancedAnalyses { 
  
 private Network<Object> network; 
 private Context<Object> context; 
 private int NumberOfIdleTicks = 0; 
 
  
 public AdvancedAnalyses(Context<Object> _context, Network<Object> 
_network){ 
  this.context = _context; 
  this.network = _network; 
 } 
  
  
 @ScheduledMethod(start = 0.0, interval = 1, priority = 100) 
 public  void step(){ 
  RunEnvironment environment = RunEnvironment.getInstance(); 
  double tickCount = RepastEssentials.GetTickCount(); 
   
  //Network analysis still required? 
  if (tickCount > SimulationParameters.Network_analysis_required_until){ 
   SimulationParameters.Network_analysis_required = false; 
  } 
   
  //is simulation currently stable? 
  boolean isSimStatic = true; 
  for (Object i : context.getObjects(Agent.class)){ 
   isSimStatic = isSimStatic && ((Agent)i).isStatic(); 
  } 
 
  if(!isSimStatic || tickCount< 2.0){ 
   ExecutorService threadPool = 
Executors.newFixedThreadPool(SimulationParameters.NumberOfAnalysisThreads); 
   if(SimulationParameters.CentralityAnalysisRequired){ 
    threadPool.submit(new Runnable() { 
     public void run() { 
      calculateBetweennessCentralities(); 
     } 
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    }); 
    threadPool.submit(new Runnable() { 
     public void run() 
{    
      getClosenessCentralities(); 
     } 
    }); 
    threadPool.submit(new Runnable() { 
     public void run() { 
      getClusteringCoefficients(); 
     } 
    }); 
   } 
   if(SimulationParameters.StructuralHolesAnalysisRequired){ 
    StructuralHolesAnalyses.getStructuralHolesMeasures(context, network, 
threadPool); 
   } 
   if(SimulationParameters.GroupCentralityAnalysisRequired){ 
    GroupCentralityAnalyses.getGroupCentralityMeasures(context, network, 
threadPool); 
   } 
   try { 
    threadPool.shutdown(); 
    threadPool.awaitTermination(Long.MAX_VALUE, TimeUnit.HOURS); 
   } catch (InterruptedException e) { 
    // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
   } 
  } 
   
  if (SimulationParameters.MinNumberOfSimSteps > -1){ 
   if(tickCount <= (double) SimulationParameters.MinNumberOfSimSteps){ 
    return; 
   } 
  } 
  if (SimulationParameters.MaxNumberOfSimSteps > -1){ 
   if(tickCount >= (double) SimulationParameters.MaxNumberOfSimSteps){ 
    environment.endRun(); 
   } 
  } 
   
  if (SimulationParameters.doEndIfSimIsStatic == true){ 
   if(isSimStatic){ 
    NumberOfIdleTicks++; 
   }else{ 
    NumberOfIdleTicks=0; 
   } 
    
   if(NumberOfIdleTicks > SimulationParameters.AcceptableIdleTicks){ 
    environment.endRun(); 
   } 
  } 
 } 
  
 public int AgentsUsingSpecialFeature(){ 
  int retVal = 0; 
  for (Object i: context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
   if 
(((Effectuator)i).getProductVector().hasFeature(SimulationParameters.Featur
eUnderObservation)){ 
    retVal++; 
   } 
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  } 
  return retVal; 
 } 
 
 public int EFFsUsingSpecialFeature(){ 
  int retVal = 0; 
  for (Object i: context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
   if(i.getClass().getName().equals(Effectuator.class.getName())){ 
    if 
(((Effectuator)i).getProductVector().hasFeature(SimulationParameters.Featur
eUnderObservation)){ 
     retVal++; 
    } 
   } 
  } 
  return retVal; 
 } 
 public int ECsUsingSpecialFeature(){ 
  int retVal = 0; 
  for (Object i: context.getObjects(EndCustomer.class)){ 
   if 
(((EndCustomer)i).getProductVector().hasFeature(SimulationParameters.Featur
eUnderObservation)){ 
    retVal++; 
   } 
  } 
  return retVal; 
 } 
 
 public int EFFsUsingSpecialFeature_ByPickup(){ 
  int retVal = 0; 
  for (Object i: context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
   if(i.getClass().getName().equals(Effectuator.class.getName())){ 
    if 
(((Effectuator)i).getProductVector().hasFeature(SimulationParameters.Featur
eUnderObservation)){ 
     if(((Effectuator)i).hasAdoptedThroughPickup){ 
      retVal++; 
     } 
    } 
   } 
  } 
  return retVal; 
 } 
 
 public int AgentsUsingSpecialFeature_ByNegotiation(){ 
  int retVal = 0; 
  for (Object i: context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
   if 
(((Effectuator)i).getProductVector().hasFeature(SimulationParameters.Featur
eUnderObservation)){ 
    if(((Effectuator)i).hasAdoptedThroughNegotiation){ 
     retVal++; 
    } 
   } 
  } 
  return retVal; 
 } 
 
 public int EFFsUsingSpecialFeature_ByNegotiation(){ 
  int retVal = 0; 
  for (Object i: context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
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   if(i.getClass().getName().equals(Effectuator.class.getName())){ 
    if 
(((Effectuator)i).getProductVector().hasFeature(SimulationParameters.Featur
eUnderObservation)){ 
     if(((Effectuator)i).hasAdoptedThroughNegotiation){ 
      retVal++; 
     } 
    } 
   } 
  } 
  return retVal; 
 } 
 public int ECsUsingSpecialFeature_ByNegotiation(){ 
  int retVal = 0; 
  for (Object i: context.getObjects(EndCustomer.class)){ 
   if 
(((EndCustomer)i).getProductVector().hasFeature(SimulationParameters.Featur
eUnderObservation)){ 
    if(((EndCustomer)i).hasAdoptedThroughNegotiation){ 
     retVal++; 
    } 
   } 
  } 
  return retVal; 
 } 
 public int countReasonForNonTransmit_NonPropagation(){ 
  int retVal = 0; 
  for (Object i: context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
   retVal+= ((Effectuator)i).countReasonForNonTransmit_NonPropagation; 
  } 
  return retVal; 
 } 
  
 public int countReasonForNonTransmit_NonRePropagation(){ 
  int retVal = 0; 
  for (Object i: context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
   retVal+= ((Effectuator)i).countReasonForNonTransmit_NonRePropagation; 
  } 
  return retVal; 
 } 
  
 public int countReasonForNonTransmit_NegoFailed_Docility(){ 
  int retVal = 0; 
  for (Object i: context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
   retVal+= 
((Effectuator)i).countReasonForNonTransmit_NegoFailed_Docility; 
  } 
  return retVal; 
 } 
  
 public int countReasonForNonTransmit_NegoFailed_Fitness(){ 
  int retVal = 0; 
  for (Object i: context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
   retVal+= ((Effectuator)i).countReasonForNonTransmit_NegoFailed_Fitness; 
  } 
  return retVal; 
 } 
  
 public int countReasonForNonTransmit_SacrInNego(){ 
  int retVal = 0; 
  for (Object i: context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
   retVal+= ((Effectuator)i).countReasonForNonTransmit_SacrInNego; 
76 
  } 
  return retVal; 
 } 
  
 public int countReasonForNonTransmit_NotPickedUp(){ 
  int retVal = 0; 
  for (Object i: context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
   retVal+= ((Effectuator)i).countReasonForNonTransmit_NotPickedUp; 
  } 
  return retVal; 
 } 
 
 public double avgGlobalFitness(){ 
  double retVal = 0; 
  double denominator = 0; 
  for (Object i: context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
   Effectuator EFF =(Effectuator)i; 
   retVal += FitnessLandscape.getFitness(EFF.getProductVector()); 
   denominator++; 
  } 
  if(denominator>0){ 
   return retVal/denominator; 
  }else{ 
   return 0; 
  } 
 } 
  
 public double avgGlobalFitness_EFFs(){ 
  double retVal = 0; 
  double denominator = 0; 
  for (Object i: context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
   if(i.getClass().getName().equals(Effectuator.class.getName())){ 
    Effectuator EFF =(Effectuator)i; 
    retVal += FitnessLandscape.getFitness(EFF.getProductVector()); 
    denominator++; 
   } 
  } 
  if(denominator>0){ 
   return retVal/denominator; 
  }else{ 
   return 0; 
  } 
 } 
 
 public double avgGlobalFitness_ECs(){ 
  double retVal = 0; 
  double denominator = 0; 
  for (Object i: context.getObjects(EndCustomer.class)){ 
   EndCustomer EC =(EndCustomer)i; 
   retVal += FitnessLandscape.getFitness(EC.getProductVector()); 
   denominator++; 
  } 
  if(denominator>0){ 
   return retVal/denominator; 
  }else{ 
   return 0; 
  } 
 } 
  
 public double avgDeltaFitnessOfSpecialFeatureForECs_ALL(){ 
  double retVal = 0; 
  double denominator = 0; 
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  for (Object i: context.getObjects(EndCustomer.class)){ 
   EndCustomer EC =(EndCustomer)i; 
   ProductVector PV_tmp = new ProductVector(EC.getProductVector()); 
   PV_tmp.setFeature(SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObservation.getA(), 
                     SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObservation.getB()); 
   retVal+= ((EndCustomer)i).getDeltaFitness(PV_tmp); 
   denominator++; 
  } 
  if(denominator>0){ 
   return retVal/denominator; 
  }else{ 
   return 0; 
  } 
 } 
 
 public double 
avgDeltaFitnessOfSpecialFeatureForECs_WithoutSpecialFeature(){ 
  double retVal = 0; 
  double denominator = 0; 
  for (Object i: context.getObjects(EndCustomer.class)){ 
   EndCustomer EC =(EndCustomer)i; 
  
 if(!EC.getProductVector().hasFeature(SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObse
rvation)){ 
    ProductVector PV_tmp = new ProductVector(EC.getProductVector()); 
   
 PV_tmp.setFeature(SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObservation.getA(), 
                      
SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObservation.getB()); 
    retVal+= ((EndCustomer)i).getDeltaFitness(PV_tmp); 
    denominator++; 
   } 
  } 
  if(denominator>0){ 
   return retVal/denominator; 
  }else{ 
   return 0; 
  } 
 }  
  
 public double getCreatorDegreeCentrality(){ 
  Effectuator EFF = getCreator(); 
  if(EFF != null){ 
   return EFF.getDegreeCentrality(); 
  } 
  return 0; 
 } 
  
 public double getCreatorBetweennessCentrality(){ 
  Effectuator EFF = getCreator(); 
  if(EFF != null){ 
   return EFF.getBetweennessCentrality(); 
  } 
  return 0; 
 } 
 
 public double getCreatorClosenessCentrality(){ 
  Effectuator EFF = getCreator(); 
  if(EFF != null){ 
   return EFF.getClosenessCentrality(); 
  } 
  return 0; 
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 } 
 
 public double getCreatorClusteringCoefficient(){ 
  Effectuator EFF = getCreator(); 
  if(EFF != null){ 
   return EFF.getClusteringCoefficient(); 
  } 
  return 0; 
 } 
  
 public double getCreatorDocility(){ 
  Effectuator EFF = getCreator(); 
  if(EFF != null){ 
   return EFF.getDocility(); 
  } 
  return 0; 
 } 
 public double getCreatorProactiveness(){ 
  Effectuator EFF = getCreator(); 
  if(EFF != null){ 
   return (double) EFF.getPropagation_probability(); 
  } 
  return 0; 
 } 
 
 public double getCreatorMarketFit(){ 
  Effectuator EFF = getCreator(); 
  if(EFF != null){ 
   return (double) EFF.calculateGlobalAverageMarketFit(); 
  } 
  return 0; 
 } 
 
 private Effectuator getCreator(){ 
  for (Object i: context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
   Effectuator EFF = (Effectuator)i; 
   if (EFF.isCPUN_Creator()){ 
    return EFF; 
   } 
  } 
  return null; 
 } 
  
 
 private void calculateBetweennessCentralities(){ 
  if(SimulationParameters.Network_analysis_required){ 
   ContextJungNetwork<Object> N = (ContextJungNetwork<Object>)network; 
   Graph<Object, RepastEdge<Object>> G = N.getGraph(); 
   BetweennessCentrality<Object, RepastEdge<Object>> ranker =  
    new BetweennessCentrality<Object, RepastEdge<Object>>(G); 
   ranker.setRemoveRankScoresOnFinalize(false); 
   ranker.evaluate(); 
   double size = SimulationParameters.NumberOfEffectuators + 
SimulationParameters.NumberOfEndCustomers; 
   double NormalizationFactor = (((size-1) * (size-2)) / 2.0); 
   double retVal = 0; 
   for (Object i : context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
    retVal = ranker.getVertexRankScore(i) / NormalizationFactor; 
    ((Effectuator)i).setBetweennessCentrality((float)retVal); 
   } 
  } 
 } 
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 private void getClosenessCentralities(){ 
  if(SimulationParameters.Network_analysis_required){ 
   ContextJungNetwork<Object> N = (ContextJungNetwork<Object>)network; 
   Graph<Object, RepastEdge<Object>> G = N.getGraph(); 
   ClosenessCentrality<Object, RepastEdge<Object>> ranker =  
    new ClosenessCentrality<Object, RepastEdge<Object>>(G); 
   double retVal = 0; 
   for (Object i : context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
    retVal =ranker.getVertexScore(i); 
    ((Effectuator)i).setClosenessCentrality((float)retVal); 
   } 
  } 
 } 
 
  
 private void getClusteringCoefficients(){ 
  if(SimulationParameters.Network_analysis_required){ 
   Map<Object, Double> cc = 
Metrics.clusteringCoefficients(((ContextJungNetwork<Object>)network).getGra
ph()); 
   double retVal = 0; 
   for (Object i : context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
    retVal = cc.get(i);  
    ((Effectuator)i).setClusteringCoefficient((float)retVal); 
   } 
  } 
 } 
 
  
  
  
 public int getNumberOfProjects(){ 
  return Effectuator.projectCounter; 
 } 
 
  
} 
Agent.java 
package jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator; 
 
 
 
import repast.simphony.context.Context; 
import repast.simphony.engine.schedule.ScheduledMethod; 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.Network; 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.RepastEdge; 
 
public abstract class Agent { 
 
 /** 
  * @uml.property  name="id" 
  */ 
 private String name = ""; 
 
 /** 
  * @uml.property  name="productVector" 
  * @uml.associationEnd  
inverse="agent:jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator.ProductVector" 
  */ 
80 
 protected ProductVector productVector = new 
jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator.ProductVector(); 
 
 /** 
  * @uml.property  name="network" 
  */ 
 protected Network<Object> network; 
 
 /** 
  * @uml.property  name="context" 
  */ 
 protected Context<Object> context; 
  
 protected boolean isStatic = true; 
 
 /** 
  */ 
 public Agent(Context<Object> context, Network<Object> network, String id, 
ProductVector productVector){ 
  this.setNetwork(network); 
  this.setContext(context); 
  this.setName(id); 
  this.setProductVector(productVector); 
  this.setNOTStatic(); 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * Getter of the property <tt>productVector</tt> 
  * @return  Returns the productVector. 
  * @uml.property  name="productVector" 
  */ 
 public ProductVector getProductVector() { 
  return productVector; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * Setter of the property <tt>productVector</tt> 
  * @param productVector  The productVector to set. 
  * @uml.property  name="productVector" 
  */ 
 public void setProductVector(ProductVector productVector) { 
  this.productVector = productVector; 
  setNOTStatic(); 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * Getter of the property <tt>id</tt> 
  * @return  Returns the id. 
  * @uml.property  name="id" 
  */ 
 public String getName() { 
  return name; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * Setter of the property <tt>id</tt> 
  * @param id  The id to set. 
  * @uml.property  name="id" 
  */ 
 public void setName(String name) { 
  this.name = name; 
  setNOTStatic(); 
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 } 
 
   
  /** 
   * Getter of the property <tt>network</tt> 
   * @return  Returns the network. 
   * @uml.property  name="network" 
   */ 
  public Network<Object> getNetwork() { 
   return network; 
  } 
 
  /** 
   * Setter of the property <tt>network</tt> 
   * @param network  The network to set. 
   * @uml.property  name="network" 
   */ 
  public void setNetwork(Network<Object> network) { 
   this.network = network; 
   setNOTStatic(); 
  } 
 
  /** 
   * Getter of the property <tt>context</tt> 
   * @return  Returns the context. 
   * @uml.property  name="context" 
   */ 
  public Context<Object> getContext() { 
   return context; 
  } 
 
  /** 
   * Setter of the property <tt>context</tt> 
   * @param context  The context to set. 
   * @uml.property  name="context" 
   */ 
  public void setContext(Context<Object> context) { 
   this.context = context; 
   setNOTStatic(); 
  } 
   
//  public float getMarketFit(ProductVector testProduct){ 
//   return 0; 
//  } 
   
//  public HashMap<ProductVector, Integer> 
getProductRanking(ArrayList<ProductVector> testProducts){ 
//   return null; 
//  } 
   
  @ScheduledMethod(start = 1, interval = 1, shuffle = true, priority = 
300) 
  public void step(){ 
   setStatic(); 
  } 
 
  public float calculateGlobalAverageMarketFit() { 
   assert context != null :"Global market fit cannot be calcualted without 
context!"; 
    
   float marketFits = 0F; 
   float denominator = 0F; 
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   for (Object ec : context.getObjects(EndCustomer.class)){ 
    denominator+=1F; 
    marketFits += this.getProductVector().calculateFit( 
((EndCustomer)ec).getProductVector()); 
   } 
   assert denominator>0 : "Global market fit cannot be calculated without 
endCustomers!"; 
   if(denominator>0.1F){ 
    return (marketFits)/(denominator); 
   }else{ 
    return 0; 
   } 
  } 
 
  public float calculateLocalAverageMarketFit() { 
   assert context != null :"Local market fit cannot be calculated without 
context!"; 
   assert context != null :"Local market fit cannot be calculated without 
network!"; 
    
   float marketFits = 0F; 
   float denominator = 0F; 
   for (Object ec : context.getObjects(EndCustomer.class)){ 
    if(network.getEdge(this, ec) != null){ 
     denominator+=1F; 
     marketFits += this.getProductVector().calculateFit( 
((EndCustomer)ec).getProductVector()); 
    } 
   } 
   //assert denominator>0 : "Global market fit cannot be calculated 
without (local) endCustomers!"; 
   if(denominator>0.1F){ 
    return (marketFits)/(denominator); 
   }else{ 
    return 0; 
   } 
  } 
   
  public String getProductVectorString(){ 
   return getProductVector().toString(); 
  } 
 
 public boolean isBusinessPartner(String agentName){ //checked 
  //1. Find Agent by name 
  Agent partner = null; 
  for (Object i : context.getObjects(Agent.class)){ 
   Agent curr_agent = (Agent)i; 
   if(curr_agent.getName().equals(agentName)){ 
    partner = curr_agent; 
   } 
  } 
   
  //2. See if partner is a BusinessPartner (EdgeWeight =2) 
  RepastEdge<Object> edge = network.getEdge(this, partner); 
  if(edge == null){ 
   return false; 
  }else{ 
   if(edge.getWeight() == 2){ 
    return true; 
   }else{ 
    return false; 
   } 
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  } 
   
 } 
 
 public boolean isStatic() { 
  return this.isStatic; 
 } 
 
 public void setStatic() { 
  this.isStatic = true; 
 } 
 
 public void setNOTStatic() { 
  this.isStatic = false; 
 } 
} 
 
BarabasiAlbertNetworkGenerator.java 
package jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator; 
 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
import java.util.Iterator; 
 
import repast.simphony.context.Context; 
import repast.simphony.context.space.graph.NetworkGenerator; 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.Network; 
 
/** 
 * @author Jan Willem Jansen 
 * 
 */ 
public class BarabasiAlbertNetworkGenerator extends 
EffectualNetworkGenerator 
  implements NetworkGenerator<Object> { 
 
 /** 
  *  
  */ 
 public BarabasiAlbertNetworkGenerator(Context<Object> context) { 
  super(context); 
 } 
 
 /* (non-Javadoc) 
  * @see 
repast.simphony.context.space.graph.NetworkGenerator#createNetwork(repast.s
imphony.space.graph.Network) 
  */ 
 @Override 
 public Network<Object> createNetwork(Network<Object> network) { 
  return network; 
 } 
 
 @Override 
 public void step() { 
   
 } 
 
 @Override 
 public Network<Object> createIntraAgentNetwork(Network<Object> network, 
   Class<?> targetClass) { 
  this.network = network; 
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  return createInterAgentNetwork(network, targetClass, targetClass); 
 } 
 
 @Override 
 public Network<Object> createInterAgentNetwork(Network<Object> network, 
   Class<?> originClass, Class<?> targetClass) { 
  this.network = network; 
   
   
  //Get all related agents ready  
  ArrayList<Object> origins = new ArrayList<Object>(); 
  ArrayList<Object> targets = new ArrayList<Object>(); 
   
  //Get all origins !! Exchange Target-Origins due to speciality of 
Barabasi-Albert & two-mode-networks 
  Iterator<Object> iter = context.getObjects(targetClass).iterator(); 
  while (iter.hasNext()){ 
   Object current = iter.next(); 
   if (current.getClass().getName().equals(targetClass.getName())){ 
    origins.add(current); 
   } 
  } 
   
  //Get all targets !! Exchange Target-Origins due to speciality of 
Barabasi-Albert & two-mode-networks 
  iter = context.getObjects(originClass).iterator(); 
  while (iter.hasNext()){ 
   Object current = iter.next(); 
   if (current.getClass().getName().equals(originClass.getName())){ 
    targets.add(current); 
   } 
  } 
     
  for (Object i: origins){ 
   for (int k = 0; k<SimulationParameters.BAG_EdgesPerStep;k++){ 
    int[] ConnectionProbabilities = new int[targets.size()]; 
    for (int j = 0; j < targets.size();j++){ 
     if(targets.get(j).equals(i)){ 
      ConnectionProbabilities[j] = 0; 
     } 
     else if(network.getEdge(i, targets.get(j)) != null){ 
      ConnectionProbabilities[j] = 0; 
     }else{ 
      ConnectionProbabilities[j] = 1 + 
10*network.getDegree(targets.get(j)); 
     } 
    } 
    int draw = 
RandomHelper.drawfromProbabilityMassFunction(ConnectionProbabilities); 
     
    //Avoid to create Edges twice. Can happen if BAG_EdgesPerStep is too 
large for remining targets 
    if(network.getEdge(i, targets.get(draw)) == null){ 
     network.addEdge(i, targets.get(draw)); 
    } 
   } 
  } 
  return network; 
 } 
 
 @Override 
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 public Network<Object> addCreatorsWithFixedDegrees(Network<Object> 
network, 
   ArrayList<Effectuator> creators, int creatorDegree) { 
  for(Effectuator EFF: creators){ 
   int degree = 0; 
   ArrayList<Effectuator> EFFs = new ArrayList<Effectuator>(); 
   for (Object i : context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
    EFFs.add((Effectuator) i); 
   } 
   creatorDegree = Math.min(creatorDegree, EFFs.size()); 
   while(degree < creatorDegree){  
    int size = EFFs.size(); 
    int random = Math.abs(RandomHelper.getGenerator().nextInt()) % size; 
    Object i = EFFs.get(random); 
    if(network.getEdge(EFF, i)==null){ 
     network.addEdge(EFF, i); 
    } 
    EFFs.remove(i); 
    degree = network.getDegree(EFF); 
   } 
  } 
  return network; 
 } 
 
} 
 Causator.java 
package jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator; 
 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
import repast.simphony.context.Context; 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.Network; 
 
/** 
 * @author Jan Willem Jansen 
 * 
 */ 
public class Causator extends Agent { 
 
 /** 
  *  
  */ 
 public Causator(Context<Object> context, Network<Object> network, String 
id) { 
  super(context, network, id, new ProductVector()); 
 } 
 
 /** 
  *  
  */ 
 public ArrayList<ProductVector> doMarketResearch(Integer 
numberOfParticipants){  //checked 
  ArrayList<ProductVector> prodVectors = new ArrayList<ProductVector>();  
  //Go though all known Contacts 
  for (Object cust : context.getRandomObjects(EndCustomer.class, 
numberOfParticipants)){ 
   ProductVector prodVec = ((EndCustomer)cust).getCustomerPreferences(); 
   prodVectors.add(prodVec); 
  } 
  return prodVectors; 
 } 
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 public ProductVector createNewOffering(ArrayList<ProductVector> 
ProductVectors){ //checked 
  ProductVector newOffering = new ProductVector(); 
  int[][]  analysis_grid = new 
int[SimulationParameters.NumberOfFeatures+1][SimulationParameters.NumberOfV
ariants+1]; 
   
  // Create histogram of market research data 
  for (ProductVector pv : ProductVectors){ 
   for (int i = 0 ; i <= SimulationParameters.NumberOfFeatures; i++){ 
    analysis_grid[i][pv.getOpinionOn(i)]++; 
   } 
  } 
  // Select highest ranking entries for new Product vector 
  for (int feature = 0; feature < analysis_grid.length; feature++){ 
   int maxVariant = -1; 
   int maxPos = -1; 
   for(int value = 0; value < analysis_grid[feature].length; value++){ 
    if(analysis_grid[feature][value] > maxVariant){ 
     maxVariant = analysis_grid[feature][value]; 
     maxPos = value; 
    } 
   } 
   newOffering.setFeature(feature, maxPos); 
  } 
  return newOffering; 
 } 
 
 @Override 
 public void step() { //checked 
  super.step(); 
  if(SimulationParameters.doMarketResearch){ 
   // DO Market research 
   ArrayList<ProductVector> marketResearch = 
doMarketResearch(SimulationParameters.NumberOfMarketResearchParticipants);
    
 
   // Create new market offering 
   ProductVector newProd = createNewOffering(marketResearch); 
   if (!getProductVector().equals(newProd)){ 
     setNOTStatic(); 
   } 
   this.setProductVector(newProd); 
  } 
     
 } 
 
} 
EdgeWeightTransformer.java 
package jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator; 
 
import org.apache.commons.collections15.Transformer; 
 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.RepastEdge; 
 
/** 
 * @author Jan Willem Jansen 
 * 
 */ 
public class EdgeWeightTransformer implements 
Transformer<RepastEdge<Object>, Double> { 
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 @Override 
 public Double transform(RepastEdge<Object> arg0) { 
  if (SimulationParameters.fixedEdgeWeight > 0){ 
   return Double.valueOf((double)SimulationParameters.fixedEdgeWeight); 
  }else 
  { 
   return Double.valueOf(arg0.getWeight()); 
  } 
 } 
 
} 
EffectualNetworkGenerator.java 
package jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator; 
 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
import java.util.Arrays; 
import java.util.HashMap; 
import java.util.Map; 
 
import bibliothek.util.container.Tuple; 
 
import repast.simphony.context.space.graph.ContextJungNetwork; 
import repast.simphony.context.space.graph.NetworkGenerator; 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.Network; 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.RepastEdge; 
import repast.simphony.context.Context; 
import repast.simphony.engine.schedule.ScheduledMethod; 
import edu.uci.ics.jung.algorithms.metrics.Metrics; 
import edu.uci.ics.jung.algorithms.shortestpath.DistanceStatistics; 
 
/** 
 * @author Jan Willem Jansen 
 * 
 */ 
public abstract class EffectualNetworkGenerator implements 
NetworkGenerator<Object> { 
 
 /** 
  *  
  */ 
 public EffectualNetworkGenerator(Context<Object> context) { 
  this.context = context; 
 } 
 
 
 /** 
  */ 
 public abstract Network<Object> createNetwork(Network<Object> network); 
 
 
 /** 
  */ 
 public abstract Network<Object> createIntraAgentNetwork(Network<Object> 
network, Class<?> targetClass); 
   
 /** 
  */ 
 public abstract Network<Object> createInterAgentNetwork(Network<Object> 
network, Class<?> originClass, Class<?> targetClass); 
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 @ScheduledMethod(start = 1, interval = 1, shuffle = true, priority = 1) 
 public abstract void step(); 
 
 /** 
  * @uml.property  name="context" 
  */ 
 protected Context<Object> context; 
 protected Network<Object> network; 
 
 /** 
  * Getter of the property <tt>context</tt> 
  * @return  Returns the context. 
  * @uml.property  name="context" 
  */ 
 public Context<Object> getContext() { 
  return context; 
 } 
 
 
 /** 
  * Setter of the property <tt>context</tt> 
  * @param context  The context to set. 
  * @uml.property  name="context" 
  */ 
 public void setContext(Context<Object> context) { 
  this.context = context; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * Getter of the property <tt>context</tt> 
  * @return  Returns the context. 
  * @uml.property  name="context" 
  */ 
 public Network<Object> getNetwork() { 
  return network; 
 } 
 
 
 /** 
  * Setter of the property <tt>context</tt> 
  * @param context  The context to set. 
  * @uml.property  name="context" 
  */ 
 public void setnetwork(Network<Object> network) { 
  this.network = network; 
 } 
  
 public Tuple<int[][],ArrayList<String>> getSociomatrix(){ //checked 
  HashMap<Integer, Integer> AgentHashes = new HashMap<Integer, Integer>(); 
  ArrayList<String> AgentNames = new ArrayList<String>(); 
  int counter = 0; 
  for (Object agent : context.getObjects(Agent.class)){ 
   AgentHashes.put(agent.hashCode(), counter); 
   AgentNames.add(((Agent)agent).getName()); 
   counter++; 
  } 
  int numberOfAgents = AgentHashes.size(); 
  int[][] Sociomatrix = new int[numberOfAgents][numberOfAgents]; 
   
  for(Object ed : network.getEdges()){ 
   @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") 
   RepastEdge<Object> edge = (RepastEdge<Object>) ed; 
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   int sourceNum = AgentHashes.get(edge.getSource().hashCode()); 
   int targetNum = AgentHashes.get(edge.getTarget().hashCode());  
   Sociomatrix[sourceNum][targetNum] = (int)(edge.getWeight()); 
   Sociomatrix[targetNum][sourceNum] = (int)(edge.getWeight()); 
  } 
   
  Tuple<int[][],ArrayList<String>> retVal = new 
Tuple<int[][],ArrayList<String>>(); 
  retVal.setA(Sociomatrix); 
  retVal.setB(AgentNames); 
  return retVal; 
 } 
  
 public String getSociomatrixString(){ //checked 
  Tuple<int[][],ArrayList<String>> data = getSociomatrix(); 
  int [][] matrix = data.getA(); 
  ArrayList<String> headers = data.getB(); 
  String retVal = "["; 
  retVal += Arrays.toString(headers.toArray()); 
  retVal += ";"; 
  for (int[] row : matrix){ 
   retVal += Arrays.toString(row) + ";"; 
  } 
  retVal = retVal.substring(0, retVal.length()-1); 
  retVal += "]"; 
  return retVal; 
 } 
  
 public static double getDensity(Network<Object> network){ 
  double retVal =  ( 2.0 * network.numEdges() ) / ( network.size() * 
(network.size()-1) ); 
  return retVal; 
 } 
 
 public static double getDiameter(Network<Object> network){ 
  double retVal = 
DistanceStatistics.diameter(((ContextJungNetwork<Object>)network).getGraph(
)); 
  return retVal; 
 } 
  
 public static double getNetworkClusteringCoefficient(Network<Object> 
network){ 
  double retVal = 0; 
  Map<Object, Double> cC = 
Metrics.clusteringCoefficients(((ContextJungNetwork<Object>)network).getGra
ph()); 
  for (Object n: network.getNodes()) { 
   retVal += cC.get(n) / network.size(); 
  } 
   
  return retVal; 
 } 
 
 
 public abstract Network<Object> 
addCreatorsWithFixedDegrees(Network<Object> network, ArrayList<Effectuator> 
creators, 
   int creatorDegree); 
} 
 Effectuator.java 
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package jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator; 
 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
import java.util.HashMap; 
import java.util.Random; 
 
import repast.simphony.context.Context; 
import repast.simphony.engine.schedule.ScheduledMethod; 
import repast.simphony.essentials.RepastEssentials; 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.Network; 
 
/** 
 * @author Jan Willem Jansen 
 * 
 */ 
public class Effectuator extends Agent { 
 
 protected float docility = 0; 
 protected float propagation_probability = 0; 
 protected String projectName = "-"; 
 private ProductVector oldProductVector = new ProductVector(); 
 public static int projectCounter = 0; 
 public boolean isActive = true; 
  
  
  
  
 /** 
  * @return the projectCounter 
  */ 
 public static int getProjectCounter() { 
  Effectuator.projectCounter++; 
  return projectCounter; 
 } 
 
 public String getProjectName() { 
  return projectName; 
 } 
 
 public void setProjectName(String projectName) { 
  this.projectName = projectName; 
  setNOTStatic(); 
 } 
 
 public float getPropagation_probability() { 
  return propagation_probability; 
 } 
 
 public void setPropagation_probability(float propagation_probability) { 
  this.propagation_probability = propagation_probability; 
  //setNOTStatic(); 
 } 
 
 protected float distribution_probability = 0;  
 
 /** 
  *  
  */ 
 public Effectuator(Context<Object> context, Network<Object> network, 
String id,  
   ProductVector productVector, float docility, float 
propagation_probability,  
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   float distribution_probability, boolean isActive) { 
  super(context, network, id, productVector); 
  setDocility(docility); 
  this.propagation_probability = propagation_probability; 
  this.distribution_probability = distribution_probability; 
  setNOTStatic(); 
  this.isActive = isActive; 
 } 
 
 @Override 
 public void step() { 
  super.step(); 
  resetNonTransmitCounters(); 
  setIncomingIdeasStack(); 
  // Go through daily routine of an effectuator 
   
  //Think of propagation only if you have sth. new to tell! 
  if(!getProductVector().equals(oldProductVector)){ 
   if(SimulationParameters.doPropagateOwnidea && this.isActive){ //checked 
    //Propagate ideas 
    propagateOwnIdea(Effectuator.class); 
    propagateOwnIdea(EndCustomer.class); 
   }    
  } 
  oldProductVector = new ProductVector(getProductVector()); 
     
  if(SimulationParameters.doPropagateOtherIdeas){ //checked 
   //Get Ideas from staple & propagate them 
   propagateOtherIdeas();    
  } 
 
   
  if(SimulationParameters.doEvaluatePropagatedIdeas){ 
   //Evaluate ideas propagated by other effectuators 
   evaluatePropagatedIdeas(); 
  } 
 
  if(SimulationParameters.doPickupNewFeatureFromOtherIdea && 
this.isActive){ 
   //Evaluate ideas propagated by other effectuators 
   pickupNewFeatureFromOtherIdeas(); 
  } 
   
  //Finally get rid of new ideas 
  incomingIdeas.clear(); 
   
  //Do some Self-Measurements 
  TotalNumberOfFeatureChanges+=this.getNumberOfFeatureChanges(); 
  checkCPUNassignment(); 
 } 
  
 @ScheduledMethod(start = 1, interval = 1, priority = 200) 
 public void transmitCreatorStrategyToProject(){ 
  if(isCPUN_Creator()){ 
   if(SimulationParameters.doTransmitCreatorStrategyToProject){ 
    for(Object i : network.getAdjacent(this)){ 
     if(network.getEdge(this, i).getWeight()==2){ 
      ((Effectuator)i).setDocility(this.getDocility()); 
     
 ((Effectuator)i).setPropagation_probability(this.getPropagation_probabilit
y()); 
     } 
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    } 
   } 
  } 
 } 
  
 protected void resetNonTransmitCounters() { 
  countReasonForNonTransmit_NegoFailed_Docility =0; 
  countReasonForNonTransmit_NegoFailed_Fitness =0; 
  countReasonForNonTransmit_NonPropagation =0; 
  countReasonForNonTransmit_NonRePropagation = 0; 
  countReasonForNonTransmit_NotPickedUp =0; 
  countReasonForNonTransmit_SacrInNego=0; 
 } 
 
 protected void setIncomingIdeasStack() { 
  double tickCount = RepastEssentials.GetTickCount(); 
  incomingIdeas = incomingIdeaStorage.get(tickCount); 
  if(incomingIdeas == null){ 
   incomingIdeas = new HashMap<ProductVector, ArrayList<String>>(); 
  } 
 } 
 
 protected void pickupNewFeatureFromOtherIdeas() { 
  for (ProductVector pv : incomingIdeas.keySet()){ 
   //due to asynchronous processing, we have to exclude ideas from new 
found business partners 
   //due to repropagation of our idea, we have to make sure to exclude our 
own ideas 
   String sender = incomingIdeas.get(pv).get(0); 
   if(!sender.equals(this.getName()) && !isBusinessPartner(sender)){ 
  
    if(SimulationParameters.doPickupNewFeatureFromOtherIdea){ 
     if(RandomHelper.getGenerator().nextDouble() <= this.getDocility()){ 
      ProductVector newIdeas = pickupNewFeatureFromOtherIdea(pv); 
      if(!newIdeas.isEmpty()){ 
       ProductVector copy = new ProductVector(getProductVector()); 
       getProductVector().incorporateIdeas(newIdeas); 
       setNOTStatic(); 
       //CHeck if this pickup led to (non-)incorporation of special 
feature 
       checkHasAdoptedThroughPickup(); 
      
 if(!getProductVector().hasFeature(SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObserva
tion) && 
         pv.hasFeature(SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObservation)){ 
        countReasonForNonTransmit_NotPickedUp++; 
       } 
       // Negotiate inclusion with my business partners 
       Negotiation myNego = new ProbabilisticNegotiation(context, 
network); 
       myNego.setPartyA(this); 
       myNego.setPartyB(this); 
       boolean result = myNego.negotiate(); 
       if(!result){ 
        assert 1<0 : "That should not have happened! BUG???"; 
        setProductVector(copy); 
       } 
      } 
     }else{ 
      //Measurement: see if low docility caused Non-Pickup of "special 
feature" 
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      //which is only relevant if the special feature is really not 
there! 
      if(pv.hasFeature(SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObservation) && 
         
!getProductVector().hasFeature(SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObservation
)){ 
       countReasonForNonTransmit_NotPickedUp++; 
      } 
     } 
    } 
   } 
  }   
 } 
 
 protected void propagate(ProductVector idea, Class<?> targetclass, 
ArrayList<String> ids){ //checked 
  //Go though all known Contacts  
  for (Object neighbor: network.getAdjacent(this)){ 
   //identify targets 
   if(neighbor.getClass().getName().equals(targetclass.getName())){ 
    //If this guy is not already with you 
    if(network.getEdge(this, neighbor).getWeight() != 2){ 
     //Pitch your idea if you feel like it 
     Effectuator EFF = (Effectuator)neighbor; 
     Random generator = RandomHelper.getGenerator(); 
     if (generator.nextFloat() <= this.propagation_probability){ 
      EFF.addIncomingIdea(idea, ids); 
      if 
(getProductVector().hasFeature(SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObservation
)){ 
       CPUN_Propagator = true; 
      } 
     }else{ 
      if 
(getProductVector().hasFeature(SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObservation
)){ 
       if(ids.get(0).equals(getName())){ 
        countReasonForNonTransmit_NonPropagation++; 
       }else{ 
        countReasonForNonTransmit_NonRePropagation++; 
       } 
      } 
     } 
    }    
   } 
  } 
 } 
  
 protected ProductVector pickupNewFeatureFromOtherIdea(ProductVector 
otherIdea){ //checked 
  ProductVector newIdea = new ProductVector();  
  ArrayList<Integer>  newfeatures = otherIdea.getKnownFeatures(); 
  newfeatures.removeAll(getProductVector().getKnownFeatures()); 
  if (newfeatures.size() > 0){ 
   int position = RandomHelper.getGenerator().nextInt(newfeatures.size()); 
   newIdea.setFeature(newfeatures.get(position), 
otherIdea.getOpinionOn(newfeatures.get(position))); 
  } 
  return newIdea; 
 } 
  
 protected void propagateOwnIdea(Class <?> clazz){ //checked 
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  ArrayList<String> ids = new ArrayList<String>(); 
  ids.add(getName()); 
  propagate(getProductVector(), clazz, ids); 
 } 
  
 protected void propagateOtherIdeas(){ 
  for (ProductVector pv: incomingIdeas.keySet()){ 
   //if(RandomHelper.getGenerator().nextFloat() <= 
this.distribution_probability){ 
    ArrayList<String> ids = incomingIdeas.get(pv); 
    ids.add(getName()); 
    propagate(pv, Effectuator.class, ids); 
    propagate(pv, EndCustomer.class, ids); 
   //} 
  }  
 }  
  
 protected HashMap<Double, HashMap<ProductVector, ArrayList<String>>> 
incomingIdeaStorage = new HashMap<Double, 
HashMap<ProductVector,ArrayList<String>>>(); 
  
 protected HashMap<ProductVector, ArrayList<String>> incomingIdeas = null; 
   
 protected void evaluatePropagatedIdeas(){ 
  ArrayList<String> removeLater = new ArrayList<String>();  
  for (ProductVector pv : incomingIdeas.keySet()){ 
   String sender = incomingIdeas.get(pv).get(0); 
   //due to asynchronous processing, we have to exclude ideas from new 
found business partners 
   //due to repropagation of our idea, we have to make sure to exclude our 
own ideas 
   if(!sender.equals(this.getName()) && !isBusinessPartner(sender)){ 
    Negotiation myNegotiation = new ProbabilisticNegotiation(context, 
network); 
    boolean hasSuccessfullyNegotiated = executeNegotiation(sender, 
myNegotiation); 
    if(hasSuccessfullyNegotiated){ 
     setNOTStatic(); 
     //See if negotiation led to Pickup of special feature or its loss in 
the negotiation 
     checkHasAdoptedOrLostThroughNegotiation(); 
     removeLater.add(sender); 
    }else{ 
     //See if negotiation failed and let to non-propagation of special 
feature 
    
 if(!getProductVector().hasFeature(SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObserva
tion) && 
        pv.hasFeature(SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObservation)){ 
      if(myNegotiation.reasonForFailure_Docility){ 
       countReasonForNonTransmit_NegoFailed_Docility++; 
      } 
      if(myNegotiation.reasonForFailure_Fitness){ 
       countReasonForNonTransmit_NegoFailed_Fitness++; 
      } 
     } 
    } 
   } 
  } 
  //Clear List of successfully negotiated Ideas for Pickup-Stuff 
  for (String i : removeLater){ 
   incomingIdeas.remove(i); 
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  } 
 } 
 
// public boolean evaluatePropagatedIdea(String AgentID, ProductVector 
idea){ //checked 
//  //if (this.getProductVector().isAcceptable(idea, getDocility())){ 
//   return executeNegotiation(AgentID); 
//  //} 
//  //return false; 
// } 
 
 protected boolean executeNegotiation(String AgentID, Negotiation 
myNegotiation){  //checked 
   
  //myNegotiation = new ProbabilisticNegotiation(context, network); 
  for (Object agent : context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
   if (((Agent)agent).getName().equals(AgentID)){ 
    myNegotiation.setPartyA((Effectuator)agent); 
   } 
  } 
  myNegotiation.setPartyB(this); 
  return myNegotiation.negotiate(); 
 } 
  
 public boolean addIncomingIdea(ProductVector incomingIdea, 
ArrayList<String> ids) { 
  double tickCount = RepastEssentials.GetTickCount(); 
  if(incomingIdeaStorage.get(tickCount+1) == null){ 
   incomingIdeaStorage.put(tickCount+1, new HashMap<ProductVector, 
ArrayList<String>>()); 
  } 
  HashMap<ProductVector, ArrayList<String>> FutureIncomingIdeas = 
incomingIdeaStorage.get(tickCount+1); 
   
  if(!ids.contains(getName())){ 
   FutureIncomingIdeas.put(incomingIdea, ids); 
   return true; 
  }else{ 
   return false; 
  } 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * Getter of the property <tt>docility</tt> 
  * @return  Returns the docility. 
  * @uml.property  name="docility" 
  */ 
 public float getDocility() { 
  return docility; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * Setter of the property <tt>docility</tt> 
  * @param docility  The docility to set. 
  * @uml.property  name="docility" 
  */ 
 public void setDocility(float docility) { 
  this.docility = docility; 
  //setNOTStatic(); 
 } 
  
 public boolean isNegotiationResultAcceptable(ProductVector result){ 
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  return getProductVector().isAcceptable(result, getDocility()); 
 } 
  
 protected boolean hasAdoptedThroughPickup = false; 
 protected boolean hasAdoptedThroughNegotiation = false; 
  
  
  
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
////////////////////// 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
////////////////////// 
// 
// Measurement related stuff 
// 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
////////////////////// 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
////////////////////// 
 
  
  
 public int countReasonForNonTransmit_NonPropagation = 0; 
 public int countReasonForNonTransmit_NonRePropagation = 0; 
 public int countReasonForNonTransmit_NegoFailed_Docility = 0; 
 public int countReasonForNonTransmit_NegoFailed_Fitness = 0; 
 public int countReasonForNonTransmit_SacrInNego = 0; 
 public int countReasonForNonTransmit_NotPickedUp = 0; 
 
 
 public void checkHasAdoptedThroughPickup(){ 
 
 if(getProductVector().hasFeature(SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObservat
ion)){ 
   if(hasAdoptedThroughPickup || hasAdoptedThroughNegotiation){ 
    return; 
   }else{ 
    hasAdoptedThroughPickup = true; 
   } 
  }else{ 
   hasAdoptedThroughPickup = false; 
   hasAdoptedThroughNegotiation = false; 
  } 
 } 
 
 public void checkHasAdoptedOrLostThroughNegotiation(){ 
 
 if(getProductVector().hasFeature(SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObservat
ion)){ 
   if(hasAdoptedThroughPickup || hasAdoptedThroughNegotiation){ 
    return; 
   }else{ 
    hasAdoptedThroughNegotiation = true; 
   } 
  }else{ 
   if(hasAdoptedThroughPickup || hasAdoptedThroughNegotiation){ 
    countReasonForNonTransmit_SacrInNego++; 
   } 
   hasAdoptedThroughPickup = false; 
   hasAdoptedThroughNegotiation = false; 
  } 
 } 
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 //Creator, User, Propagator, None of the above - Einteilung: 
 public boolean CPUN_None = false; 
 public boolean CPUN_Creator = false; 
 public boolean CPUN_Propagator = false; 
 public boolean CPUN_User = false; 
 
 public boolean isCPUN_None() { 
  return CPUN_None; 
 } 
 
 public boolean isCPUN_Creator() { 
  return CPUN_Creator; 
 } 
 
 public boolean isCPUN_Propagator() { 
  return CPUN_Propagator; 
 } 
 
 public boolean isCPUN_User() { 
  return CPUN_User; 
 } 
 
 protected void checkCPUNassignment(){ 
  if(hasAdoptedThroughPickup || hasAdoptedThroughNegotiation || 
CPUN_Creator){ 
   CPUN_User = true; 
  }else{ 
   CPUN_User = false; 
  } 
   
  this.CPUN_None = !(CPUN_Creator && CPUN_Propagator && CPUN_User); 
 } 
 
 public void setCreator(boolean isCreator) { 
  this.CPUN_Creator = isCreator; 
 } 
 
 public double getAbsoluteFitness(ProductVector PV){ 
  return FitnessLandscape.getFitness(PV); 
 } 
  
 public float getEFF_Fitness(){ 
  return (float) FitnessLandscape.getFitness(getProductVector()); 
 } 
  
  
 protected float betweennessCentrality = 0.0f; 
 protected float closenessCentrality = 0.0f; 
 protected float clusteringCoefficient = 0.0f; 
 protected float groupDegreeCentrality = 0.0f; 
 protected float groupBetweennessCentrality = 0.0f; 
 protected float groupClosenessCentrality = 0.0f; 
 protected float constraint = 0.0f; 
 protected float effectiveSize = 0.0f; 
 protected float efficientyStructHoles = 0.0f; 
 protected float hierarchy = 0.0f; 
  
 
 
 public double getDegreeCentrality(){ 
98 
  double retVal = (double)network.getDegree(this) / 
(double)(SimulationParameters.NumberOfEffectuators + 
SimulationParameters.NumberOfEndCustomers); 
  return retVal; 
 } 
 
 public float getBetweennessCentrality() { 
  return betweennessCentrality; 
 } 
 
 public void setBetweennessCentrality(float betweennessCentrality) { 
  this.betweennessCentrality = betweennessCentrality; 
 } 
 
 public float getClosenessCentrality() { 
  return closenessCentrality; 
 } 
 
 public void setClosenessCentrality(float closenessCentrality) { 
  this.closenessCentrality = closenessCentrality; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * @return the clusteringCoefficient 
  */ 
 public float getClusteringCoefficient() { 
  return clusteringCoefficient; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * @param clusteringCoefficient the clusteringCoefficient to set 
  */ 
 public void setClusteringCoefficient(float clusteringCoefficient) { 
  this.clusteringCoefficient = clusteringCoefficient; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * @return the groupDegreeCentrality 
  */ 
 public float getGroupDegreeCentrality() { 
  return groupDegreeCentrality; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * @param groupDegreeCentrality the groupDegreeCentrality to set 
  */ 
 public void setGroupDegreeCentrality(float groupDegreeCentrality) { 
  this.groupDegreeCentrality = groupDegreeCentrality; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * @return the groupBetweennessCentrality 
  */ 
 public float getGroupBetweennessCentrality() { 
  return groupBetweennessCentrality; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * @param groupBetweennessCentrality the groupBetweennessCentrality to set 
  */ 
 public void setGroupBetweennessCentrality(float 
groupBetweennessCentrality) { 
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  this.groupBetweennessCentrality = groupBetweennessCentrality; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * @return the groupClosenessCentrality 
  */ 
 public float getGroupClosenessCentrality() { 
  return groupClosenessCentrality; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * @param groupClosenessCentrality the groupClosenessCentrality to set 
  */ 
 public void setGroupClosenessCentrality(float groupClosenessCentrality) { 
  this.groupClosenessCentrality = groupClosenessCentrality; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * @return the constraint 
  */ 
 public float getConstraint() { 
  return constraint; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * @param constraint the constraint to set 
  */ 
 public void setConstraint(float constraint) { 
  this.constraint = constraint; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * @return the effectiveSize 
  */ 
 public float getEffectiveSize() { 
  return effectiveSize; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * @param effectiveSize the effectiveSize to set 
  */ 
 public void setEffectiveSize(float effectiveSize) { 
  this.effectiveSize = effectiveSize; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * @return the efficiency 
  */ 
 public float getEfficiencyStructHoles() { 
  return efficientyStructHoles; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * @param efficiency the efficiency to set 
  */ 
 public void setEfficiencyStructHoles(float efficiencyStructHoles) { 
  this.efficientyStructHoles = efficiencyStructHoles; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * @return the hierarchy 
  */ 
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 public float getHierarchy() { 
  return hierarchy; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * @param hierarchy the hierarchy to set 
  */ 
 public void setHierarchy(float hierarchy) { 
  this.hierarchy = hierarchy; 
 } 
 
 public int getProjectSize() { 
  // return project size 
  int retVal = 1; 
  if (this.getProjectName().equals("-")){ 
   return retVal; 
  } 
   
  for(Object i : network.getAdjacent(this)){ 
   if(((Effectuator) i).getProjectName().equals(this.getProjectName())){ 
    retVal++; 
   } 
  } 
  return retVal; 
 } 
  
 private int oldNumberOfStakeholders = 0; 
  
 public int getNumberOfStakeholders(){ 
  return getProjectSize()-1; 
 } 
  
 public int getNumberOfNewStakeholders(){ 
  int retVal = getNumberOfStakeholders() - oldNumberOfStakeholders; 
  oldNumberOfStakeholders = getNumberOfStakeholders(); 
  return retVal; 
 } 
  
 public int getNumberOfFeatureChanges(){ 
  if(oldProductVector.isEmpty()){ 
   return 0; 
  }else{ 
   return getProductVector().getNumberOfFeatureChanges(oldProductVector); 
  } 
 } 
  
 private int TotalNumberOfFeatureChanges=0; 
  
 public int getTotalNumberOfFeatureChanges(){ 
  return TotalNumberOfFeatureChanges; 
 } 
  
 public int getNumberOfNewFeatures(){ 
  if(oldProductVector.isEmpty()){ 
   return 0; 
  }else{ 
   return getProductVector().getNumberOfNewFeatures(oldProductVector); 
  } 
 } 
  
 public int getAbsoluteNumberOfFeatures(){ 
  return getProductVector().getKnownFeatures().size(); 
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 } 
  
 private int initialPVType = -1; 
 
 public int getInitialPVType() { 
  return initialPVType; 
 } 
 
 public void setInitialPVType(int initialPVType) { 
  this.initialPVType = initialPVType; 
 } 
  
 private ArrayList<Integer> getStakeholderInitialPVTypeDistribution_list(){ 
  ArrayList<Integer> PVTypeDistribution_list = new ArrayList<Integer>(); 
  if(SimulationParameters.PVGeneratorType.equals("Predef")){ 
    
   //PrepareList 
   for (int i = 0; i< SimulationParameters.PVPathDependency_NumberOfTypes; 
i++){ 
    PVTypeDistribution_list.add(0); 
   } 
    
   //Add yourself 
   PVTypeDistribution_list.set(getInitialPVType()-1, 1); 
    
   //Add the others 
   for(Object i : network.getAdjacent(this)){ 
    if(network.getEdge(this, i).getWeight() > 1){ 
     Effectuator EFF = (Effectuator) i; 
     if(EFF.getInitialPVType()>0){ 
      int count = PVTypeDistribution_list.get(EFF.getInitialPVType()-1); 
      PVTypeDistribution_list.set(EFF.getInitialPVType()-1, count+1); 
     } 
    } 
   } 
   return PVTypeDistribution_list; 
  } 
  return new ArrayList<Integer>(); 
 } 
 public String getStakeholderInitialPVTypeDistribution_exact(){ 
  String retVal =""; 
  if(SimulationParameters.PVGeneratorType.equals("Predef")){ 
   ArrayList<Integer> InitPVDist = 
getStakeholderInitialPVTypeDistribution_list(); 
    
   //Calculate total number of stakeholders 
   float sum = 0; 
   for(Integer i: InitPVDist){ 
    sum +=i; 
   } 
    
   //Calculate percentages 
   for(Integer i: InitPVDist){ 
    retVal += Float.toString((float)i / sum )+","; 
   } 
  } 
  return retVal; 
 } 
 
 public String getStakeholderInitialPVTypeDistribution_rounded(){ 
  String retVal =""; 
  if(!SimulationParameters.PVGeneratorType.equals("-")){ 
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   ArrayList<Integer> InitPVDist = 
getStakeholderInitialPVTypeDistribution_list(); 
    
   //Calculate total number of stakeholders 
   float sum = 0; 
   for(Integer i: InitPVDist){ 
    sum +=i; 
   } 
    
   //Calculate percentages 
   float factor = 5; 
   for(Integer i: InitPVDist){ 
    float val = Math.round(i*factor / (sum)) / factor; 
    retVal += Float.toString(val)+","; 
   } 
  } 
  return retVal; 
 } 
} 
 EndCustomer.java 
package jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator; 
 
import repast.simphony.context.Context; 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.Network; 
 
/** 
 * @author Jan Willem Jansen 
 * 
 */ 
public class EndCustomer extends Effectuator { 
 
 
  
 public EndCustomer(Context<Object> context, Network<Object> network, 
String id, ProductVector productVector) { 
  super(context, network, id, productVector, 0.0F, 0F, 0F, false); 
  this.setDocility(0.0F); 
  setNOTStatic(); 
 } 
 
 
  
 public ProductVector getCustomerPreferences(){ 
  return getProductVector(); 
 } 
 
 
 @Override 
 public void step() { //checked 
  setStatic(); 
  resetNonTransmitCounters(); 
  setIncomingIdeasStack(); 
  if(SimulationParameters.doEvaluatePropagatedIdeas){ 
   //Evaluate ideas propagated by other effectuators 
   evaluatePropagatedIdeas(); 
  } 
   
  //Finally get rid of new ideas 
  incomingIdeas.clear(); 
  checkCPUNassignment(); 
 } 
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 @Override 
 public boolean isNegotiationResultAcceptable(ProductVector result){ 
  if(FitnessLandscape.getFitness(result) >= 
FitnessLandscape.getFitness(getProductVector())){ 
   return true; 
  }else{ 
   return false; 
  } 
 } 
  
 public double getDeltaFitness(ProductVector PV){ 
  return FitnessLandscape.getFitness(PV) - 
FitnessLandscape.getFitness(getProductVector()); 
 } 
} 
 FitnessLandscape.java 
package jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator; 
 
 
public class FitnessLandscape { 
 
 protected static double[][] staticFitnessValues;  
  
 public FitnessLandscape() { 
  staticFitnessValues = new double[0][0]; 
 } 
 
 public FitnessLandscape(int NumberOfFeatures, int NumberOfValues) { 
  staticFitnessValues = new double[NumberOfFeatures][NumberOfValues+1]; 
 } 
  
  
 public void createRandomFitnesslandscape(double minVal, double maxVal){ 
  for (int i = 0; i<staticFitnessValues.length; i++){ 
   for (int j = 0; j < staticFitnessValues[0].length; j++){ 
    staticFitnessValues[i][j] = RandomHelper.getGenerator().nextDouble() 
* (maxVal - minVal) + minVal; 
   } 
  } 
  //Set "No feature" to 0 
//  for (int i = 0; i<staticFitnessValues.length; i++){ 
//   staticFitnessValues[i][0]=0; 
//  } 
 } 
  
 public static double getFitness(ProductVector request){ 
  double retVal = 0; 
//  for (Integer i : request.getKnownFeatures()){ 
//   retVal += staticFitnessValues[i-1][request.getOpinionOn(i)]; 
//  } 
  for (int i =0; i< staticFitnessValues.length;i++){ 
   retVal += staticFitnessValues[i][request.getOpinionOn(i+1)]; 
  } 
  return retVal; 
 } 
  
 public static void clearFeature(int feature){ 
  for (int i =0; i< staticFitnessValues[feature-1].length;i++){ 
   staticFitnessValues[feature-1][i]=0; 
  } 
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 } 
 
 public static void setFeatureVariant(int feature, int variant, double 
value){ 
  staticFitnessValues[feature-1][variant]=value; 
 } 
  
} 
Negotiation.java 
package jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator; 
 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.Network; 
import repast.simphony.context.Context; 
 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
 
/** 
 * @author Jan Willem Jansen 
 * 
 */ 
public abstract class Negotiation { 
  
 protected Effectuator[] Effectuators = {null, null}; 
  
 protected Context<Object> context = null; 
  
 protected Network<Object> network = null; 
  
 protected boolean reasonForFailure_Docility = false; 
 protected boolean reasonForFailure_Fitness = false; 
 
 public Negotiation(Context<Object> context, Network<Object> network) { 
  this.context = context; 
  this.network = network; 
 } 
  
 public Negotiation(Context<Object> context, Network<Object> network, 
Effectuator PartyA, Effectuator PartyB) { 
  this(context, network); 
  setPartyA(PartyA); 
  setPartyB(PartyB); 
 } 
 
 public void setPartyA(Effectuator PartyA){ 
  Effectuators[0] = PartyA; 
 } 
  
 public Effectuator getpartyA(){ 
  return Effectuators[0]; 
 } 
 
 public void setPartyB(Effectuator PartyB){ 
  Effectuators[1] = PartyB; 
 } 
 
 public Effectuator getpartyB(){ 
  return Effectuators[0]; 
 } 
  
 abstract public boolean negotiate(); 
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 abstract protected ProductVector calculateResult(ArrayList<ProductVector> 
interestsA, ArrayList<ProductVector> interestsB); 
 
 protected void createEdgesfromAtoB(ArrayList<Effectuator> involvedAgentsA, 
ArrayList<Effectuator>involvedAgentsB, double EdgeWeight){ 
  //Cycle through parties  
  for (Effectuator agentA : involvedAgentsA){ 
   for (Effectuator agentB : involvedAgentsB){ 
    assert !agentA.equals(agentB) : "Negotiation let to creation of loop 
in network from agentA to agentA"; 
    NetworkEdge myEdge = (NetworkEdge) network.getEdge(agentA, agentB); 
    //Create/Update network of weight EdgeWeight 
    if (myEdge == null){ 
     myEdge = (NetworkEdge) network.addEdge(agentA, agentB, EdgeWeight); 
    } 
    myEdge.setWeight(Math.max(EdgeWeight, myEdge.getWeight())); 
   } 
  } 
 } 
  
 protected ArrayList<Effectuator> gatherInvolvedAgents(Effectuator party){ 
//checked 
  ArrayList<Effectuator> involvedAgents = new ArrayList<Effectuator>(); 
  involvedAgents.add(party); 
  for (Object i : network.getAdjacent(party)){ 
   if(network.getEdge(party, i).getWeight() == 2){ 
    involvedAgents.add((Effectuator)i); 
   } 
  } 
  return involvedAgents; 
 } 
  
 protected ArrayList<ProductVector> gatherInterests(ArrayList<Effectuator> 
involvedAgents){ //checked 
  ArrayList<ProductVector> interests = new ArrayList<ProductVector>(); 
  for(Effectuator EFF : involvedAgents){ 
   interests.add(EFF.getProductVector()); 
  } 
  return interests; 
 } 
} 
NetworkEdge.java 
package jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator; 
 
import java.awt.Color; 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.RepastEdge; 
 
/** 
 * @author willem 
 * 
 */ 
public class NetworkEdge extends RepastEdge<Object> { 
  
 private double thickness; 
 private Color color; 
 private ArrayList<Color> colorList= new ArrayList<Color>(); 
 
 public NetworkEdge() { 
  this(null, null, false, 1); 
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 } 
 
 public NetworkEdge(Object source, Object target, boolean directed) { 
  this(source, target, directed, 1); 
 } 
 
 public NetworkEdge(Object source, Object target, boolean directed, 
   double weight) { 
  super(source, target, directed, weight); 
  colorList.add(Color.GREEN); 
  colorList.add(Color.RED); 
  colorList.add(Color.BLUE); 
  colorList.add(Color.ORANGE); 
  colorList.add(Color.CYAN); 
  colorList.add(Color.PINK); 
  colorList.add(Color.YELLOW); 
  colorList.add(Color.GRAY); 
  colorList.add(Color.LIGHT_GRAY); 
  colorList.add(Color.MAGENTA); 
  setWeight(weight); 
 } 
 
 @Override 
 public void setWeight(double weight){ 
  super.setWeight(weight); 
  if(weight == 1){ 
   setColor(Color.BLACK); 
   setThickness(20.0); 
  }else if(weight == 2){ 
   String projectName = ((Effectuator)this.getSource()).getProjectName(); 
   int projectNumber = Integer.parseInt(projectName.split("_")[1]); 
   setColor(colorList.get(projectNumber % colorList.size())); 
   setThickness(35.0);    
  }else{ 
   //so far undefined! 
   setColor(Color.RED); 
   setThickness(1.0);    
  } 
 } 
 /** 
  * @return the thickness 
  */ 
 public double getThickness() { 
  double retVal = thickness; 
  return retVal; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * @param thickness the thickness to set 
  */ 
 public void setThickness(double thickness) { 
  this.thickness = thickness; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * @return the color 
  */ 
 public Color getColor() { 
  return color; 
 } 
 
 /** 
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  * @param color the color to set 
  */ 
 public void setColor(Color color) { 
  this.color = color; 
 } 
  
 public double getRed() { 
  double retVal = color.getRed();  
  return retVal; 
 } 
  
 public double getGreen() { 
  double retVal =  color.getGreen(); 
  return retVal; 
 } 
  
 public double getBlue() { 
  double retVal =  color.getBlue(); 
  return retVal; 
 } 
  
 public void resetVisualization(){ 
  setWeight(getWeight()); 
 } 
} 
ProbabilisticNegotiation.java 
package jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator; 
 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
 
import repast.simphony.context.Context; 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.Network; 
 
/** 
 * @author Jan Willem Jansen 
 * 
 */ 
public class ProbabilisticNegotiation extends Negotiation { 
 
 /** 
  *  
  */ 
 public ProbabilisticNegotiation(Context<Object> context, Network<Object> 
network) { 
  super(context, network); 
 } 
  
 public ProbabilisticNegotiation(Context<Object> context, Network<Object> 
network, Effectuator PartyA, Effectuator PartyB) { 
  super(context, network, PartyA, PartyB); 
 } 
 
 @Override 
 public boolean negotiate() { //checked 
  ArrayList<Effectuator> involvedAgentsA = 
gatherInvolvedAgents(Effectuators[0]); 
  ArrayList<Effectuator> involvedAgentsB = 
gatherInvolvedAgents(Effectuators[1]); 
  involvedAgentsB.removeAll(involvedAgentsA); 
  ArrayList<ProductVector> interestsA = gatherInterests(involvedAgentsA); 
  ArrayList<ProductVector> interestsB = gatherInterests(involvedAgentsB); 
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  ProductVector result = calculateResult(interestsA, interestsB); 
  boolean involvedAgentsA_agree = true; 
  boolean involvedAgentsB_agree = true; 
  for (Effectuator i : involvedAgentsA){ 
   boolean answer = i.isNegotiationResultAcceptable(result); 
   involvedAgentsA_agree = involvedAgentsA_agree && answer; 
   if(!answer){ 
    if(i.getClass().getName().equals(Effectuator.class.getName())){ 
     this.reasonForFailure_Docility = true; 
    }else{ 
     this.reasonForFailure_Fitness = true; 
    } 
   } 
  } 
  for (Effectuator i : involvedAgentsB){ 
   boolean answer = i.isNegotiationResultAcceptable(result); 
   involvedAgentsB_agree = involvedAgentsB_agree && answer; 
   if(!answer){ 
    if(i.getClass().getName().equals(Effectuator.class.getName())){ 
     this.reasonForFailure_Docility = true; 
    }else{ 
     this.reasonForFailure_Fitness = true; 
    } 
   } 
  } 
   
  //If both parties agree, connect them and create joint project 
  if(involvedAgentsA_agree && involvedAgentsB_agree){ 
   String ProjectName = ""; 
   if (Effectuators[0].getProjectName().equals("-")){ 
    if(Effectuators[1].getProjectName().equals("-")){ 
     ProjectName = "Proj_" + 
Integer.toString(Effectuator.getProjectCounter()); 
    }else{ 
     ProjectName = Effectuators[1].getProjectName(); 
    } 
   }else{ 
    ProjectName = Effectuators[0].getProjectName(); 
   } 
    
   for (Effectuator i : involvedAgentsA){ 
    i.setProductVector(result); 
    i.setProjectName(ProjectName); 
    i.checkHasAdoptedOrLostThroughNegotiation(); 
    i.setNOTStatic(); 
    i.isActive = true; 
   } 
   for (Effectuator i : involvedAgentsB){ 
    i.setProductVector(result); 
    i.setProjectName(ProjectName); 
    i.checkHasAdoptedOrLostThroughNegotiation(); 
    i.setNOTStatic(); 
    i.isActive = true; 
   } 
   createEdgesfromAtoB(involvedAgentsA, involvedAgentsB, 2); 
   return true; 
  }else{ 
   //createEdgesfromAtoB(involvedAgentsA, involvedAgentsB, 1); 
   return false; 
  } 
 } 
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 @Override 
 protected ProductVector calculateResult(ArrayList<ProductVector> 
interestsA, ArrayList<ProductVector> interestsB) {  //checked 
  ProductVector retVal = new ProductVector(); 
     
  // Create histogram array 
  int[][] histogram = new int[SimulationParameters.NumberOfFeatures+1] 
                               [SimulationParameters.NumberOfVariants+1]; 
   
  //Populate with preferences of Parties A & B 
  for (ProductVector PV : interestsA){ 
   for (int feature: PV.getKnownFeatures()){ 
    histogram[feature][PV.getOpinionOn(feature)] += 1; 
   } 
  } 
  for (ProductVector PV : interestsB){ 
   for (int feature: PV.getKnownFeatures()){ 
    histogram[feature][PV.getOpinionOn(feature)] += 1; 
   } 
  }   
  //Clear "0" = unknown feature column to avoid "majority vote" on 
exclusion of a feature 
  for (int[] feature: histogram){ feature[0] = 0; } 
   
  //Create result of negotiation based on probabilistic negotiation for 
required features 
  for (int i = 1; i < histogram.length; i++){ 
   //See if line in historamm was used aka. feature is really known to 
anyone 
   int sum = 0; 
   for (int j : histogram[i]){ 
    sum += j; 
   } 
   if(sum > 0){ 
    Integer drawResult = 
RandomHelper.drawfromProbabilityMassFunction(histogram[i]); 
    retVal.setFeature(i, drawResult); 
   } 
  } 
  return retVal; 
 } 
} 
ProductVector.java 
package jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator; 
 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
import java.util.HashMap; 
import java.util.Random; 
 
import bibliothek.util.container.Tuple; 
 
/** 
 * @author Jan Willem Jansen 
 * 
 */ 
public class ProductVector { 
 
 protected HashMap<Integer, Integer> prodvector = new HashMap<Integer, 
Integer>(); 
 /** 
  *  
110 
  */ 
 public ProductVector() { 
 } 
 
 public ProductVector(ProductVector originalProductVector) { 
  for (Integer feature : originalProductVector.getKnownFeatures()){ 
   this.setFeature(feature, originalProductVector.getOpinionOn(feature)); 
  } 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * Creates randomly assigned Productvector with NumOfFeatures elements 
based on FeatureRange and ValueRange 
  */ 
 public ProductVector(Integer FeatureRange, Integer ValueRange, Integer 
NumOfFeatures, boolean isEndCustomer) { 
  Random generator = RandomHelper.getGenerator(); 
  while (prodvector.size() < NumOfFeatures){ 
   Integer randFeature = generator.nextInt(FeatureRange)+1; 
   Integer randValue = 0; 
   if(!isEndCustomer){ 
    randValue = generator.nextInt(ValueRange)+1; 
   }else{ 
    double[] fitness = FitnessLandscape.staticFitnessValues[randFeature-
1]; 
    int[] int_fitness = new int[fitness.length]; 
    for(int i=0; i<fitness.length;i++){ 
     int_fitness[i] = (int)(10000*fitness[i]); 
    } 
    randValue = 
RandomHelper.drawfromProbabilityMassFunction(int_fitness); 
   } 
   setFeature(randFeature, randValue); 
  } 
 }  
  
 /** 
  * Getter of the property <tt>prodvector</tt> 
  * @return  
  * @return  Returns the prodvector. 
  * @uml.property  name="prodvector" 
  */ 
 HashMap<Integer, Integer> getProdvector() { 
  return prodvector; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * Setter of the property <tt>Pvector</tt> 
  * @param Pvector  The pvector to set. 
  * @uml.property  name="Pvector" 
  */ 
 public void setProdvector(HashMap<Integer, Integer> prodvector) { 
  this.prodvector = prodvector; 
 } 
  
 /** 
  * Returns Opinion on a given feature. '0' indicates "unknown Feature" 
  */ 
 public Integer getOpinionOn(Integer feature){ 
  if (prodvector.containsKey(feature)){ 
   return prodvector.get(feature); 
  }else{ 
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   return 0; 
  } 
 } 
  
 public ArrayList<Integer> getKnownFeatures(){ 
  return new ArrayList<Integer>(prodvector.keySet()); 
 } 
  
 /** 
  * Sets Opinion on a given feature. '0' indicates "unknown Feature/No 
Opinion" and deletes it. Feature '0' is ignored) 
  */ 
 public Boolean setFeature(Integer feature, Integer value){ 
  if (feature != 0){ 
   if (value !=0){ 
    prodvector.put(feature, value); 
   }else{ 
    prodvector.remove(feature); 
   } 
   return true; 
  }else{ 
   return true; 
  } 
 } 
  
 public Boolean isAcceptable(ProductVector otherVector, float docility){ 
//checked 
  if (requiredDocility(otherVector) > docility){ 
   return false; 
  }else{ 
   return true; 
  } 
 } 
  
 public float requiredDocility(ProductVector otherVector){ //checked 
  int positives = 0; 
  int negatives = 0; 
  int no_overlap = 0; //Count occurrences of features  
   
  ArrayList<Integer> knownFeatures = this.getKnownFeatures(); //Get all 
Known Features 
  for (Integer i : knownFeatures){ 
   //Ignore the ones we have no opinion on 
   if (getOpinionOn(i) != 0){ 
    //Count if other Vector does not interfere 
    if (otherVector.getOpinionOn(i) == 0){ 
     no_overlap++; 
    }else{ 
     if (this.getOpinionOn(i) == otherVector.getOpinionOn(i)){ 
      //Count as positives if the opinion is the same 
      positives++; 
     }else{ 
      //Count as negatives if opinion differs 
      negatives++; 
     } 
    } 
   } 
  } 
  // Return relative amount of negatives over all my features  
  return (float) negatives / (float)(negatives+positives+no_overlap); 
 } 
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 @Override 
 public boolean equals(Object otherVector){ 
  if(otherVector instanceof ProductVector){ 
   ProductVector otherPV = (ProductVector) otherVector; 
   if(getKnownFeatures().size() != otherPV.getKnownFeatures().size()){ 
    return false; 
   } 
   for(int i : getKnownFeatures()){ 
    if(this.getOpinionOn(i) != otherPV.getOpinionOn(i)){ 
     return false; 
    } 
   } 
   return true; 
  }else{ 
   return false;    
  } 
 } 
  
 public boolean incorporateIdeas(ProductVector newIdea){ 
  for (Integer feature : newIdea.getKnownFeatures()){ 
   if(this.getOpinionOn(feature) != 0){ 
    return false; 
   } 
  } 
  for (Integer newFeature : newIdea.getKnownFeatures()){ 
   this.setFeature(newFeature, newIdea.getOpinionOn(newFeature)); 
  } 
  return true; 
 } 
  
 public int size(){ 
  return prodvector.size(); 
 } 
  
 public float calculateFit(ProductVector customerIdea){ 
  //Calculate market fit for 2 Product Vectors 
  //Idea: Fit = (#features compliant with customer needs) / total number 
of customer's features) 
  //compliant: feature of customer is there & has same value 
  int denominator = customerIdea.size(); 
  int compliantFeatures = 0; 
   
  for (int feature : customerIdea.getKnownFeatures()){ 
   if(customerIdea.getOpinionOn(feature) == this.getOpinionOn(feature)){ 
    compliantFeatures++; 
   } 
  } 
  float retVal = ((float)compliantFeatures) / ((float) denominator);  
  return retVal; 
 } 
  
 @Override 
 public String toString(){ //checked 
  String retVal = "["; 
  for (int i=1; i<=SimulationParameters.NumberOfFeatures; i++){ 
   if(getOpinionOn(i) != 0){ 
    retVal += Integer.toString(getOpinionOn(i)) +","; 
   }else{ 
    retVal += "-" +","; 
   } 
  } 
  retVal = retVal.substring(0, retVal.length()-1); 
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  retVal +="]"; 
  return retVal; 
 } 
 
 public boolean hasFeature(Tuple<Integer, Integer> featureUnderObservation) 
{ 
  if (featureUnderObservation.getA() != 0){ 
   if 
(getOpinionOn(featureUnderObservation.getA()).equals(featureUnderObservatio
n.getB())){ 
    return true; 
   }else{ 
    return false; 
   } 
  }else{ 
   return false; 
  } 
 } 
 
 public boolean isEmpty() { 
  boolean retVal = getKnownFeatures().isEmpty(); 
  return retVal; 
 } 
  
 public int getNumberOfFeatureChanges(ProductVector oldPV){ 
  int retVal = 0; 
  for (Integer feature : oldPV.getKnownFeatures()){ 
   if(this.getOpinionOn(feature) != oldPV.getOpinionOn(feature)){ 
    retVal++; 
   } 
  } 
  return retVal; 
 } 
  
 public int getNumberOfNewFeatures(ProductVector oldPV){ 
  ArrayList<Integer> featureList = this.getKnownFeatures(); 
  featureList.removeAll(oldPV.getKnownFeatures()); 
  return featureList.size(); 
 } 
} 
PVFactory.java 
package jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator; 
 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
 
import bibliothek.util.container.Tuple; 
 
public class PVFactory { 
 private ArrayList<ProductVector> PVs= new ArrayList<ProductVector>(); 
  
 public void createPredefinedPVs(int NumberOfPVs){ 
  PVs.clear(); 
  for(int i=0;i<NumberOfPVs;i++){ 
   ProductVector PV = new 
ProductVector(SimulationParameters.NumberOfFeatures, 
     SimulationParameters.NumberOfVariants, 
SimulationParameters.NumberOfKnownFeaturesEffectuators, true); 
   PVs.add(PV); 
  } 
 } 
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 public Tuple<ProductVector, Integer> getRandomPredefinedPV(){ 
  if(PVs!= null){ 
   int i = RandomHelper.getGenerator().nextInt(PVs.size()); 
   Tuple<ProductVector, Integer> retVal = new Tuple<ProductVector, 
Integer>(); 
   retVal.setA(new ProductVector(PVs.get(i))); 
   retVal.setB(i+1); 
   return retVal; 
  }else{ 
   return null; 
  } 
 } 
} 
RandomHelper.java 
package jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator; 
 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
import java.util.Random; 
 
public class RandomHelper { 
 private static Random generator = null; 
  
 public static Random getGenerator() { //checked 
  if (RandomHelper.generator == null){ 
   RandomHelper.generator = new Random(SimulationParameters.RandomSeed); 
  } 
  return generator; 
 } 
  
 public static Integer drawfromProbabilityMassFunction(int[] histogram){ 
//checked 
   
  //Calculate sum as sum of all entries in ProbabilityMassFunction 
  int totalSum = 0; 
  for (int i : histogram){ 
   totalSum += i; 
  } 
   
  if(totalSum != 0){ 
   int draw = getGenerator().nextInt(totalSum)+1; 
   int runningSum = 0; 
   int returnValue = 0; 
   for (int i = 0; i < histogram.length; i++){ 
    runningSum += histogram[i]; 
    if(runningSum >= draw){ 
     returnValue = i; 
     break; 
    } 
   } 
   return returnValue; 
  }else{ 
   return getGenerator().nextInt(histogram.length); 
  } 
 } 
  
 public static void resetGenerator(){ //checked 
  resetGenerator(SimulationParameters.RandomSeed); 
 } 
  
 public static void resetGenerator(long randomSeed){ //checked 
  if(randomSeed>0){ 
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   RandomHelper.generator = new Random(randomSeed); 
  }else{ 
   RandomHelper.generator = new Random(); 
  } 
 } 
  
 public static int[] randomSequence(int range){ 
  assert range > 0 : "Invalid range size"; 
   
  int[] destList = new int[range]; 
  ArrayList<Integer> sourceList = new ArrayList<Integer>(); 
   
  for (int i = 0 ; i< range; i++){ 
   sourceList.add(i); 
  } 
   
  for (int i = 0 ; i< range; i++){ 
   int sourcePosition = 
RandomHelper.getGenerator().nextInt(sourceList.size()); 
   destList[i] = sourceList.get(sourcePosition); 
   sourceList.remove(sourcePosition); 
  } 
   
  return destList; 
 } 
} 
RandomNetworkGenerator.java 
package jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator; 
 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
import java.util.Random; 
 
import repast.simphony.context.Context; 
import repast.simphony.context.space.graph.NetworkGenerator; 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.Network; 
 
 
public class RandomNetworkGenerator extends EffectualNetworkGenerator 
implements 
  NetworkGenerator<Object> { 
 
 /** 
  * @uml.property  name="EdgeProbability" 
  */ 
 protected float edgeProbability =  0.0F; 
 
 public RandomNetworkGenerator(Context<Object> context, float 
EdgeProbability) { 
  super(context); 
  setEdgeProbability(EdgeProbability); 
 } 
  
 @Override 
 public Network<Object> createNetwork(Network<Object> network) { 
  this.network = network; 
  return network; 
 } 
 
 @Override 
 public Network<Object> createIntraAgentNetwork(Network<Object> network, 
   Class<?> targetClass) { 
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  this.network = network; 
  return createInterAgentNetwork(network, targetClass, targetClass); 
 } 
 
 @Override 
 public Network<Object> createInterAgentNetwork(Network<Object> network, 
   Class<?> originClass, Class<?> targetClass) { 
  this.network = network; 
  Random generator = RandomHelper.getGenerator(); 
   for (Object i : context.getObjects(originClass)){ 
    if(i.getClass().getName().equals(originClass.getName())){ 
    for (Object j : context.getObjects(targetClass)){ 
     if(j.getClass().getName().equals(targetClass.getName())){ 
      if(!i.equals(j) && network.getEdge(i, j) == null && 
network.getEdge(i, j) == null){ 
       if(generator.nextFloat()<= getEdgeProbability()){ 
         NetworkEdge  Edge = (NetworkEdge) network.addEdge(i, j); 
         Edge.setWeight(1); 
       } 
      } 
     } 
    } 
    } 
  } 
  return network; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * Getter of the property <tt>EdgeProbability</tt> 
  * @return  Returns the edgeProbability. 
  * @uml.property  name="EdgeProbability" 
  */ 
 public float getEdgeProbability() { 
  return edgeProbability; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * Setter of the property <tt>EdgeProbability</tt> 
  * @param EdgeProbability  The edgeProbability to set. 
  * @uml.property  name="EdgeProbability" 
  */ 
 public void setEdgeProbability(float edgeProbability) { 
  this.edgeProbability = edgeProbability; 
 } 
 
 @Override 
 public void step() { 
  if(SimulationParameters.doCreateRandomLinks){ //checked, think about it 
contentwise!!! 
   assert this.network != null : "Network not initialized yet!"; 
   float originalEdgeProbability = getEdgeProbability(); 
  
 setEdgeProbability(SimulationParameters.RNG_EdgeProbability*SimulationPara
meters.RNG_EdgeProbability); 
   //Create Eff-Eff and Eff-EndCustomerLinks with very low probability 
   createIntraAgentNetwork(network, Effectuator.class); 
   createInterAgentNetwork(network, Effectuator.class,EndCustomer.class); 
    
   setEdgeProbability(originalEdgeProbability); 
  } 
 } 
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 @Override 
 public Network<Object> addCreatorsWithFixedDegrees(Network<Object> 
network, 
   ArrayList<Effectuator> creators, int creatorDegree) { 
  assert 1<0 : "Not implemented!!!"; 
  return network; 
 } 
} 
SimulationParameters.java 
package jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator; 
 
import bibliothek.util.container.Tuple; 
import repast.simphony.engine.environment.RunEnvironment; 
 
/**  
 * @author Jan Willem Jansen 
 */ 
public class SimulationParameters { 
 public static repast.simphony.parameter.Parameters params = 
RunEnvironment.getInstance().getParameters(); 
  
 public static long RandomSeed = 0; 
 public static long RandomSeed_Network = 0; 
 public static int NumberOfFeatures = 7; 
 public static int NumberOfVariants = 2; 
 public static int NumberOfKnownFeaturesEndcustomers = 4; 
 public static int NumberOfKnownFeaturesEffectuators = 3; 
 public static int NumberOfEffectuators = 10; 
 public static int NumberOfCausators = 1; 
 public static int NumberOfEndCustomers = 20; 
 public static int NumberOfMarketResearchParticipants = (int) 
Math.ceil(((float)NumberOfEndCustomers / 10.0F)); 
 public static float DocilityEffectuators = 0.2f; 
 public static float PropagationProbability = 0.5f; 
 public static float DistributionProbability = 0.0f; 
  
  
 //Creator controls 
 public static float PropagationProbabilityCreator = 0.5f; 
 public static float DocilityCreator = 0.2f; 
 public static int useCreators = 0; 
 public static float goodnessOfIdea = 0.5f; 
 //public static boolean doCentralizeCreator = false; 
  
 //Initiator controls 
 public static int useInitiators = 0; 
  
 //network generator controls 
 public static String NetworkGeneratorType = "BarabasiAlbert"; 
 public static float RNG_EdgeProbability = 1.0f; 
 public static int BAG_EdgesPerStep = 1; 
 public static boolean doCreatorDegreeSweep = false; 
 public static int CreatorDegree = BAG_EdgesPerStep; 
  
 //Behaviour controls 
 public static boolean doMarketResearch = false; 
 public static boolean doPropagateOwnidea = true; 
 public static boolean doPickupNewFeatureFromOtherIdea = true; 
 public static boolean doEvaluatePropagatedIdeas = true; 
 public static boolean doPropagateOtherIdeas = true; 
 public static boolean doCreateRandomLinks = false; 
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 public static boolean doTransmitCreatorStrategyToProject = false; 
 public static boolean isActive_std = true; 
  
 //Simulation controls 
 public static boolean doEndIfSimIsStatic = true; 
 public static int AcceptableIdleTicks = 150; 
 public static int MinNumberOfSimSteps = 50; 
 public static int MaxNumberOfSimSteps = -1; 
  
 //Setup controls 
 public static String PVGeneratorType = "-"; 
 public static int PVPathDependency_NumberOfTypes=0; 
  
 //Measurement 
 public static Tuple<Integer, Integer> FeatureUnderObservation = new 
Tuple<Integer, Integer>(7, 1); 
 public static int VariantUnderObservation = 1; 
 public static float fixedEdgeWeight = 1.0f; 
 public static int NumberOfAnalysisThreads = 8; 
 public static boolean Network_analysis_required = true; 
 public static float Network_analysis_required_until = 10000f; 
 public static boolean CentralityAnalysisRequired = true; 
 public static boolean GroupCentralityAnalysisRequired = false; 
 public static boolean StructuralHolesAnalysisRequired = false; 
 
  
 
 
 /** 
  * Load Parameters from simulation environment 
  */ 
 public static void LoadParameters() { //checked 
  RandomSeed = (Integer)params.getValue("randomSeed"); 
  RandomSeed_Network = (Integer)params.getValue("RandomSeed_Network"); 
  NumberOfFeatures = (Integer)params.getValue("NumberOfFeatures"); 
  NumberOfVariants = (Integer)params.getValue("NumberOfVariants"); 
  NumberOfKnownFeaturesEndcustomers = 
(Integer)params.getValue("NumberOfKnownFeaturesEndcustomers"); 
  NumberOfKnownFeaturesEffectuators = 
(Integer)params.getValue("NumberOfKnownFeaturesEffectuators"); 
  
  NumberOfEffectuators = (Integer)params.getValue("NumberOfEffectuators"); 
  NumberOfCausators = (Integer)params.getValue("NumberOfCausators"); 
  NumberOfEndCustomers = (Integer)params.getValue("NumberOfEndCustomers"); 
  DocilityEffectuators = (Float)params.getValue("DocilityEffectuators"); 
  PropagationProbability = 
(Float)params.getValue("PropagationProbability"); 
  //DistributionProbability = 
(Float)params.getValue("DistributionProbability"); 
  NetworkGeneratorType = (String)params.getValue("NetworkGeneratorType"); 
  RNG_EdgeProbability = (Float)params.getValue("RNG_EdgeProbability"); 
  BAG_EdgesPerStep = (Integer)params.getValue("BAG_EdgesPerStep"); 
  NumberOfMarketResearchParticipants = 
(Integer)params.getValue("NumberOfMarketResearchParticipants"); 
  doCreatorDegreeSweep = (Boolean) 
params.getValue("doCreatorDegreeSweep"); 
  CreatorDegree = (Integer)params.getValue("CreatorDegree"); 
   
  //Creator controls 
  PropagationProbabilityCreator = 
(Float)params.getValue("PropagationProbabilityCreator"); 
  DocilityCreator = (Float)params.getValue("DocilityCreator"); 
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  useCreators = (Integer)params.getValue("useCreators"); 
  goodnessOfIdea = (Float)params.getValue("goodnessOfIdea"); 
  //doCentralizeCreator = (Boolean) 
params.getValue("doCentralizeCreator"); 
   
  //InitiatorControls 
  useInitiators = (Integer)params.getValue("useInitiators"); 
   
  //Behaviour controls 
  doMarketResearch = (Boolean) params.getValue("doMarketResearch"); 
  doPropagateOwnidea = (Boolean) params.getValue("doPropagateOwnidea"); 
  doPickupNewFeatureFromOtherIdea = (Boolean) 
params.getValue("doPickupNewFeatureFromOtherIdea"); 
  doEvaluatePropagatedIdeas = (Boolean) 
params.getValue("doEvaluatePropagatedIdeas"); 
  doPropagateOtherIdeas = (Boolean) 
params.getValue("doPropagateOtherIdeas"); 
  doCreateRandomLinks = (Boolean) params.getValue("doCreateRandomLinks"); 
  doTransmitCreatorStrategyToProject = (Boolean) 
params.getValue("doTransmitCreatorStrategyToProject"); 
  isActive_std = (Boolean) params.getValue("isActive_std"); 
   
  //Simulation controls 
  doEndIfSimIsStatic = (Boolean) params.getValue("doEndIfSimIsStatic"); 
  AcceptableIdleTicks = (Integer)params.getValue("AcceptableIdleTicks"); 
  MinNumberOfSimSteps = (Integer)params.getValue("MinNumberOfSimSteps"); 
  MaxNumberOfSimSteps = (Integer)params.getValue("MaxNumberOfSimSteps"); 
   
  //Setup controls 
  PVGeneratorType = (String)params.getValue("PVGeneratorType"); 
  PVPathDependency_NumberOfTypes = 
(Integer)params.getValue("PVPathDependency_NumberOfTypes"); 
 
  //Measurement 
  VariantUnderObservation = 
(Integer)params.getValue("VariantUnderObservation"); 
  if (VariantUnderObservation>=0){ 
   FeatureUnderObservation = new Tuple<Integer, Integer>(NumberOfFeatures, 
VariantUnderObservation); 
  }else{ 
   FeatureUnderObservation = new Tuple<Integer, Integer>(0, 
VariantUnderObservation); 
  } 
  //fixedEdgeWeight = (Float)params.getValue("fixedEdgeWeight"); 
  //NumberOfAnalysisThreads = 
(Integer)params.getValue("NumberOfAnalysisThreads"); 
  Network_analysis_required = (Boolean) 
params.getValue("Network_analysis_required"); 
  Network_analysis_required_until = 
(Float)params.getValue("Network_analysis_required_until"); 
  CentralityAnalysisRequired = true; //(Boolean) 
params.getValue("Network_analysis_required"); 
  GroupCentralityAnalysisRequired = true; //(Boolean) 
params.getValue("GroupCentralityAnalysisRequired"); 
  StructuralHolesAnalysisRequired = true; //(Boolean) 
params.getValue("StructuralHolesAnalysisRequired"); 
 
 
 } 
 
} 
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StructuralHolesAnalyses.java 
package jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator; 
 
import java.util.concurrent.ExecutorService; 
import repast.simphony.context.Context; 
import repast.simphony.context.space.graph.ContextJungNetwork; 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.Network; 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.RepastEdge; 
import edu.uci.ics.jung.algorithms.metrics.StructuralHoles; 
import edu.uci.ics.jung.graph.Graph; 
 
public class StructuralHolesAnalyses { 
 private static Context<Object> context = null; 
 private static Network<Object> network = null; 
 private static StructuralHoles<Object, RepastEdge<Object>> structuralHoles 
= null; 
 
 public static void getStructuralHolesMeasures(Context<Object> context, 
Network<Object> network, ExecutorService threadPool){ 
  StructuralHolesAnalyses.context = context; 
  StructuralHolesAnalyses.network = network; 
   
  if(SimulationParameters.Network_analysis_required){ 
    
   ContextJungNetwork<Object> N = (ContextJungNetwork<Object>)network; 
   Graph<Object, RepastEdge<Object>> G = N.getGraph(); 
   structuralHoles = new StructuralHoles<Object, RepastEdge<Object>>(G, 
new EdgeWeightTransformer()); 
   for (Object i : context.getObjects(Effectuator.class)){ 
    if(!i.getClass().getName().equals(Effectuator.class.getName())){ 
     continue; 
    } 
    EFFThread thread = new StructuralHolesAnalyses.EFFThread(i); 
    threadPool.submit(thread); 
   } 
  } 
 } 
  
 public static class EFFThread implements Runnable{ 
  private Effectuator EFF = null; 
   
  public EFFThread(Object i){ 
   EFF = (Effectuator)i; 
  } 
   
  public void run(){ 
   float constraint = (float)structuralHoles.constraint(EFF); 
   float effectiveSize = (float)structuralHoles.effectiveSize(EFF); 
   float efficientyStructHoles = (float)structuralHoles.efficiency(EFF); 
   float hierarchy = (float)structuralHoles.hierarchy(EFF); 
   EFF.setConstraint(constraint); 
   EFF.setEffectiveSize(effectiveSize); 
   EFF.setEfficiencyStructHoles(efficientyStructHoles); 
   EFF.setHierarchy(hierarchy); 
  } 
 } 
 
} 
SystemBuilder.java 
package jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator; 
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import java.util.ArrayList; 
 
import bibliothek.util.container.Tuple; 
 
import edu.uci.ics.jung.algorithms.shortestpath.DistanceStatistics; 
import edu.uci.ics.jung.graph.Graph; 
 
import repast.simphony.context.Context; 
import repast.simphony.context.DefaultContext; 
import repast.simphony.context.space.graph.ContextJungNetwork; 
import repast.simphony.context.space.graph.NetworkBuilder; 
import repast.simphony.dataLoader.ContextBuilder; 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.EdgeCreator; 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.Network; 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.RepastEdge; 
 
 
/** 
 * @author Jan Willem Jansen 
 * 
 */ 
public class SystemBuilder extends DefaultContext<Object> implements 
ContextBuilder<Object> { 
 
 /** 
  * @uml.property  name="effectualNetworkGenerator" 
  * @uml.associationEnd  
inverse="systemBuilder:jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator.EffectualNetworkGenera
tor" 
  */ 
 private static EffectualNetworkGenerator effectualNetworkGenerator; 
 /** 
  * @uml.property  name="network" 
  */ 
 public static Network<Object> network; 
 /** 
  * @uml.property  name="context" 
  */ 
 public static Context<Object> context; 
  
 //public int NumberOfIdleTicks = 0; 
 /** 
  * @uml.property  name="endCustomers" 
  * @uml.associationEnd  multiplicity="(0 -1)" 
inverse="systemBuilder:jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator.EndCustomer" 
  */ 
 //protected ArrayList<EndCustomer> endCustomers = new 
ArrayList<EndCustomer>(); 
 /** 
  * @uml.property  name="causators" 
  * @uml.associationEnd  multiplicity="(0 -1)" 
inverse="systemBuilder:jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator.Causator" 
  */ 
 //protected ArrayList<Causator> causators = new ArrayList<Causator>(); 
 /** 
  * @uml.property  name="effectuators" 
  * @uml.associationEnd  multiplicity="(0 -1)" 
inverse="systemBuilder:jEffCauSocialNetworkSimulator.Effectuator" 
  */ 
 //protected ArrayList<Effectuator> effectuators = new 
ArrayList<Effectuator>(); 
 /** 
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  *  
  */ 
 public SystemBuilder() { 
 } 
 
 @Override 
 public Context<Object> build(Context<Object> context) {  //checked 
  if(context == null){ 
   context = new SystemBuilder(); 
  } 
  context.clear(); 
  network = null; 
  Effectuator.projectCounter = 0; 
   
  String contextname ="jEffectuationSimulation";  
  context.setId(contextname); 
  context.setTypeID(contextname); 
  setContext(context); 
  //context.add(this); 
   
  //Load parameters from Runtime-Environment 
  SimulationParameters.LoadParameters(); 
  RandomHelper.resetGenerator(); 
   
   
  //Initialise Networks 
  initNetwork(); 
 
  //Last: Create Fitness Landscape 
  FitnessLandscape myLandscape = new 
FitnessLandscape(SimulationParameters.NumberOfFeatures, 
SimulationParameters.NumberOfVariants); 
  myLandscape.createRandomFitnesslandscape(0, 1); 
   
  int leaveOutFeatures = 0; 
  if(SimulationParameters.useCreators >0){ 
   leaveOutFeatures = 1; 
  } 
   
  PVFactory myPVFactory = null; 
  if(SimulationParameters.PVGeneratorType.equals("Predef")){ 
   myPVFactory = new PVFactory(); 
  
 myPVFactory.createPredefinedPVs(SimulationParameters.PVPathDependency_Numb
erOfTypes); 
  } 
  //Create Agents 
  // 1st: Create End customers 
  for (int i=1; i<= SimulationParameters.NumberOfEndCustomers; i++){ 
   EndCustomer ec = null; 
   if(SimulationParameters.PVGeneratorType.equals("-")){ 
    ProductVector pv = new 
ProductVector(SimulationParameters.NumberOfFeatures- leaveOutFeatures, 
      SimulationParameters.NumberOfVariants, 
SimulationParameters.NumberOfKnownFeaturesEndcustomers, true); 
    pv.setFeature(SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObservation.getA(), 
0); 
    ec = new EndCustomer(context, network,"EC_"+Integer.toString(i), pv); 
   }else{ 
    Tuple<ProductVector, Integer> tup = 
myPVFactory.getRandomPredefinedPV(); 
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    ec = new EndCustomer(context, network,"EC_"+Integer.toString(i), 
tup.getA()); 
    ec.setInitialPVType(tup.getB()); 
   } 
   context.add(ec); 
   //endCustomers.add(ec); 
  } 
   
  // 2nd: Create Effectuators 
  for (int i=1; i<= SimulationParameters.NumberOfEffectuators - 
SimulationParameters.useCreators - SimulationParameters.useInitiators; 
i++){ 
   Effectuator EFF = null; 
   if(SimulationParameters.PVGeneratorType.equals("-")){ 
    ProductVector pv = new 
ProductVector(SimulationParameters.NumberOfFeatures - leaveOutFeatures, 
      SimulationParameters.NumberOfVariants, 
SimulationParameters.NumberOfKnownFeaturesEffectuators, false); 
    pv.setFeature(SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObservation.getA(), 
0); 
    EFF = new Effectuator(context, network, "EFF_"+Integer.toString(i), 
pv, 
      SimulationParameters.DocilityEffectuators, 
SimulationParameters.PropagationProbability, 
      SimulationParameters.DistributionProbability, 
SimulationParameters.isActive_std); 
   }else{ 
    Tuple<ProductVector, Integer> tup = 
myPVFactory.getRandomPredefinedPV(); 
    EFF = new Effectuator(context, network, "EFF_"+Integer.toString(i), 
tup.getA(), 
      SimulationParameters.DocilityEffectuators, 
SimulationParameters.PropagationProbability, 
      SimulationParameters.DistributionProbability, 
SimulationParameters.isActive_std); 
    EFF.setInitialPVType(tup.getB()); 
     
   } 
   context.add(EFF); 
   //effectuators.add(EFF); 
  } 
   
  //2nd.A. Create "Creators" - The effectuators with a special feature 
  ArrayList<Effectuator> creators = new ArrayList<Effectuator>(); 
  for (int i=1; i<= SimulationParameters.useCreators; i++){ 
   ProductVector pv = new ProductVector(); 
   pv.setFeature(SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObservation.getA(), 
SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObservation.getB()); 
   Effectuator EFF = new Effectuator(context, network, 
"CRE_"+Integer.toString(i), pv, 
     SimulationParameters.DocilityEffectuators, 
SimulationParameters.PropagationProbability, 
     SimulationParameters.DistributionProbability, true); 
   EFF.checkHasAdoptedThroughPickup(); 
   EFF.setCreator(true); 
   EFF.setDocility(SimulationParameters.DocilityCreator); 
  
 EFF.setPropagation_probability(SimulationParameters.PropagationProbability
Creator); 
    
   //Now add creators to SEPARATE LIST !!!! 
   creators.add(EFF); 
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   //Probably repeated multiple times (but who cares :) ) 
   if (SimulationParameters.goodnessOfIdea>=0){ 
   
 FitnessLandscape.clearFeature(SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObservation
.getA()); 
   
 FitnessLandscape.setFeatureVariant(SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObserv
ation.getA(), 
      SimulationParameters.FeatureUnderObservation.getB(), 
SimulationParameters.goodnessOfIdea); 
   } 
  } 
   
  //2nd.B Create "Initiators" - the initially lone active effectuator 
accessing a "passive" network 
  for (int i=1; i<= SimulationParameters.useInitiators; i++){ 
   ProductVector pv = new 
ProductVector(SimulationParameters.NumberOfFeatures, 
     SimulationParameters.NumberOfVariants, 
SimulationParameters.NumberOfKnownFeaturesEffectuators, false); 
   Effectuator EFF = new Effectuator(context, network, 
"INT_"+Integer.toString(i), pv, 
     SimulationParameters.DocilityEffectuators, 
SimulationParameters.PropagationProbability, 
     SimulationParameters.DistributionProbability, true); 
    
   //Add initiators separately to make use of "DegreeSweep"-Mechanism 
   creators.add(EFF); 
  } 
   
  // 3rd: Create Causators (if any) 
  for (int i=0; i< SimulationParameters.NumberOfCausators; i++){ 
   Causator CAU = new Causator(context, network, 
"CAU_"+Integer.toString(i)); 
   context.add(CAU); 
   //causators.add(CAU); 
  } 
   
   
  //Create Networks 
  // 0th: Initialise NetworkGenerator and load network seed 
  RandomHelper.resetGenerator(SimulationParameters.RandomSeed_Network); 
  if(!SimulationParameters.doCreatorDegreeSweep){ 
   context.addAll(creators); 
  } 
   
  if(SimulationParameters.NetworkGeneratorType.equals("BarabasiAlbert")){ 
   effectualNetworkGenerator = new 
BarabasiAlbertNetworkGenerator(context); 
  }else if(SimulationParameters.NetworkGeneratorType.equals("Random")){ 
   effectualNetworkGenerator = new RandomNetworkGenerator(context, 
SimulationParameters.RNG_EdgeProbability); 
  }else{ 
   throw new Error("No valid generator Type chosen"); 
  } 
  //context.add(effectualNetworkGenerator); 
   
  // 1st: Create Effectuator-Effectuator network + Effectuator-Customer 
network  
  boolean isConnected = false; 
  int i=1; 
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  while(!isConnected){ 
   network = effectualNetworkGenerator.createIntraAgentNetwork(network, 
Effectuator.class); 
   network = effectualNetworkGenerator.createInterAgentNetwork(network, 
Effectuator.class, EndCustomer.class); 
   ContextJungNetwork<Object> N = (ContextJungNetwork<Object>)network; 
   Graph<Object, RepastEdge<Object>> G = N.getGraph(); 
   double diameter = DistanceStatistics.diameter(G); 
   if(diameter < Double.POSITIVE_INFINITY){ 
    isConnected = true; 
   }else{ 
    RandomHelper.resetGenerator(SimulationParameters.RandomSeed+i); 
    i++; 
   } 
  } 
   
  //2nd: Add creators in a special way if necessary 
  if(SimulationParameters.doCreatorDegreeSweep){ 
   network = 
effectualNetworkGenerator.addCreatorsWithFixedDegrees(network, creators, 
SimulationParameters.CreatorDegree); 
   context.addAll(creators); 
  } 
   
  //3rd: reset randomGenerator 
  RandomHelper.resetGenerator(SimulationParameters.RandomSeed); 
   
   
  AdvancedAnalyses myAdvancedAnalysis = new AdvancedAnalyses(context, 
network); 
  context.add(myAdvancedAnalysis); 
   
  System.out.println("Random Seed:" + 
String.valueOf(SimulationParameters.RandomSeed)); 
  return context; 
  //return getContext(); 
 } 
 
 protected void initNetwork() { 
  EdgeCreator<NetworkEdge, Object> edgeCreator = new 
EdgeCreator<NetworkEdge, Object>( 
     
    ) { 
     public Class<NetworkEdge> getEdgeType() { 
      return NetworkEdge.class; 
     } 
 
     @Override 
     public NetworkEdge createEdge(Object source, Object target, 
       boolean isDirected, double weight) { 
      return new NetworkEdge(source, target, true, 1); 
     } 
    }; 
  //Initialise complete network 
  NetworkBuilder<Object> netBuilder = new 
NetworkBuilder<Object>("CompleteNetwork", context, false); 
  netBuilder.setEdgeCreator(edgeCreator);   
  network = netBuilder.buildNetwork(); 
 } 
 
 
 /** 
126 
  * Getter of the property <tt>network</tt> 
  * @return  Returns the network. 
  * @uml.property  name="network" 
  */ 
 public Network<Object> getNetwork() { 
  return SystemBuilder.network; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * Setter of the property <tt>network</tt> 
  * @param network  The network to set. 
  * @uml.property  name="network" 
  */ 
 public void setNetwork(Network<Object> network) { 
  SystemBuilder.network = network; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * Getter of the property <tt>context</tt> 
  * @return  Returns the context. 
  * @uml.property  name="context" 
  */ 
 public Context<Object> getContext() { 
  return SystemBuilder.context; 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * Setter of the property <tt>context</tt> 
  * @param context  The context to set. 
  * @uml.property  name="context" 
  */ 
 public void setContext(Context<Object> context) { 
  SystemBuilder.context = context; 
 } 
} 
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Part B. Research papers 
Paper I – Individual vs. Collective Control in Effectual Social Networking: A Simulation 
Study 
 
 
Paper II – Entrepreneurial Mingling Secrets: Investigating the Performance Impact of 
Network Structure for Control-Based Entrepreneurship using Agent-based Simulation 
 
 
Paper III – Out of Thin Air? Simulating Entrepreneurial Opportunity Creation and the 
Impact of Environmental Complexity and Stakeholder Behavior 
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Individual vs. Collective Control in Effectual Social Networking: A Simulation 
Study 
Abstract 
Who is really in control in control-based entrepreneurship? We investigate how and why the 
inter-subjective interaction behavior of effectual entrepreneurs affects emerging markets. Using 
agent-based computer simulation, we study the individual vs. collective impact of interaction 
behavior on emerging markets in an effectual network.  
Our findings contrast with the image of entrepreneurs single-handedly creating new markets and 
reveal the severely limited impact of individuals on emerging markets. Successful entrepreneurs 
require a collective of partners who act both docile and persistent in inter-subjective interactions. 
Moreover, we identify the significant impact of effectual transformation processes on the shape 
of emerging markets by disseminating new ideas beyond “project borders.” 
 
Keywords: effectuation process, docility, agent-based computer simulation, effectual social 
networking  
 130 
1 Introduction 
The use of social networks, which is paramount for successful entrepreneurship, has been 
the subject of substantial research efforts (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Jack, 2010). Networks 
enable information exchange and foster resource acquisition (Hite, 2005; Slotte-Kock & 
Coviello, 2010). In this context, resources are both tangible and intangible: capital, emotional 
support, employees, and market knowledge (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). Although detailed 
process models for the beneficial use of networks have yet to be determined, initial research 
suggests a prediction-based approach (Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010) that follows the idea of 
exploration and exploitation (Holland, 1975). In this process, entrepreneurs use social networks 
as a means to acquire all the resources required to pursue fixed, predefined goals. However, in 
uncertain environments, the application of this approach poses severe limitations as the definition 
of a goal worth pursuing is simply impossible. For such environments, effectuation (Sarasvathy, 
2001) offers an alternative control-based decision logic that relies heavily on the use of social 
networks. 
Effectuation is an alternative approach used by expert serial entrepreneurs. The approach is 
designed for use in environments that feature Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921), Marchian 
goal ambiguity (March & Olsen, 1982) and isotropy. Effectuation proposes exercising control in 
the shaping of markets rather than using prediction to optimally position one’s venture in an 
emerging market. Consequently, effectuation follows four principles that contradict prediction-
based entrepreneurship. First, effectuation focuses on effects that are achievable with available 
means rather than the definition of a goal and the acquisition of all the required resources. 
Second, effectuation proposes keeping the potential loss associated with a project affordable 
instead of maximizing the expected return. Third, effectuation actively exploits contingencies 
instead of mitigating them. Lastly, effectuation proposes jointly co-creating markets with other 
market participants rather than viewing these participants as competitors. 
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Despite their contradictory networking approaches, case studies on both control- and 
prediction-based entrepreneurship place “the entrepreneur” at the center of the development of 
new markets (e.g., Dodgson, 2011). Moreover, initial research shows a positive performance 
impact of effectual social networking (Brettel, Mauer, Engelen, & Küpper, 2012; Read, Song, & 
Smit, 2009), which raises the question of the extent to which the process, the partners, and “the 
effectuator” can positively affect the emergence of markets. 
Introduced in 2001 (Sarasvathy, 2001), effectuation has quickly drawn attention from the 
research community. In addition to scale development (Brettel et al., 2012; Chandler, DeTienne, 
McKelvie, & Mumford, 2011), effectuation was introduced to adjacent research (Goel & Karri, 
2006; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2008) and tested quantitatively, which revealed a positive performance 
impact (Read, Song, et al., 2009; Wiltbank, Read, Dew, & Sarasvathy, 2009). In addition to 
theoretical broadening (Dew, Sarasvathy, Read, & Wiltbank, 2009; Read, Dew, & Sarasvathy, 
2009; Sarasvathy, Dew, Read, & Wiltbank, 2008), effectuation was portrayed as a process (Dew, 
Read, Sarasvathy, & Wiltbank, 2008; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a), thus revealing the importance 
of inter-subjective interaction. Moreover, transformation mechanisms were recognized as an 
integral component of the effectuation process (Dew, Read, Sarasvathy, & Wiltbank, 2010). 
As the discussion stabilizes on the relevant building blocks of effectuation and their positive 
performance impacts, research has focused on the mechanisms at work: effectuation is an agent-
centric process that uses inter-subjective interaction and affects macro-level constructs such as 
market development. Consequently, questions have emerged regarding how micro-level 
interactions affect macro-level outcomes (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011). This 
consideration includes both the process and the actors. Although transformation types have been 
observed to be an important part of effectuation, the extent of and reasons for their positive 
impact remain unclear. Moreover, the behavioral impact of actors, that is, “the entrepreneur” and 
“the partners,” requires further research attention. What type of behavior does the effectuation 
process foster? How and why does certain interaction behavior affect performance? How and 
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why must we separate the behavior of “the entrepreneur” from that of “the partners”? To what 
extent can these entities exercise control, i.e., affect the shape of emerging markets? 
Investigating these questions will help to improve the understanding of effectual 
entrepreneurship in multiple ways. First, this investigation deepens the understanding of 
effectuation and “under what circumstances [it] provide[s] particular advantages and 
disadvantages” (Sarasvathy, 2001, p. 249). Second, it focuses on “inter-subjective interaction[, 
which] is the very essence of the effectual process”(Dew et al., 2008, p. 50) and is regarded as a 
key research area of effectuation and entrepreneurship in general (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 
2011). Third, although a significant number of studies have delivered helpful insights regarding 
the “content […], governance and structure” (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003, p. 1) of entrepreneurial 
social networks, this paper provides a much-needed “process-oriented stud[y]” (Hoang & 
Antoncic, 2003, p. 167). Lastly, process-based entrepreneurship research efforts are essential to 
transform entrepreneurship into a science of the artificial (Venkataraman, Sarasvathy, Dew, & 
Forster, 2012) – a method that can be tailored to specific entrepreneurial environments. 
This study uses “heterogeneous agent-based computational modeling” (McKelvey, 2004), 
which is a method that is underrepresented in the social sciences but commonly used in 
engineering and the natural sciences. Computer simulation, as a “third way of doing science” 
(Axelrod, 2003, p. 1), enables the analysis of complex, intertwined, and non-linear processes 
(Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2007). By enabling the collection of data at arbitrary points in 
time on all the modeled levels of detail, computer simulation fosters data analysis beyond 
empirical feasibility (Lévesque, 2004; McKelvey, 2004). Effectual social networking is optimally 
suited for computer-simulation research; given the “nascent/intermediate state” (Perry, Chandler, 
& Markova, 2012), the multi-actor setup and the intertwined, non-linear effectuation process, 
computer simulation is well suited to “contribute novel theory” (Davis et al., 2007, p. 482). 
Following the roadmap of Davis et al. (2007, p. 482), we create a formal model of the 
effectuation process with all the involved entities and implement the model using the Repast 
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Simphony Framework (North, Howe, Collier, & Vos, 2007) to conduct three series of 
experiments in a Monte Carlo fashion (Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2009). Using the example 
of shaping an emerging market by introducing a novel idea, we set up a typical entrepreneurial 
environment with effectual agents who interact with each other and the environment – 
represented by “end customer agents” – to shape an emerging market by fostering the adoption of 
a specific idea. We track the dissemination of this idea within the market and list reasons for its 
non-dissemination. By varying input parameters such as interaction behavior, we determine the 
extent of and reasons for performance variations. Although the contributions are theoretical, they 
may facilitate and simplify subsequent empirical research as researchers will know what to look 
for. 
Our study aims to offer the following four contributions and explanations: a formal model of 
effectuation, the importance of transformation mechanisms for effectuation, the significant 
impact of the collective interaction behavior of partners, and the limited impact of the individual 
interaction behavior of the focal entrepreneur. To the best of our knowledge, this model is among 
the first models of effectual decision making. 
Our first contribution is a formal model of effectuation that unifies available principles 
(Sarasvathy, 2001), dimensions (Chandler et al., 2011), process descriptions (Dew et al., 2008; 
Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a), and transformation mechanisms (Dew et al., 2010). This stylized 
model requires precise terminology and will therefore help to mitigate ambiguous processes and 
definitions. An examination of the current debate on whether entrepreneurial opportunities are 
“made” vs. “created” or “found” vs. “discovered” (Alvarez & Barney, 2013; Shane, 2012; 
Venkataraman et al., 2012) emphasizes this need. Moreover, we hope to encourage the use of 
computer simulation in effectuation and entrepreneurship research in general, as promoted by 
leading researchers (Davis et al., 2007; Harrison, Carroll, & Carley, 2007; Lévesque, 2004; 
McKelvey, 2004). 
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Our second contribution suggests the importance of transformation mechanisms for 
effectuation. Our findings reveal that although market saturation doubles using transformation, 
this mechanism is used rather rarely. Transformation has a trigger effect and is paramount for 
controlling the emergence of a market. This concept is counter-intuitive from a prediction-based 
entrepreneurship perspective because it includes giving away new ideas to competitors. 
However, from a control-based perspective, providing valuable ideas to other market participants 
facilitates the shaping of an emerging market, and the immediate loss through strengthening the 
competition can be mitigated in the long run through a larger number of adopters. An illustrative  
historical example of this scenario is the introduction of potatoes to Prussia, Germany around 
1750: when farmers refused the cultivation of a plant with poisonous leaves, Friedrich II founded 
guarded plantations and instructed soldiers to look the other way when curious farmers tried to 
steal the roots for cultivation. 
Our third contribution suggests the strong impact of collective interaction behavior. 
Behaving docilely in negotiations and being persistent in approaching new potential partners 
both have a strong positive impact on the dissemination of a new idea in an emerging market. An 
examination of the reasons for non-dissemination indicates that docile behavior not only fosters 
successful negotiations among effectual entrepreneurs but also improves the inclusion of the 
conscious and sub-conscious demands of end customers, which thus improves the general utility 
of an opportunity. In summary, our contribution provides reasons why “[e]ffectuation assumes 
docility as a fundamental behavioral construct applicable to all partners” (Dew et al., 2008, p. 
49). Moreover, our findings reveal that persistence in approaching new partners is an import 
quality in actual and potential partners. Examining the reasons for non-dissemination reveals that 
partners have a crucial multiplication function in the shaping of emerging markets, which 
contrasts with their role as passive entities in existing process descriptions (Dew et al., 2008; 
Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a). 
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Our last contribution indicates the surprisingly small impact of “the entrepreneur.” Our 
findings reveal that individual persistence in approaching potential partners has a positive but 
weak impact in comparison to collective persistence. Moreover, docile behavior has no positive 
impact on shaping emerging markets. “This contrasts with the image of the persistent 
entrepreneur who holds on against all odds and against all skepticism to bring an idea to fruition” 
(Wood & McKinley, 2010, p. 71). 
2 A review of the effectuation process 
Prior to the creation of a formal model of effectuation, we review the available literature and 
extract the relevant process information by focusing on inter-subjective interaction and possible 
parameters. Information on the effectuation process can be grouped into four categories. First, 
the description of effectuation began with “principles” (Sarasvathy, 2001) and “views” 
(Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b, p. 390) that were later used as a basis for scale development (Brettel 
et al., 2012; Chandler et al., 2011) and performance evaluation (Dew, Read, Sarasvathy, & 
Wiltbank, 2009; Wiltbank et al., 2009), as well as to organize further research (Perry et al., 
2012). Second, researchers linked the actions of effectuators and the aforementioned principles in 
order to create a process-based view of effectuation (Dew et al., 2008; Read, Dew, et al., 2009; 
Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a). Third, transformation mechanisms were identified as an integral 
effectual technique (Dew et al., 2010). Lastly, to fill the gaps in the literature on effectuation 
processes that emphasize network interaction, we consulted reviews on entrepreneurial 
networking (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Jack, 2010). 
Based on these studies, we created an integrated process model, as illustrated in figure 1. 
Similar to prior process descriptions (Dew et al., 2008, p. 49), we chose an ego-centric 
description that an effectual entrepreneur can follow in a step-by-step fashion.  
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--------------------------- 
Insert figure 1 here 
 
Figure 1: Enhanced process model of effectuation, based on Dew et al. (2008, p. 49) 
---------------------------- 
Step 1: Means 
In addition to “Who I am” and “What I know,” social networks (“Whom I know”) are a key 
resource for entrepreneurs using effectuation logic. Effectuation teaches us to begin with 
available means, which refers to the assessment of individual preferences, networks and 
resources. Effectuation proposes to focus on effects that can be achieved with available means 
(Sarasvathy, 2001). 
Step 2: What can we, as a project, do? 
Based on the idea of pre-commitments, entrepreneurs who use effectuation logic can join 
projects to co-create an opportunity (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a). Unlike prior process 
descriptions, we emphasize joint action by including the creation of a joint opportunity on a 
team, as described in the literature (Dew et al., 2008). 
Step 3: Interaction with known contacts 
To create or finalize an opportunity, entrepreneurs who use effectuation logic create a 
“project” (Dew et al., 2008, p. 50), approach known contacts, and present their current 
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opportunity to negotiate pre-commitments. The effectuation literature usually treats this action as 
a mere prelude to subsequent steps (Dew et al., 2008). However, “the ask”6 is an integral step in 
the effectuation process and holds a previously unmentioned degree of freedom for effectual 
interaction behavior: the decision to (not) approach a potential partner. Based on personality 
traits (“Who I am”) and the affordable loss of time and effort, the persistence with which 
effectual entrepreneurs approach potential partners is part of their individual interaction behavior. 
Although this persistence might be related to the “proactiveness” dimension of entrepreneurial 
orientation (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996, p. 146), this quality is less focused on leadership. Whereas 
the effectuation literature focuses on the use of network contacts for direct interaction, the 
network literature mentions another important function: the exchange and relay of information. 
Therefore, we include the “relay of information” as a second important process activity that is 
consistent with the idea of the contingency principle (Sarasvathy, 2001). 
Except for a willingness to exchange pre-commitments to avoid situations in which “non-
customers drive the decision process” (Dew & Sarasvathy, 2007), the effectuation literature does 
not limit the type of customers who can be approached. This lack of restrictions enables the 
inclusion of non-entrepreneurs, i.e., end customers who intend to use rather than actively develop 
an opportunity. 
Step 4: Negotiation with potential partners 
To further the finalization of an opportunity, effectual entrepreneurs engage in negotiations 
regarding pre-commitments. These negotiations can be initiated by themselves or by direct and 
indirect network contacts. Acting on the “contingency principle” (Sarasvathy, 2001) effectual 
entrepreneurs do not dismiss other projects with limited similarities, but actively exploit these 
unforeseen opportunities as a source of unconventional ideas. Because of uncertainty, effectual 
entrepreneurs dismiss the idea of market research and focus on the negotiation of a series of pre-
                                              
6 As referred to by Sarasvathy at the “Effectuation Research and Teaching Conference 2013,” Lyon. 
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commitments. Here, the negotiations will primarily focus “on the characteristics of the project 
[…] rather than the type and quantity of returns” (Dew et al., 2008, p. 50) because the market 
itself is emerging with the opportunity. 
Although the literature on entrepreneurial and effectual negotiation is sparse (Sarasvathy & 
Venkataraman, 2011), docility has been identified as “a fundamental behavioral construct” (Dew 
et al., 2008, p. 50). Introduced by Simon (1990), docility is defined as “the tendency to depend 
on suggestions, recommendations, persuasion, and information obtained through social channels 
as a major basis for choice“ (Simon, 1993a, p. 156). Simon later added that “[w]e are highly 
susceptible to social influence and persuasion, susceptibility that I will call docility. I use the 
term ‘docility’ here in its sense of teachability or educatability -- not in its alterative sense of 
passivity or meekness” (Simon, 1997). Consequently, we recognize docility to be another 
important behavioral degree of freedom for effectual entrepreneurs. 
Step 5: Transformation 
The negotiation of pre-commitments is not the only way to improve an opportunity through 
effectuation. Based on a case study, Dew et al. (Dew et al., 2010) list 9 types of transformations 
that expert serial entrepreneurs apply to their opportunities to shape emerging markets in their 
favor. Contrary to negotiations, this action does not lead to a contribution of new contacts or 
resources. To create a formal model of effectuation, we focus on those types of interactions 
(“deletion and supplementation” and “composition and decomposition”) that use external stimuli 
provided through the network to transform an opportunity. These types of interactions do not 
require any form of “genius,” which is neither a prerequisite for the application of effectuation 
nor a concept that can be properly formalized. 
Step 6: Concretion of opportunity 
Over time, the increased number of partners creates “two concurrent dynamic cycles” 
(Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a, p. 1), which leads to an increase in committed resources and the 
finalization of the joint opportunity. 
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Step 7: New contacts 
New partners will likely lead to new contacts for the project both internally (because new 
partners are likely to be acquainted with current partners) and externally (because new partners 
may know potential partners beyond the reach of the former group of partners). Because the 
process is iterative, new partners will approach their contacts in subsequent rounds of the 
effectuation process until the “effectual transformation [is] complete” (Sarasvathy & Dew, 
2005a, p. 549). 
3 A formal model of effectual social networking 
Modeling effectual social networking requires a formal representation of all the relevant 
actors, objects, and processes of effectual networking. This representation includes entrepreneurs 
who use effectuation logic, their opportunities, and the environment. Entrepreneurs who use 
effectuation logic form a social network that allows them to approach each other. According to 
the literature (Dew & Sarasvathy, 2007), effectual entrepreneurs cooperate only with partners 
who are willing to make pre-commitments. Therefore we represent the environment as a number 
of end customer agents that are part of the social network and can be approached by effectual 
entrepreneurs.. Moreover, we pay particular attention to the implementation of uncertainty, 
which is a major prerequisite for effectuation (Sarasvathy, 2001).  
3.1 General setup of the model 
Our formal model consists of effectual entrepreneurs who aim to shape an emerging market 
in their favor. Starting with a loosely defined individual opportunity, effectual entrepreneurs 
approach their known contacts to negotiate pre-commitments and to create a joint opportunity in 
a joint project. The entrepreneurs execute the effectuation process in each time step in a turn-
based fashion. They finalize their opportunities by including the ideas of new project partners 
and shape a new market using a control-based approach that involves effectual entrepreneurs and 
end customers who represent the environment. The simulation ends when it reaches a stable 
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state, i.e., no new contacts are created, and no changes occur in any opportunity within 10 
consecutive time steps. 
In the subsequent chapters, we first introduce all the objects and actors in our formal model 
and then introduce the actions that they perform. 
3.2 Objects and actors 
3.2.1 Artifact 
The artifact is our stylized version of an opportunity that the entrepreneur finalizes using 
effectuation logic (Sarasvathy, 2001), representing the individual means (“Who I am” and “What 
I know”), i.e., the desires and interests of each effectual entrepreneur. Following the product 
description of arbitrary merchandise, e.g., a life vest, we formalize an artifact as a list of (feature: 
variant)-tuples. For example, a life vest could be described as follows: {(color: red), (weight: 
500 g, (fabric: polyester), (air capacity: 6 liters)}. Mathematically speaking, we formalize an 
artifact A as a set of (feature, variant)-tuples of variable length, as presented in equation 1. Each 
feature can appear only once in an artifact, and the number of variants per feature and the total 
number of features are limited, discrete, and strictly positive. Notably, these maximum numbers 
are not known by the agents. Hence, Knightian uncertainty is introduced into the model because 
agents know neither the number nor the distribution of existing features and variants. 
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In equation 2, we define v(f, A) as the variant of feature f in artifact A, if available. The 
variant “0” is reserved for “unknown feature.” In our example, the variant of “color” of our life 
vest is “red,” and the variant of the feature “blinking lights” is “0” because it was not yet defined. 
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The set F(A) in equation 3 represents the set of all known features in A. In the life-vest 
example, this would be the set {color, weight, fabric, air capacity}. 
 AvfvfAF iiii  ),(|)(         (3) 
One of these (feature: variant)-combinations plays a special role in our simulation: because 
we aim to investigate the shaping of emerging markets, we study the propagation of one 
arbitrarily chosen combination, which represents our new idea under study. The ability to shape 
emerging markets can then be measured as the level of dissemination of this idea. 
3.2.2 Effectual agent 
We model entrepreneurs who use effectuation logic as agents pursuing the task of artifact 
finalization. Every effectual agent has an artifact, which is partially pre-populated with randomly 
drawn (feature: variant)-combinations during the initialization of the simulation. The effectual 
process is executed in a turn-based simulation including interactions with other effectual agents 
and “end customer agents” who represent the environment. Although the extant literature implies 
that effectual entrepreneurs can “declare the effectual transformation complete and begin 
competing in alternative markets” (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a, p. 549), we focus on a single 
round of market development and end the simulation once the development of a market is 
completed. Moreover, we assume that each partner contributes sufficient resources to drive 
transformations and negotiations. Therefore, we omit an explicit modeling of resources and 
potential constraints and assume that every action an effectual agent takes fulfills the affordable 
loss principle. 
One effectual agent plays a special role in our formal model. This agent is called the 
“inventor” and provides a starting point for the new idea under study. Although this agent 
behaves like any other effectual agent, the agent’s artifact consists of only the new idea under 
study, a single (feature: variant)-combination, which is exclusively received during initialization. 
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To investigate the effect that individuals can have on the spread of new ideas, we allow for an 
individual adjustment of the inventor’s level of docility and persistence in the experiments. 
3.2.3 End customer agent 
End customer agents represent the market demand in our current model. Formalized as 
agents in our model, these agents fulfill the important role of providing insights into what 
customers want and regard as useful. The effectuation literature often mentions the important 
role of end customers in examples such as the customer-investors of U-Haul, who helped to both 
shape and grow a one-man, one-truck company into a company that held “essentially 100 percent 
market share in the newly created do-it-yourself moving industry” (Sarasvathy, 2001, p. 248). 
More recent examples include the users of crowd-funding platforms such as Kickstarter (see 
Belleflamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, 2013). These customers represent the market demand 
to the entrepreneurs who ask for funding. In part, this role is also assumed by entrepreneurs who 
use effectuation logic and their prior knowledge (“What I know”). 
Therefore, we formalize end customers as “passive” agents with two distinct properties: 
these customers can participate in the negotiation of pre-commitments when engaged by 
effectual agents. End customer agents then represent the market demand, including both 
conscious and sub-conscious demands in these negotiations. Like effectual agents, all end 
customer agents have an artifact that represents their conscious demands. To represent sub-
conscious demands, we use the concept of market utility (see next chapter). This concept enables 
an end customer agent to compare two opportunities and identify the preferred one based on 
market utility. Based on Henry Ford’s famous quote regarding faster horses, i.e., conscious 
demands, we assume that upon presentation, an end customer will choose a car over faster horses 
because a car has greater utility even if it contradicts the conscious demand. 
During initialization, the artifact of each end customer agent is partially pre-populated with 
(feature: variant)-combinations. While the features are drawn randomly, the respective variant is 
drawn to probabilistically represent the market demand. For example, if the artifact represents a 
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life vest, the utility of a yellow vest is much higher than the utility of a black one. Therefore, the 
yellow variant is much more likely than the black variant to be assigned to the color feature of an 
artifact. 
3.2.4 Market utility 
We formalized the concept of market utility as an “NK-fitness landscape,” which is a well-
known approach in management research that employs simulation studies (Ganco & Agarwal, 
2009; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Levinthal, 1997). Market utility assigns a “utility value” to all 
possible artifacts that represents the utility of these artifacts if presented to an end customer. In 
accordance with effectuation theory, we implemented the simplest version of an NK-fitness 
landscape, which regards products as “near decomposable“ (Sarasvathy, 2003). The total utility 
of an artifact A in our fitness landscape is defined in equation (4) as the sum of the utility of each 
feature-variant combination. 
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We randomly initialize our utility function u((fi,vi)) for all possible feature-variant-
combinations. Moreover, we assign a value to features that are not available in the artifact. For 
the new idea under study, we define a fixed utility value of 1.0 if a feature occurs in the artifact 
and 0.0 if it does not occur. The utility of an artifact that represents the aforementioned life vest 
would, for example, be calculated by awarding points to known features, e.g., “color,” with high 
scores for “yellow” and low scores for “black.” We also assign points for missing features, e.g., 
“entertainment system,” which might be useless in emergency situations but could be considered 
an additional luxury for snorkeling trips. Therefore, the artifact scores points because of the 
absence of certain features. All points are then summed to calculate the total utility U(A) of an 
artifact. 
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3.2.5 Social network 
We initialize the network among effectual agents and between effectual and end customer 
agents as an undirected scale-free network according to the generation procedures introduced by 
Barabási and Albert (Barabasi & Albert, 1999). We assume undirected networks because each of 
the two acquainted parties is able to approach the other one. Numerous studies have shown that 
scale-free networks best capture the structure of real-world networks (Aiello, Chung, & Lu, 
2001; Barabasi & Albert, 1999; Broder et al., 2000; Jeong, Mason, Barabási, & Oltvai, 2001; 
Newman, 2000). Scale-free networks assume that the likelihood p of having k known contacts 
assumes a negative exponential shape (p ~ k-α). 
Using the algorithm of Barabási and Albert, we first create a network between effectual 
agents. Therefore, the algorithm cycles through all effectual agents and creates exactly one tie 
originating from this effectual agent i. The target agent j of the tie is probabilistically chosen as 
indicated in equation 5: 
jijreejp  ,1.0,1,)(deg~)(  
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The function degree (j) refers to the number of contacts known by the agent j. Second, all the 
end customer agents are attached to the previously created network in the same way. Connections 
between end customer agents are omitted because they would serve no purpose for these passive 
agents. 
3.3 Simulation mechanics 
3.3.1 Behaviors of effectual agents 
An effectual agent can exhibit the following four behaviors: approaching a known contact to 
present the current state of its artifact (Step 3a), relaying information on the artifacts of other 
effectual agents to known contacts (Step 3b), negotiating strategic alliances by exchanging pre-
commitments (Step 4), and inheriting the ideas of other effectual agents’ artifacts through 
transformation (Step 5). All of these behaviors are influenced by the effectual agents’ levels of 
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docility and persistence. Both constructs are formalized as a variable that represents low levels of 
persistence and docility as 0.0 and high levels of persistence and docility as 1.0. 
3.3.2 Approaching known contacts (Step 3a) 
Effectual agents can approach known contacts to present the current state of their artifact. 
We formalized this behavior as transferring copies of the artifact. For each contact, the effectual 
agent executes this behavior probabilistically using the persistence parameter as an execution 
probability. The effectual agent can approach all known contacts except for its partners once per 
turn. This behavior is executed at the beginning of the simulation and every time the agent’s 
artifact changes. The recipient processes the proposed artifact in the next time step. In this way, 
isotropy is induced because the receiving agents cannot determine a general direction or trend 
coming from the artifacts of other effectual agents. 
3.3.3 Relaying received artifacts to known contacts (Step 3b) 
Effectual agents can relay information regarding other agents’ artifacts. We formalized this 
behavior as probabilistically transferring unaltered copies of incoming artifacts to all known 
contacts except partners. This behavior is triggered by every incoming artifact and is 
probabilistically executed using the persistence parameter as an execution probability. Again, the 
recipient processes the relayed artifact in the next time step. To avoid multiple receptions of the 
same artifact, a list of previous recipients is transferred along with the artifact. In this way, the 
repeated acceptance of the same artifact can be avoided. 
3.3.4 Negotiation of pre-commitments (Step 4) 
“Even the literature that is directly focused on negotiations has mostly neglected new 
venture creation processes” (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011, p. 126). Despite the absence of 
a concrete algorithm, the literature (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a) proposes multiple requirements 
for such a formalization as follows: (a) allow the negotiation between two or more parties, (b) 
ensure that ideas supported by a majority of participants are more likely to prevail, (c) support an 
individual acceptance or refusal of negotiation results to ensure both self-selection into a project 
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and the consideration of pre-commitments, and (d) ensure that negotiations are triggered by the 
approach of an effectual agent, as described in the “effectual cycle” (Dew et al., 2008). 
As illustrated in figure 2, we formalize the negotiation process as a simple, three-stage 
probabilistic negotiation. First, the algorithm determines all the relevant partners, i.e., the project 
partners of the approaching and the approached agent. Subsequently, the algorithm gathers 
information on the artifacts of all the involved agents. Second, the algorithm creates a combined 
list of occurring features and scans the list to create histograms of the frequency of the partners’ 
preferred variants. Third, the algorithm creates a proposed negotiation result that includes all the 
known features. The variant of each feature is determined probabilistically using the histograms 
as a non-normalized discrete probability mass function. For example, if 1 partner prefers the 
“color”-feature to be “red” and 9 prefer it to be “blue,” the artifact will be blue with a likelihood 
of 90%. Lastly, the algorithm proposes the negotiation result to each participant to receive 
feedback. A negotiation result is accepted only if all the participants agree on its adoption. In the 
event of an adoption, the algorithm replaces the artifact of each participant with the negotiation 
result and creates new network ties among all the new project partners.  
After a negotiation result is created, each effectual agent will individually compare the result 
to the state of its own artifact and decide whether to adopt the proposal. Because “[e]ffectuation 
assumes docility as a fundamental behavioral construct” (Dew et al., 2008, p. 498), we propose a 
docility-based formalization of the acceptance process that follows a simple rule: the less similar 
the negotiation result is to the effectual agent’s own artifact, the more docility is required to 
adopt it. 
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Insert figure 2 here 
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We formalized this rule as the calculation of the share of “conflicting” features in relation to 
the total number of features that the artifact of the deciding effectual agent holds. A conflicting 
feature is a different variant of the same property, e.g., a “red vest” instead of a “blue vest.” We 
assume the following: the larger the share of conflicts over known features for an entrepreneur 
who uses effectuation logic, the more docile an entrepreneur who uses effectuation logic must be 
to accept these changes. Therefore, in our formal representation, an effectual agent accepts a 
negotiation result if the relative share of conflicting features is lower than its docility. If an 
effectual entrepreneur i with artifact A examines the negotiation result R, the entrepreneur can 
accept this result if equation (6) is true. 
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3.3.5 Transformation of artifact (Step 5) 
As presented in the literature review, we formalize artifact transformation as a single abstract 
behavior as follows: the process is triggered by a previously unsuccessful negotiation with the 
owner of the proposed artifact. Initially, the algorithm compiles a list of features that are 
exclusive to the proposed artifact. Second, it randomly chooses one of these features. Third, the 
algorithm includes the chosen feature-variant combination probabilistically into the receiving 
Gather artifacts of 
all relevant 
stakeholders
Create histogram 
of occurring 
variants
Create 
negotiation 
proposal
Artifacts Variants
Feature A1 A2 A3 A4 v1 v2 Proposal
1 1 1 1 1 4 0 1
2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1
5 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
8 2 2 2 1 1 3 2
9 - - - 1 1 0 1
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effectual agent’s artifact using the receiving agent’s docility as an execution probability. Lastly, 
the receiving agent initiates a negotiation for adoption with its partners. 
This formalization implies the assumption that a certain amount of docility is required to 
transform an artifact based on external information. Moreover, we assume that the adoption of a 
previously unknown feature is significantly more likely than the change of a known feature, 
which likely represents both the agent’s and its partners’ preferences. 
3.3.6 End customer agents’ assessment of market utility 
During the negotiation, end customer agents can access the fitness landscape that represents 
the market utility exactly once. When confronted with the decision to adopt a negotiation 
proposal, end customer agents can compare the utility of the proposal and their current artifact. 
This restricted access formalizes the notion of goal ambiguity, i.e. that customers “are not quite 
sure of their own […] preferences” (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b, p. 401). The access restriction is 
essential to maintain the state of uncertainty in the effectual environment. Knightian uncertainty 
is maintained because the number of design alternatives and their respective success probabilities 
cannot be determined by the end customer agent. Goal ambiguity is maintained because end 
customer agents are unaware of their sub-conscious desires. Isotropy is maintained because the 
conscious desires that the end customer agent enters into a negotiation algorithm do not 
necessarily correspond to its sub-conscious demands. 
4 Simulation experiments 
We designed three simulation experiments to investigate the importance of transformation, 
the impact of collective interaction behavior, and the impact of individual behavior. 
If not stated otherwise, we use the following set of standard parameters: we created a 
population of 60 end customer agents and 30 effectual agents. Except for the inventor, all the 
agents received an artifact with 5 randomly selected features that were drawn from 9 available 
features with 2 respective variants. The docility of all the effectual agents was set to 0.2, and the 
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persistence was set to 0.6. Each simulation was repeated 1,000 times per parameter setting, with 
randomly initiated artifacts and randomly generated networks. 
4.1 The importance of effectual transformation 
In our first experiment, we investigated the impact of transformation on shaping emerging 
markets. 
As reflected in figure 3a, we measured the level of adoption of the idea under study over 
time allowing and disallowing transformation. The results show that the shape of the adoption 
curve follows a “logistic function” (Verhulst, 1845) also known as an s-curve. The s-curve is a 
well-known function to describe diffusion processes (Mahajan & Peterson, 1985) and has been 
used as an input in other computer simulations of innovation and social networks (Abrahamson 
& Rosenkopf, 1997). Simulation studies on distribution mechanisms such as critical mass 
(Marwell, Oliver, & Prahl, 1988; Oliver, Marwell, & Teixeira, 1985) or threshold models 
(Granovetter, 1978; Macy, 1991) have indicated similar outcomes. 
More importantly, we observe a significant increase in adoption levels when comparing 
scenarios that allow and disallow transformation. While a scenario without effectual 
transformation reaches an average adoption level of approximately 30 agents, this figure 
increases to approximately 60 agents when transformation is allowed. 
Additionally, figure 3b shows the number of adoptions of the idea under study over time by 
reason – negotiation or transformation. While enabling transformation doubles the adoption 
level, figure 3b shows that only approximately 5 adoptions occur directly due to transformation 
behavior. 
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Insert figure 3a+b here 
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4.2 The impact of collective interaction behavior 
In our second simulation experiment, we analyzed the impact of collective inter-subjective 
interaction behavior on shaping emerging markets. Therefore, we conducted a single parameter 
variation of collective docility (0.01 and 0.99) and persistence (0.01 and 0.99). Although these 
extreme settings are unlikely to occur in reality, we used these settings to exemplify the effects 
that could occur. In addition to the effect of these variations on the adoption level, we 
investigated the rate of occurrence of the following four possible reasons for the containment of 
new ideas: (a) a breakdown in negotiations because of the limited docility of one or more 
effectual agents, (b) a breakdown in negotiations because of a negative utility impact for one or 
more end customer agents, (c) a failure to propagate the state of an artifact including the new 
idea, and (d) a failure to adopt the new idea under study via transformation from a presented 
artifact after unsuccessful negotiations. Figure 4 displays the number of events that lead to the 
containment of the new idea under study over time for our standard set of parameters. The rate of 
failed negotiations and non-adoptions begins at a low rate and increases exponentially, reaching a 
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peak after 5-6 time steps and then decreasing dramatically as the simulation approaches a stable 
state near time step 21. 
---------------------------- 
Insert figure 4 here 
 
---------------------------- 
Table 1 shows both the average level of adoption of the idea under study and the average 
total occurrence of reasons for non-dissemination for all 4 parameter variation experiments and 
for the standard set of parameters. The results are presented separately by parameter in the two 
subsequent chapters.  
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Insert table 1 here 
4.2.1.1 Table 5: Impact of effectual behavior on the containment of a new idea 
 Experiment 
Measure 
Standard 
parameters 
High 
docility 
Low 
docility 
High 
persistence 
Low 
persistence 
Avg. 
number of 
adopters 
59.2 78.5 13.6 76.4 2.8 
Reason for containment     
(a) Docility 24.2 0.4 31.3 31.0 0.5 
(b) Utility 17.4 6.3 20.9 23.9 1.1 
(c) Not 
propagated 
27.0 17.0 6.7 2.9 8.4 
(d) Not 
adopted 
16.4 0.0 18.6 19.3 0.7 
 
---------------------------- 
4.2.2 The impact of collective docility 
High collective docility increases the average dissemination of the idea under study 
significantly from 59.2 to 78.5. Consequently, non-dissemination based on docility (a) and non-
adoption (d) deteriorates nearly completely. Moreover, non-dissemination based on non-
propagation (c) and insufficient utility (b) decreases. 
Low collective docility leads to opposing effects: in addition to a starkly lower average 
adoption rate of 13.6, it increases the rates of containment events due to limited docility (a) and 
the non-adoption via transformation (d). Additionally, low collective docility leads to an 
increased number of containment events because of limited utility (b). However, low collective 
docility reduces the number of non-propagation events (c). 
4.2.3 The impact of collective persistence 
The level of collective persistence has a significant effect on the adoption level, varying it 
from 2.8 to 76.4 for low/high settings. The number of non-dissemination events due to docility 
(a), utility (b), and non-adoption (c) increases with high collective persistence and decreases with 
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low collective persistence. The number of containment events due to non-propagation (c) 
decreases with high collective persistence, as expected. 
4.3 The impact of individual interaction behavior 
In our third experiment, we investigated the impact of individual inter-subjective interaction 
behavior. Keeping the general levels of docility and persistence constant, we investigated the 
impact of varying levels of interaction parameters of the inventor of the idea under study. 
Although it is difficult to change the levels of collective docility and persistence, entrepreneurs 
who use effectuation logic can consciously modify their own levels of docility and persistence to 
affect the adoption level of their new idea. In our experiment, we simulated this scenario through 
a variation of the inventor agent’s docility and persistence parameters while keeping all the other 
parameters in accord with our standard model. In this experiment, we focused on the impact on 
the adoption level because the impact on the reasons for containment did not reveal additional 
insights beyond the aforementioned results. The results reflected in figures 5a and 5b show the 
number of agents who adopted the new idea under study at the end of the simulation under 
variations of the inventor agent’s docility (fig. 5a) and persistence (fig. 5b) parameters. 
---------------------------- 
Insert figure 5 a+b here 
   
---------------------------- 
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As indicated by figure 5a, changing the level of the inventor agent’s docility has no positive 
impact on the adoption level of the idea under study. Although a low level of docility decreases 
the level of adoption, an increase above the collective level of docility has nearly no effect on the 
level of adoption. 
As reflected in figure 5b, the level of individual persistence has a small positive effect on the 
level of adoption of the idea under study. However, with an increase from ~60 (standard 
persistence) to ~63 (maximum persistence), the effect is significantly smaller than the effect of 
the aforementioned collective persistence. As expected, low individual persistence decreases the 
adoption to ~55. 
5 Propositions for the effectuation process, individual and collective 
interaction behavior 
In this chapter, we present and support five propositions deduced from the results of the 
simulation experiments presented in chapter 4. We discuss the impact of the effectuation process 
and the impact of individual and collective interaction behavior on the shaping of emerging 
markets. 
5.1 The impact of effectual transformations 
Proposition 1: Effectual transformation mechanisms convert entrepreneurs outside 
the project into multipliers for a new idea. This behavior propagates ideas for other 
projects and thus significantly increases the number of adopters. 
In our simulation experiments, allowing the application of transformation nearly doubles the 
level of adoption of the idea under study. Surprisingly, our results show that transformation 
rarely is the reason for propagation. Therefore, how does a mechanism that is rarely used double 
the rate of success? 
The explanation is counter-intuitive from a control-based perspective: by allowing 
transformation and thus foregoing direct control regarding the use of his or her idea, an effectual 
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entrepreneur fosters the shaping of an emerging market by relying on the creativity and strength 
of others. By allowing transformation, other effectual entrepreneurs become the users and active 
promoters of a new idea and use negotiation to promote the idea as part of their opportunities, 
which is indicated by the nearly doubled rates of propagation via negotiation. The surprising 
success of this method not only underlines its vital importance for effectual entrepreneurship but 
also contradicts the current “best practice” of prediction-based entrepreneurs. Prediction-based 
entrepreneurship usually exercises a tight regime of control over new ideas. The restrictive use of 
patents and secrecy through non-disclosure agreements (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009) is a vital 
part of practices to create and maintain a lead over competing firms. The transformation 
approach can be seen as an instantiation of Simon’s “intelligent altruism” (Simon, 1993b). In 
addition to being a conclusive theoretical proposition, transformation also exhibits successful 
practical uses: when IBM released its personal computer (PC) in 1981, the company also 
provided the “IBM PC Technical Reference Manual” that included circuit schematics, BIOS 
source codes and all other information required to create replicas. By releasing this information, 
IBM enabled the competition to quickly create its own designs (“IBM clones”) based on IBM’s 
key ideas, e.g., x86 processor commands or BIOS. By enabling other partners, IBM played a 
crucial role in the rapid growth of the PC market and managed to benefit despite the loss of 
control. 
5.2 The impact of collective interaction behavior 
In addition to the effectuation process, the results reveal a significant impact of collective 
interaction behavior.  
Proposition 2: Increased collective docility results in more cooperative negotiation 
behavior and stronger end customer involvement. Consequently, increasing levels of 
collective docility lead to an increase in the adoption of new ideas. 
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The simulation results clearly indicate the positive impact of high collective docility on 
shaping emerging markets in favor of a new idea. Moreover, the results show decreased levels of 
non-dissemination because of insufficient docility and utility. These findings reveal the reasons 
behind the positive impact of collective docility. It is clear that increased docility reduces non-
dissemination because of limited docility. However, the interaction with utility is counter-
intuitive at first sight because effectual entrepreneurs do not optimize for “general” utility. 
Moreover, the effectual agents in our formal model have no means to access, assess, estimate, or 
process the utility level of an opportunity; only end customer agents can assess the utility of an 
opportunity. Consequently, the positive impact of increased collective docility can be motivated 
only by the interaction of effectual entrepreneurs and end customers. Increased docility leads to 
more openness toward both other entrepreneurs and end customers. Consequently, the conscious 
ideas of end customers are more likely to be included and accepted by entrepreneurs. Therefore, 
the utility of an opportunity for end customers increases, and the market demand is shifted 
toward the opportunity. Consequently, low docility decreases the success of shaping emerging 
markets and increases the number of unsuccessful negotiations for two reasons. First, 
negotiations break down because of the rejection of negotiation proposals as a direct 
consequence of low docility. Moreover, because entrepreneurs who use effectuation logic refuse 
to adopt the ideas of end customers, end customers are more often confronted with opportunities 
of inferior utility, which they reject. 
These findings are highly relevant for entrepreneurship research for two reasons. First, 
although the benefits of a docile environment have been previously theorized (Simon, 1993a) as 
an abstract benefit for each individual, we contribute to this research through a determination of 
the relevant effectual processes and a detailed investigation of the positive impact of docility. 
Proposition 3: Increased collective persistence improves the information availability 
regarding new ideas. As a result, increasing levels of collective persistence lead to an 
increase in the adoption of new ideas. 
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High collective persistence significantly increases the success of shaping emerging markets. 
However, this factor also increases the number of non-dissemination events because of 
insufficient docility and utility. Intuitively, a high number of containment events would result in 
a low level of adoption. The counter-intuitively high level of adoption is a result of the effectual 
networking mechanisms. High levels of persistence lead to a large number of opportunity 
presentations and relays of information about opportunities. Consequently, information travels 
farther in the network and more often leads to the initiation of negotiations. As reflected in the 
high number of containment events, this behavior increases the number of successful 
negotiations. The behavior also helps to shape an emerging market by making relevant 
information more accessible and fosters the discovery of like-minded cooperation partners. 
Conversely, low collective persistence decreases adoption levels in two ways. First, the 
propagation of the idea itself is inhibited through low propagation. Moreover, re-propagation is 
also inhibited, which effectively decreases the size of the available social network. 
These results are in line with findings on the importance of information flow in social 
networks (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973). Moreover, the increased availability of information 
generates more situations in which entrepreneurs who use effectuation logic can embrace 
contingencies, as proposed by Sarasvathy (Sarasvathy, 2001). Therefore, high collective 
persistence can be seen as both a driver of information flow and a provider of contingency 
opportunities. Although the current literature treats the persistence to approach potential 
stakeholders as a given, these findings highlight the importance of this behavioral parameter and 
emphasize its importance beyond the individual. Although the individual benefits of persistence 
are obvious, these results show that an environment with persistent potential partners is vital to 
successfully shaping emerging markets for an individual entrepreneur who uses effectual logic. 
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5.3 The impact of individual interaction behavior 
Our last simulation experiment focused on the impact of the docility and persistence of an 
individual on shaping an emerging market. In contrast to their collective counterparts, the impact 
of both parameters on the adoption level is limited. 
Proposition 4: Elevating individual docility beyond collective levels does not 
positively influence the outcomes of negotiations and hence has no positive impact on 
the adoption of new ideas. 
Contrary to collective docility, our findings reveal that the level of docility of an individual 
cannot be used to increase the adoption of a new idea. With the exception of low levels, the level 
has no impact on the level of adoption. Although this finding appears to be counter-intuitive to 
the presented literature and our previous findings, a thorough review of the mechanisms at work 
reveals the underlying reasons. Effectual negotiations are dominated by the least docile 
participant. The principle of accumulating pre-commitments leading to increased available 
resources and concretization of the opportunity (Dew et al., 2008) implies that negotiation results 
must be accepted unanimously. Therefore, the individual with the lowest docility will ultimately 
decide on the acceptance of a negotiation result. In turn, an individual can only influence the 
negotiation outcome negatively by choosing a very low docility and rejecting it. 
These findings highlight the limited individual control in effectuation and an important 
feature of effectual negotiations. The effectuation literature and the entrepreneurship literature 
(Dew et al., 2008; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a, 2005b; Simon, 1993b) highlight the general 
importance of docility but fail to present a precise mechanism. Using our formal model of 
effectuation and the results regarding individual impact, we can shed light on the mechanics at 
work, differentiate the impact of individual and collective docility, and explain non-linear 
impacts, as in the case of low individual docility. 
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Proposition 5: Increased individual persistence improves the information availability 
regarding new ideas. Thus, increasing levels of individual persistence have an 
(incremental) positive effect on the adoption of new ideas.  
With regard to individual persistence, our findings reveal a measurable but limited impact on 
shaping of an emerging market. As expected, being persistent in approaching one’s own contacts 
has a positive impact; however, the reach of an individual entrepreneur is limited, and therefore, 
the surplus in terms of information dissemination is small compared to the effect of increased 
collective persistence. Given the previous results, this finding is not surprising; however, the 
finding corrects the standpoint of the literature, which often portrays “the persistent entrepreneur 
who holds on against all odds and against all skepticism to bring an idea to fruition” (Wood & 
McKinley, 2010, p. 71). 
5.4 Limitations and avenues for further research 
Our study and its model hold limitations that provide avenues for further research in the 
following three areas: theory development, empirical confirmation, and model enhancement. 
Regarding the development of effectuation theory, we are confident that the presented formal 
model of effectuation will serve as a starting point for the further formalization of effectuation 
logic. As demonstrated in the literature review, vital parts of the effectuation process regarding 
effectual communication, negotiation, and the withdrawal of pre-commitments are insufficiently 
addressed by the current literature. Moreover, we propose broadening the effectuation research 
agenda. In addition to current research calls to focus on the entrepreneur as a person (Perry et al., 
2012), we suggest that the “network of entrepreneurs who use effectuation logic” is an entity that 
must be well investigated to understand the complex dynamics at work. How do the networking 
positions of entrepreneurs who use effectuation logic or groups thereof affect the performance of 
a network? How do known network effects, e.g., weak links (Granovetter, 1973) or structural 
holes (Burt, 1992), affect a network of entrepreneurs who use effectuation logic? Which network 
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structures promote or discourage the efficient cooperation of entrepreneurs who use effectuation 
logic? 
The empirical confirmation of the proposed effects is also of key importance. The presented 
propositions were derived solely from a theory-based computer simulation. Given the nascent 
state of effectuation theory, the propositions require careful validation through empirical 
research. Moreover, a significant amount of groundwork is required to create and validate the 
required constructs for previously unstudied parameters such as docility and persistence.  
Lastly, our formal model provides multiple improvement opportunities. In particular, the 
inclusion of resources would facilitate a more comprehensive formalization of effectuation logic. 
However, developing a resource creation and consumption model will prove to be a complex 
task. Moreover, the determination of proper resource consumption values for each effectual and 
causal action will require extensive empirical research. In addition to the inclusion of resources, 
the introduction and inclusion of additional performance measures represent another avenue for 
further research. Measures regarding market demand, opportunity variance, or the network 
position of individuals and projects would foster further simulation-based studies of the network 
effects of effectuation and could help elucidate the underlying mechanics of effectuation. 
6 Conclusion 
The overwhelming impact of collective behavior and the limited impact of individual 
docility and persistence provide a contrast to the all-too-heroic perspective that the literature 
often adopts regarding the effectual entrepreneur who single-handedly creates markets through 
the accumulation of partners and resources (Sarasvathy, 2001). Instead, our study promotes the 
entrepreneur’s responsibility to choose a docile environment, attract persistent partners, and 
foster joint action through the use of social networks. Moreover, effectual transformation 
mechanisms enable other market participants to shape an emerging market in the entrepreneur’s 
favor. By forgoing control, this powerful tool enables control-based entrepreneurs to implant 
their ideas in parts of the market far beyond their reach.
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Entrepreneurial Mingling Secrets: Investigating the Performance Impact of 
Network Structure for Control-Based Entrepreneurship using Agent-based 
Simulation 
“Knowing many people is good for business, keeping them apart is even better”, captures 
the essence of research regarding the position and shape of entrepreneurial social networks. 
Current research focuses on high-level relationships, lacking understanding of underlying 
processes. Consequently, its applicability to novel approaches such as control-based 
entrepreneurship, a decision logic designed for highly uncertain environments, is limited. 
Fostering co-creation and strong involvement of partners, control-based entrepreneurship is 
conceptually at odds with current networking strategies emphasising transactional 
relationships, arbitrage, and brokering between contacts. In this study, we therefore re-
evaluate current theories regarding network position and shape for control-based 
entrepreneurship. We use a computer simulation of effectuation, a prototype of control-
based entrepreneurship. We reveal the starkly different mechanics that lead to a similarly 
positive impact of network position yet completely contrasting results for network shape. 
Proposing “tertius iungens” as an alternative theoretical foundation, we demonstrate how 
control-based entrepreneurship reorganises social networks towards a dense web with few 
structural holes, high personal centrality and highly constrained stakeholders. 
Keywords: effectuation, control-based entrepreneurship, social network, centrality, 
structural holes, tertius gaudens, tertius iungens, agent-based computer simulation 
1. Introduction 
The creation and utilisation of social networks are of key importance for entrepreneurs (Jack, 
2010; Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010). As a means of organisation, social networks allow 
entrepreneurs to gain access to a wide variety of tangible and intangible resources provided by 
other parties (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). A large body of research has determined the benefits of 
an appropriate network structure, effective governance mechanisms, and access to content 
through social networks. A central position (Brajkovich, 1994) and sufficiently large network 
(Aldrich & Reese, 1993) are structural characteristics that increase venture performance because 
they increase the accessibility of resources held by other parties. Researchers have argued for the 
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theoretical importance of both strong and weak relationships, or “ties”, (Granovetter, 1973) and 
have obtained largely supportive findings through empirical research (Aldrich, Rosen, & 
Woodward, 1987; Hite, 2005; Jack, 2005; Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000). A more 
general theory uses the occurrence of “structural holes” (Burt, 1992) to explain the beneficial 
impact of network structures by determining their efficiency, and effectiveness. With respect to 
governance, systems that rely on social mechanisms, such as trust (Larson & Starr, 1993) and 
reputation, have proven more effective than contractual systems (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 
1997).  
Despite these significant recent advances in research on entrepreneurial social networks, the 
understanding of the individual entrepreneurial networking process and its effects on the 
organisation of the network itself remains limited. The majority of research focuses on high-level 
input-output effects, leaving the underlying processes opaque. Available process descriptions 
typically focus on the network in general and discuss phases of network development in broad 
terms (Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010). In addition, recent studies have criticised the fact that the 
initial starting position was not considered (Witt, 2004) as well as the lack of research on 
network development over time (Jack, Dodd, & Anderson, 2008). Moreover, key theoretical 
contributions (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973) assume an entrepreneurial behaviour that uses 
predictive planning, causal logic, and the classical exploration-exploitation scheme (Holland, 
1975). Despite the widespread assumption of the universality of this prediction-based approach, a 
growing body of studies reveals that expert serial entrepreneurs prefer an alternative control-
based entrepreneurship approach. In this study, we use effectuation (Sarasvathy, 2001) as an 
exemplary prototype. 
Effectuation is a non-predictive logic that strives to control future market development by 
shaping it. With respect to network creation and utilisation, effectuation relies on co-creation and 
collaboration to jointly create a new market (Dew, Read, Sarasvathy, & Wiltbank, 2008; 
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Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a). Initial studies indicate a positive effect of these practices – including 
the collaborative networking approach – on venture performance (Read, Song, & Smit, 2009). In 
light of these discoveries, in this study, we re-evaluate findings regarding entrepreneurial 
network structure and deepen the understanding of the interaction dynamics of entrepreneurs 
using control-based logic and their networks as well as their impact on venture performance. We 
examine network structure and venture performance using agent-based simulations based on 
three research questions: (1) How does the network position of an entrepreneur using control-
based decision logics impact venture performance over time? (2) How does the network shape of 
an entrepreneur using control-based decision logics impact venture performance over time? (3) 
How do entrepreneurs using control-based decision logics re-organise their social networks over 
time? 
2. Literature review: the performance impact of the social network 
In this chapter, we provide an introduction to effectuation theory as a representative of control-
based entrepreneurial decision logic. We subsequently present an in-depth review of the 
effectuation process literature to derive a formal model for the subsequent simulation 
experiments. We conclude this chapter with a presentation of current theories and empirical 
results regarding the performance impact of network structure, i.e., network position and shape. 
We expose inconsistencies with control-based entrepreneurship logic and propose possible 
explanations, methods of unification, and alternative theories. 
2.1. Effectuation as an entrepreneurial expert decision logic 
Effectuation was introduced as a decision logic as a result of case studies on new venture 
creation under Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921) with expert serial entrepreneurs (Sarasvathy, 
2001). These experts approached the creation of new ventures in a manner fundamentally 
different from traditional approaches which employ prediction to best position a venture in an 
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emerging market. 
Contrary to the traditional prediction-based approach called causation, effectuation is a control-
based logic (Wiltbank & Dew, 2006) that aspires to shape future market developments rather 
than forecast them. Effectuation relies on four principles (Sarasvathy, 2001): first, effectuation 
focuses on the use of readily available means, contrasting the causation approach to first set a 
goal and subsequently acquire all required means. Second, effectuation proposes project selection 
based on maintaining an affordable potential loss rather than maximising the expected return. 
Third, effectuation proposes to embrace contingencies as an improvement opportunity rather than 
treating it as a deviation that requires mitigation. Finally, effectuation proposes viewing other 
market participants as potential partners rather than competitors. In fact, effectuators organise a 
network of partnerships through the negotiation of pre-commitments and the exchange of new 
ideas to drive the finalisation of an artefact (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a), typically a product, 
service, project, or venture. 
Introduced by Sarasvathy (Sarasvathy, 2001), effectuation has developed into an important area 
of entrepreneurship research (Venkataraman, Sarasvathy, Dew, & Forster, 2012). Despite 
significant advances, effectuation is still considered to be in a nascent state (Perry, Chandler, & 
Markova, 2012). Originally derived from thought experiments, effectuation has expanded into a 
comprehensive decision logic including a process model (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a). 
Subsequent refinements (Dew et al., 2008; Dew, Read, Sarasvathy, & Wiltbank, 2010) led to the 
inclusion of effectual transformation mechanisms (Dew et al., 2010). Effectuation was 
introduced to adjacent research streams, for example trust (Goel & Karri, 2006; Karri & Goel, 
2008; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2008a). A particularly fruitful debate regarding similarities and 
differences of Austrian economics and effectuation helped to delineate the concepts of non-
predictive control and creativity (Chiles, Bluedorn, & Gupta, 2007; Chiles, Gupta, & Bluedorn, 
2008; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2008b). Scale development has been initiated (Brettel, Mauer, 
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Engelen, & Küpper, 2012; Chandler, DeTienne, McKelvie, & Mumford, 2011), and quantitative 
studies revealed increased venture performance for business angels (Wiltbank, Read, Dew, & 
Sarasvathy, 2009) and new ventures in general (Read et al., 2009). 
The principles of effectuation were derived from scenarios with high uncertainty. More precisely, 
Sarasvathy et al. (2008) identified three distinct preconditions: Knightian uncertainty, Marchian 
goal ambiguity, and isotropy. Although these conditions typically occur “naturally” in studies 
regarding new ventures, simulation studies such as this one must place particular emphasis on these 
preconditions to produce valid results. 
2.2.  Effectual use of social networks – a review of known processes and behaviours 
Entrepreneurs using effectual logic focus on available means: “who I am”, “what I know”, and 
“whom I know” (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a). Consequently, social networks (“whom I know”) 
are essential in acquiring “new means” and “new goals” (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a). Although 
interaction with other market participants is regarded as “the very essence of the effectual 
process” (Dew et al., 2008: 50), research on inter-subjective interaction remains sparse 
(Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011). The following review provides an overview of known 
effectual processes and behaviours. We created an integrated effectual process map based on 
available studies. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, social networks are relevant to the effectuation process in four ways. 
First, effectuators approach contacts in their social network to negotiate pre-commitments 
(Sarasvathy, 2001). This typically implies the prior disclosure of the artefact on which an 
approaching effectuator is working. Second, effectuators use social networks as a mechanism to 
gather and relay information. Although this behaviour is not exclusive to effectuators, it exposes 
network participants to new ideas, which is an important principle of effectuation (Sarasvathy, 
2001). Third, effectuators engage in the actual negotiation of pre-commitments and organisation 
of joint projects (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a). Finally, effectuators use transformation 
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mechanisms to develop the artefact on which they are working (Dew et al., 2010; Sarasvathy et 
al., 2008). Although not every transformation necessitates social networks, we focus on 
transformations that are initiated by external stimuli. In contrast to negotiations, transformations 
lead to concretion of the artefact without the acquisition of new means. 
--------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 here 
---------------------------- 
2.2.1. Presentation of artefacts 
Effectuation relies on interactions with other market participants to create a market opportunity 
(Sarasvathy, 2001). Effectuation uses the negotiation of pre-commitments to mitigate the risk of 
mistaking an uninterested party for a potential customer (Dew & Sarasvathy, 2007). The 
negotiation of such pre-commitment is initiated by approaching a known contact (“whom I 
know”) and presenting the current state of the artefact (Dew et al., 2008). The literature treats this 
first step as a prelude to negotiations (Dew et al., 2008; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a) Assuming 
that effectual entrepreneurs will approach only a part of their known contacts, we argue to 
include the persistence with which effectual entrepreneurs approach known contacts in a formal 
model of effectuaiton. It is an individual decision or personality trait reflected in their means base 
(“who I am”) (Sarasvathy, 2001: 253). 
2.2.2. Relay of information 
The relay of information is a central aspect of social networks (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
Although it is not exclusive to entrepreneurs using effectual logic, the dissemination of 
information through networks plays a crucial role for them. The incidental reception of new 
information regarding other market participants is an important source of contingency that 
effectuation teaches us to embrace (Sarasvathy, 2001). Thus, the relay of such information is an 
important by-product of effectual networking. Although the existence and positive impact of 
information exchange have been studied extensively (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003), the exact 
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process steps used by entrepreneurs using effectual logic have yet to be determined (Sarasvathy 
& Venkataraman, 2011). 
2.2.3. Negotiation of pre-commitments 
The negotiation of pre-commitments is the key use of social networks for entrepreneurs 
employing effectual logic (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a). The results of a negotiation are two-fold: 
“new means” and “new goals” (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a: 543). “New means” refers to the 
surplus of both tangible and intangible resources that the other party committed to the 
development of the opportunity, whereas “new goals” refers to the further concretion of the 
artefact under development. As the market is still emerging, these negotiations focus “on the 
characteristics of the project […] rather than the type and quantity of returns” (Dew et al., 2008: 
50). In this manner, the resource base and level of concreteness grow iteratively over time, a fact 
that is referred to as “two concurrent dynamic cycles” (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a: 1). Moreover, 
the exchange of pre-commitments is more than a one-time negotiation: participants organise a 
joint project and are part of it until they “declare the effectual transformation complete” 
(Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a: 549). This high level of stakeholder involvement is conceptually 
different from the “classical” transactional use of social networks. Stakeholders are continuously 
involved in the development of a market opportunity rather than “just” providing resources in 
exchange for funds or equity. 
 “Effectuation assumes docility as a fundamental behavioral construct applicable to all 
stakeholders” (Dew et al., 2008: 50). Introduced by Simon (1990), docility describes “the 
tendency to depend on suggestions, recommendations, persuasion, and information obtained 
through social channels as a major basis for choice” (Simon, 1993: 156). Not to be interpreted as 
“passivity or meekness” (Simon, 1997), it is an important characteristic and must be included in a 
formal representation of effectual negotiation. 
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2.2.4. Transformation of artefacts 
In (2008) Sarasvathy et al. presented alternative mechanisms that effectual entrepreneurs use to 
further develop artefacts without the negotiation of pre-commitments. Although these 
transformation mechanisms lead to “new goals” in the sense of artefact concretion, they do not 
contribute “new means” because no new stakeholders are gathered. 
Based on their case studies, Dew et al. (2010) list nine different transformation types applied by 
entrepreneurs using effectual logic. Because the present study focuses on the effect of network 
position and shape, we focus on transformation types that involve the use of social networks. 
These types (e.g., “deletion and supplementation”, “composition and decomposition”, “free 
associating”) can be triggered by external stimuli provided by social networks. Moreover, we 
argue that the application of transformation mechanisms – if triggered by external stimuli – is 
subject to personal docility: similar to negotiations, effectuators change their artefact based on 
externally provided information. Then, a similar chain of considerations in which docility plays 
an important role is set in motion. The only notable difference is that no new stakeholders and 
resources are gathered in the process. 
2.3. Performance impact of the position and shape of entrepreneurial social networks 
Hoang and Antoncic (2003) list three research areas regarding the impact of entrepreneurial 
networks: content, governance, and structure. Focusing on structure as the best researched 
category, we will now review and discuss findings regarding two key qualities that characterise 
the social network of entrepreneurs: position (size, centrality) and shape (structural holes). 
2.3.1. Performance impact of network position 
The position within a network is usually defined by the measures of centrality or size. 
Researchers have identified a variety of benefits stemming from centrality and size, all of which 
have a common theme: the network enables access to resources outside the direct reach of the 
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entrepreneur. The size of an entrepreneur’s network increases the quantity (Adler & Kwon, 2002; 
Batjargal, 2003) and variety (Greve & Salaff, 2003; Greve, 1995) of accessible resources and 
improves the likelihood of their successful acquisition (Semrau & Werner, 2013). In this context, 
“resources” include both tangible resources, such as funding (Vanacker, Manigart, Meuleman, & 
Sels, 2011; Zimmer & Aldrich, 1987) and human resources (Freeman, 1999), and intangible 
resources, such as emotional support (Brüderl & Preisendörfer, 1998), information to recognise 
opportunities (Birley, 1985), and access to production capacity and distribution channels (Brown 
& Butler, 1995). Using all accessible resources, the depicted prediction-based entrepreneur will 
gather knowledge of customer preferences and exploit a new idea in such a way that the demands 
of a predefined target group are optimally satisfied. 
Control-based entrepreneurship, however, proposes a different approach to networking. 
Controlling the shape of a market requires influencing market participants and tightly including 
them to foster joint action. Despite the difference in approach, the impact of network position in 
control-based entrepreneurship has not been discussed in the literature. Aside from the generally 
positive performance impact (Read et al., 2009), to our knowledge, control-based social 
networking has not been discussed at all. At best, we can assume that increased centrality, 
resulting in a larger means base, improves the performance of control-based entrepreneurship by 
enabling access to more potential partners. Thus, the stark differences of the control- and 
prediction-based approach warrant closer investigation of the performance impact of network 
position. 
2.3.2. Performance impact of network shape 
Hoang and Antoncic (2003) identify “bridging weak ties” and “structural holes “ as key 
theoretical constructs with regard to network shape. “Bridging weak ties” (Granovetter, 1973), 
refer to the finding that that acquaintances loosely related to an actor are more likely to provide 
non-redundant information. Granovetter’s conclusions have been extended by Burt (1992) and 
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subsumed under his “structural holes” paradigm. Not unlike the idea of an “electron hole” in 
solid state physics (Weller, 1967), a structural hole describes the absence of a tie between two 
actors. According to Burt (1992), entrepreneurs profit from a network rich in structural holes. 
Hoang and Antoncic (2003) list multiple studies (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; 
Krackhardt, 1995; Zaheer & McEvily, 1999) that empirically support Burt’s theory. Burt 
proposes that entrepreneurs should actively manage their social network to be as efficient (non-
redundant) and effective (focusing on contacts with an abundance of structural holes) as possible. 
Burt proposes a strategy enabling entrepreneurs to actively benefit from an effective and efficient 
network called “tertius gaudens”. Originally introduced by Simmel (1896), tertius gaudens refers 
to a party who benefits from a conflict between two other parties. Burt argues that entrepreneurs 
should re-organise their network toward non-redundant contacts to engage in information 
arbitrage and benefit from competition for information. Because the exploited parties are not 
aware of each other, the entrepreneur is not constrained by the risk of disclosure through direct 
communication. However, the depicted entrepreneurs behave significantly differently from 
control-based expert serial entrepreneurs. Moreover, Burt’s strategy relies on prediction-based 
planning and assumes in an environment of relative certainty.  
In (2005), Obstfeld proposed a behavioural model that opposed Burt’s tertius gaudens approach. 
Revisiting Simmel’s work on triads (1950) – the effects of constellations of three actors – 
Obstfeld proposed an approach that focuses on actively filling social holes to foster collaboration 
and the emergence of innovative projects. His approach ultimately reduces the efficiency of 
networks and increasingly constraints an entrepreneur by decreasing his or her degree of freedom 
in negotiations. Building on Burt’s findings that the tertius gaudens strategy fosters “good ideas” 
but ultimately negatively impacts their implementation (Burt, 2004), Obstfeld argues that the 
benefits of collaborative innovation and the decreased mobilisation efforts might outweigh the 
benefits of Burt’s tertius gaudens strategy. 
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Given the emphasis of both effectuation and the “tertius iungens” approach on collaboration, 
control-based entrepreneurship strategies, such as effectuation, appear conceptually closer to 
“tertius iungens” than “tertius gaudens” (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005b). However, effectuation is 
classified as an approach suitable for radically innovative ideas (Sarasvathy, 2001) and could 
thus benefit from a network shaped in favour of a “tertius gaudens” entrepreneur. In effect, 
control-based strategies have not yet been associated with either strategy. Moreover, it is unclear 
how a network shaped in (dis)favour of a tertius gaudens entrepreneur affects control-based 
strategies. 
3. Computer simulations as a method 
This study uses agent-based computer simulations to examine the impact of network position and 
shape. As a “third way of doing science” (Axelrod, 1997), computer simulations can create 
unique insights, particularly for theories in a nascent state (Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2007), 
such as the control-based effectuation logic (Perry et al., 2012). In addition to their flexibility, 
computer simulations allow for data collection at a level of detail and accuracy unparalleled by 
empirical research (McKelvey, 2004). This is an important aspect, particularly for social network 
studies, because “about half of what people report about their own interactions is incorrect in one 
way or another” (Wasserman & Faust, 1994: 57). Once implemented, computer simulations 
allow for “virtual experiments” (Davis et al., 2007) to study available theory under varying 
conditions with minor effort. This approach enables the development of a deeper understanding 
of theory, particularly because it can be tested under boundary conditions – areas typically 
associated with sparse data in empirical studies. 
Although computer simulations are rarely used in entrepreneurship research, “several influential 
research efforts have used simulation as their primary method” (Harrison, Carroll, & Carley, 
2007). March (1991) investigates the relation between exploration and exploitation in 
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organisational learning using a form of agent-based simulation. Ganco and Agarwal (2009) use 
computer simulations to study the performance impact of environmental turbulence and firm 
characteristics for various industries. Davis et al. (Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2009), used 
computer simulation to investigate the interplay between firm structure and environmental 
complexity. 
Using the step-based approach of Davis et al. (2007), we develop a formal model of effectuation 
emphasising the use of social networks based on expert interviews and the literature review 
presented in chapter 2. We implemented the model using the simulation framework Repast 
Simphony (North, Howe, Collier, & Vos, 2007) and the JUNG library (O’Madadhain, Fisher, 
Smyth, White, & Boey, 2005) to calculate network measures. This setup enables automatized 
data collection for individual agents at each time step. 
4. A formal model of effectual social networking7 
Modelling effectual social networking requires a formal representation of all relevant actors, 
objects, and processes of effectual networking. This includes effectuators and their artefacts as 
well as end customers, representing the environment. Effectuators and end customers form a 
social network that allows effectuators to approach both end customers and other effectuators. 
According to the literature (Dew & Sarasvathy, 2007), effectuators cooperate only with 
stakeholders who are willing to make pre-commitments. We paid special attention to the 
implementation of uncertainty because this is a major prerequisite for effectuation (Sarasvathy et 
al., 2008).  
In brief, the simulations are performed as follows: starting at time step one, all effectual agents 
begin presenting their artefacts to known contacts. The approached agents probabilistically relay 
                                              
7 Partly taken from my paper “Individual vs. Collective Control in Effectual Social Networking” 
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the received artefact to known contacts. Moreover, they engage in negotiations with the 
approaching effectual agent. If an agreement is reached, both agents agree on a joint artefact and 
continue their search for additional stakeholders together. If no agreement is reached, the 
engaged party can decide to transform its artefact based on the information gained from the 
presented artefact. Over time, the artefacts are refined, and the simulation converges to a setting 
of multiple stable projects. The simulation is stopped after 40 steps, which is a sufficient amount 
of time to reach a stable state. 
4.1. Objects and actors 
4.1.1. Artefact 
The term artefact refers to a product, service, project, or goal being finalised by an effectuator 
(Sarasvathy, 2001). Following the product description of arbitrary merchandise, e.g., a mobile 
phone, we formalised an artefact as a list of (feature: variant) combinations. For example, a 
mobile phone could be described as follows: {(colour: red), (weight: 100 g), (connectivity: 3G), 
(battery capacity: 2000 mAh)}. Mathematically, we formalise an artefact A as a set of (feature, 
variant) tuples of variable length, as presented in Equation (1). Each feature can only appear once 
in an artefact, and the number of variants per feature and the total number of features are limited, 
discrete, and strictly positive. 
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Moreover, with Equations (2) and (3), we define ways to mathematically access artefacts. In 
Equation (2), we define v(f, A) as the variant of feature f in artefact A, if available. The variant 
“0” is reserved for “unknown feature”. In our example, the variant of the “colour” feature of our 
mobile phone is “red”, and the variant of the feature “sound system” is “0” because it was not yet 
defined. 
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The set F(A) in Equation (3) represents the set of all known features in A. In the mobile phone 
example, this would be the set {colour, weight, connectivity, battery capacity}. 
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4.1.2. Effectual agent 
We model effectuators as agents pursuing the task of artefact finalisation using their social 
network. Every effectual agent has an artefact, which is partially pre-populated with randomly 
drawn (feature: variant) combinations during the initialisation of the simulation. Although the 
literature states that effectual agents can “declare the effectual transformation complete and begin 
competing in alternative markets” (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a: 549), we focus on a single cycle 
of effectual artefact finalisation. Moreover, we assume that each stakeholder enters with 
sufficient resources to drive transformations and negotiations. Therefore, we do not explicitly 
model resources and potential constraints. 
4.1.3. End customer 
End customers represent the market demand in our current model. Formalised as agents, they 
fulfil the role of representing the conscious and sub-conscious market demand. The effectuation 
literature often notes the important role of end customers in examples, e.g., the customer-
investors of U-Haul who helped to both shape and grow a one-man, one-truck company into 
America’s leading provider of moving and storage resources (Sarasvathy, 2001). More recent 
examples are the users of crowdfunding platforms, e.g., kickstarter. These customers represent 
the market demand to entrepreneurs who ask for their funding. 
Thus, we formalise end customers as “passive” agents with two distinct properties: they can 
initiate the negotiation of pre-commitments upon approach and represent the market demand in 
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these negotiations. End customer agents represent the conscious market demand by an artefact 
that is used in negotiations. The sub-conscious demands are captured in a fitness landscape that 
enables end customer agents to assess the utility of a complete artefact. 
We formalised the utility of an artefact using a well-known utility function known as the “fitness 
landscape” (Levinthal, 1997). The fitness landscape is a simple mathematical model that 
calculates a single fitness value for any given artefact, which represents the utility of an artefact 
for the market. Higher fitness values represent a higher market utility, i.e., a more desirable 
product for the market. 
Similar to effectual agents, all end customer agents have an artefact representing their conscious 
demands. During the initialisation, the artefact is partially pre-populated with (feature: variant) 
combinations. Although the features are drawn randomly, the respective variant for an end 
customer agent is drawn to probabilistically represent the market utility. For instance, if the 
artefact represents a mobile phone, the utility of a high-capacity battery is considerably higher 
than the utility of a low-capacity battery. Therefore, the “high” variant is more likely to be 
assigned to the “battery capacity” feature of an artefact than the “low” variant. 
4.1.4. Fitness landscape 
We formalised the representation of market utility as an “NK-fitness landscape”, a well-known 
approach in management research employing simulation studies (Ganco & Agarwal, 2009; 
Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Levinthal, 1997). In accordance with effectuation theory, we 
implemented the simplest version of an NK-fitness landscape (K=0), which regards products as 
“near decomposable“, as required by theory (Sarasvathy, 2003). 
The total utility U(A) of an artefact A in our fitness landscape is defined as the sum of the utility 
of its (feature: variant) combinations. 
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As indicated in Equation (4), we randomly initialise our utility function u((fi, vi)) for all possible 
(feature: variant) combinations. Moreover, we assign a value to features absent from an artefact. 
The fitness of an artefact representing the aforementioned mobile phone, for example, is 
calculated by awarding points to known features, e.g., “colour”, with high scores for “yellow” 
and low scores for “black”. Moreover, we assign points for missing features, e.g., “surround 
sound system”, which may be useless in business phones – and therefore score points by absence 
– but could be considered desirable for younger consumers. All points are then summed up to 
calculate the total utility value U(A) of an artefact. 
4.1.5. Social network 
We initialise the network among effectual agents as well as between effectual and end-customer 
agents as an undirected free-scale network according to the generation procedures introduced by 
Barabási and Albert (Barabasi & Albert, 1999). Numerous studies have shown that free-scale 
networks best capture the structure of real-world networks (Aiello, Chung, & Lu, 2001; Barabasi 
& Albert, 1999; Broder et al., 2000; Jeong, Mason, Barabási, & Oltvai, 2001; Newman, 2000). 
Scale-free networks assume that the likelihood p of having k known contacts exhibits a negative 
exponential distribution (p ~ k-α). 
The generation process of Barabási and Albert allows for a simple creation in two steps. First, the 
algorithm creates a network of effectual agents. Second, the algorithm attaches end- customer 
agents to the network. Initially, our algorithm creates a network of effectuators by cycling 
through all effectuators and creating exactly one tie originating from this effectual agent i. The 
target effectual agent j of the tie is probabilistically chosen, as indicated in Equation (5). 
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The function Degree(j) refers to the number of contacts known by agent j. Second, all end- 
customer agents are attached to the previously created network in the same manner. 
4.2. Simulation mechanics 
4.2.1. Behaviours of effectual agents 
Effectual agents can exhibit four behaviours to interact with their environment: approaching a 
known contact to present the current state of their artefacts, relaying information about received 
artefacts to known contacts, negotiating strategic alliances by exchanging pre-commitments, and 
inheriting the ideas of other effectual agents’ artefacts through transformation. These behaviours 
are controlled by the effectual agents’ persistence and docility. Both parameters are formalised as 
a variable representing low persistence and docility as 0.0 and high persistence and docility as 
1.0. 
4.2.2. Approaching known contacts 
Effectual agents can approach known contacts to present the current state of their artefacts. We 
formalised this behaviour as transferring copies of their artefact. For each contact, the effectual 
agent executes this behaviour probabilistically using the persistence parameter as the execution 
probability. The effectual agent can approach all known contacts – except for its stakeholders – 
once per turn. This behaviour is executed at the beginning of the simulation and every time its 
artefact changes. The recipient processes the proposed artefact in the next time step. 
4.2.3. Relaying received artefacts to known contacts 
Effectual agents can relay information about other agents’ artefacts. We formalised this 
behaviour as probabilistically transferring copies of incoming artefacts to all known contacts 
except for stakeholders. This behaviour is triggered by every incoming artefact and is 
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probabilistically executed using the persistence parameter as the execution probability. Again, 
the recipient processes the relayed artefact in the next time step. To avoid multiple receptions of 
the same artefact, a list of previous recipients is transferred along with the artefact to decline the 
reception if it has been received previously. 
4.2.4. Negotiation of pre-commitments 
“Even the literature that is directly focused on negotiations has mostly neglected new venture 
creation processes” (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011). Despite the absence of a concrete 
algorithm, the literature (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a) implies multiple requirements for such an 
algorithm: (a) allow negotiation between two or more parties, (b) ensure that a position supported 
by a majority of participants is more likely to prevail, (c) support individual acceptance or refusal 
of negotiation results to ensure both self-selection into a project as well as the consideration of 
pre-commitments, and (d) negotiations are triggered by the approach of an effectual agent, as 
described in the “effectual cycle” (Dew et al., 2008). 
As illustrated in Figure 2, we formalised the negotiation process as a simple, three-staged 
probabilistic negotiation. The behaviour is triggered upon the reception of an artefact. First, the 
algorithm determines all relevant stakeholders, i.e., project partners of the sending and receiving 
agents. The algorithm then gathers information on the artefacts of all involved agents. Second, 
the algorithm creates a combined list of occurring features and traverses it to create histograms of 
the frequency of the stakeholders’ preferred variants. Third, the algorithm creates a proposed 
negotiation result that includes all known features. The variant of each feature is determined 
probabilistically using the histograms as a (non-normalised) discrete probability mass function. 
For instance, if one stakeholder prefers the “colour” to be “red” and nine prefer it to be “blue”, 
the colour will be blue with a likelihood of 90%. Finally, the algorithm proposes the negotiation 
result to each stakeholder to receive feedback. A negotiation result is accepted only if all 
stakeholders agree on the adoption. In the event of an adoption, the algorithm replaces the 
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artefact of each stakeholder with the negotiation result and creates new network ties between all 
project partners. 
--------------------------- 
Insert figure 2 here 
--------------------------- 
After a negotiation result is created, each agent individually compares it to the state of its own 
artefact and decides whether to adopt it. As “[e]ffectuation assumes docility as a fundamental 
behavioural construct” (Dew et al., 2008: 498), we propose a docility-based formalisation of the 
acceptance process for effectual agents following a simple rule: a negotiation result that is more 
similar to the effectual agent’s own artefact will require less docility to be adopted. 
We formalised this rule as a calculation of the share of conflicting features in relation to the total 
number of features held by the artefact of the deciding effectual agent. A conflicting feature is a 
different variant of the same property, e.g., a “red shell” instead of a “blue shell”. We assume 
that as the share of conflicted over known features for an effectuator increases, an effectuator 
must be more docile to accept these changes. Therefore, in our formal representation, an 
effectuator e with artefact A accepts the negotiation result R if the relative share of conflicting 
features is lower than its docility as indicated in Equation (6). 
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4.2.5. Inheriting features trough transformation 
As presented in the literature review, we formalise artefact transformation as a single abstract 
behaviour formalised as follows: the process is triggered by an unsuccessful negotiation. The 
approached agent now compiles a list of features that are exclusive to the proposed artefact. 
Then, it randomly chooses one of these features. Third, it includes the chosen (feature: variant) 
combination probabilistically in its artefact using its docility as the execution probability. Lastly, 
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the effectual agent initiates a negotiation for adoption with its stakeholders. 
This formalisation implies the assumption that a certain amount of docility is required to 
transform an artefact based on external information. Moreover, it assumes that the adoption of a 
previously unknown feature is significantly more likely than the change of a known feature, 
which represents both the agent’s preferences and those of its stakeholders. 
4.2.6. End customer agents’ access to the fitness landscape 
During the negotiation, end customers can access the fitness landscape representing the market 
demand once. When confronted with the decision to adopt a negotiation proposal, end customer 
agents can access the fitness landscape to determine the total utility value of its artefact and the 
negotiation result. An end customer only accepts negotiation proposals with improved utility. 
The access restriction is essential to maintain the uncertainty state of the effectual environment. 
Knightian uncertainty is maintained because the number of design alternatives and their 
respective success probabilities cannot be determined by any agent. Goal ambiguity is 
maintained because end customers can only voice their conscious demands in negotiations but 
cannot determine the optimal variant of any feature. Finally, isotropy is maintained because the 
market demand for variants of known features cannot be estimated beyond the individual demand 
of the end customers. In conclusion, end-customer agents cannot search the fitness landscape to 
discover its optimum product. 
4.2.7. Measures of network position 
We focus on two widely recognized measures of centrality for social networks: degree centrality 
and betweenness centrality (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Although both measures capture 
centrality, they emphasise slightly different aspects of this concept. 
Degree centrality measures the number of known contacts of an agent. Therefore, degree 
centrality also represents the size of the agent’s personal network. For better comparability, 
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degree centrality is typically normalised by the total number of agents within a network. 
Betweenness centrality captures the centrality of an actor by measuring its relevance for the 
information flow between any two other agents in the network. An agent is regarded as important 
for the information flow if it is part of the shortest route or “geodesic” between two agents. The 
measure is therefore defined as the number of appearances an agent makes on the geodesics of all 
pairs of other agents. 
4.2.8. Measures of network shape 
Burt (Burt, 1992) defines two key measures for the shape of an actor’s network: efficiency and 
constraint. 
Efficiency is the degree to which the ties of an agent are non-redundant. Thus, in a highly 
efficient network, an agent is acquainted with contacts that do not know each other but are well 
connected themselves. In a network with low efficiency, all known contact only provide access 
to agents that can also be reached through other ties as well, rendering the network largely 
redundant. Burt argues that entrepreneurs benefits from a highly efficient network. The exact 
measure is given in the literature (Burt, 1992: 53). 
Constraint is a measure that captures the extent to which acquainted contacts impede the 
exploitation of structural holes. Whereas efficiency measures the extent to which direct ties are 
redundant, constraint measures the degree to which contacts are acquainted. Burt proposes that 
the acquaintance between known contacts – the absence of a structural hole between them – 
impedes the application of arbitrage and competition for information. Therefore, a low constraint 
level indicates an abundance of structural holes resulting in many opportunities for arbitrage and 
competition for information or resources. 
Burt defines Ci as the measure of constraint for actor i, as indicated in Equation (7). The term pij 
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represents the relative share of energy and time actor i invested in the relationship with j. For 
simplicity, we assume that actors divide their energy among their known contacts equally. 
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As indicated in Figure 3, the constraint is lowest for a star-shaped network around an actor and 
highest for a complete network. Moreover, the constraint measure depends strongly on the 
inverse of known contacts. As our subsequent analysis compares actors with largely differing 
numbers of contacts, we normalised Burt’s constraint measure by multiplying it by actor degree. 
This normalisation results in a continuous value range between 1 (star-shaped network) and 4 
(complete network). 
--------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 here 
---------------------------- 
4.2.9. Measurement of performance: demand satisfaction 
The investigation on performance requires the definition of a performance measure. We define 
performance analogously to traditional performance measures (Narver, Slater, & MacLachlan, 
2004; Vorhies & Morgan, 2005) as the similarity of supply and demand and refer to it as demand 
satisfaction. The more similar an effectual agent’s artefact is to those of an end customer agent, 
the higher the score. The demand satisfaction DS(i) of an agent i is calculated as a sum over all 
individual comparisons of an effectual agent’s artefact with all end customer agents’ artefacts. As 
indicated in Equation (8). The individual comparison score ds(Ai, Aj) is calculated as the share of 
met conscious demands of end customer j by effectuator i. 
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5. Results 
To investigate the development of social networks of entrepreneurs using control-based logic 
over time as well as the performance effects of centrality and structural holes, we conducted a 
series of simulation experiments. We simulated an environment consisting of 40 end customer 
agents and 20 effectual agents. All agents received a randomly created artefact consisting of 5 
(feature: variant) combinations drawn from 10 available features and 2 respective variants. The 
fitness landscape and network were randomly initialised for each run. We used values of 0.6 for 
persistence and 0.2 for docility. To gain a sufficiently large dataset, we repeated the simulation 
1,200 times. Each run consisted of 40 turns, which was sufficient to reach a stable state. In each 
turn, all aforementioned measures regarding performance, centrality, and structural holes were 
computed for all agents. In total, we collected 1.44 GB of data that we subsequently analysed to 
investigate our research questions. 
5.1. Performance impact of network position 
We conducted two analyses to clarify the impact of network position on performance. First, we 
correlated demand satisfaction, degree, and betweenness centrality at the end of the simulation in 
a stable state. Second, we compared the initial degree and betweenness centrality to the final 
value of demand satisfaction for each effectuator. 
For the first analysis, we extracted the final values of degree and betweenness centrality, demand 
satisfaction from the data. In Figures 4a and 4b, we display the average level of demand 
satisfaction per level of centrality. To account for the continuous nature of betweenness 
centrality, we grouped the values into 20 possible levels of betweenness centrality. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 4 a-c here 
---------------------------------- 
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The results clearly indicate a connection of degree centrality with demand satisfaction. Starting 
with an average demand satisfaction of 0.4 for a degree centrality of 0.0, demand satisfaction 
increases considerably up to 0.8 at level 0.4. Then, the speed of growth decreases. Demand 
satisfaction increases to 1.0 for a degree centrality of 1.0. The correlation of betweenness 
centrality and demand satisfaction reveals a decrease of demand satisfaction with increasing 
betweenness centrality. Whereas low betweenness centrality is associated with a median demand 
satisfaction of 0.7-0.8, increasing betweenness centrality to 0.8 reduces demand satisfaction to 
0.4-0.5. Moreover, the relationship between betweenness centrality and demand satisfaction is 
significantly more distorted than the aforementioned relationships. 
Our second analysis concerned the impact of initial network configuration and final demand 
satisfaction. Thus, we analysed the impact of initial degree and betweenness centrality on the 
resulting demand satisfaction at a stable simulation state, which was always reached in turn 40. 
To ensure the availability of data over the entire range of initial centrality, we focused on a single 
agent, which was initialised with a given number of known contacts covering the complete range 
from 1 to 59. 
--------------------------- 
Insert Figures 5a-b here 
--------------------------- 
As presented in Figures 5a and 5b, both initial degree and betweenness centrality have an impact 
on final demand satisfaction. Furthermore, in both cases, demand satisfaction increases strongly 
with centrality from 0.0 to 0.3-0.4 up to 0.7-0.8, after which demand satisfaction grows only 
marginally with increasing initial centrality to approximately 0.9 for both centrality measures. 
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5.2. Performance impact of network shape 
Our second series of analyses targeted the performance implications of structural holes as defined 
by Burt (1992). Thus, we investigated the effects of constraint and network efficiency. For the 
analysis of efficiency and demand satisfaction, we grouped the continuous values into 20 levels 
of efficiency and 60 levels of normalised constraint to obtain meaningful results. As shown in 
Figure 6a, demand satisfaction decreases with efficiency from approximately 0.9 for minimal 
efficiency values to 0.3 for maximally efficient networks. As shown in Figure 6b, demand 
satisfaction increases gradually with normalised constraint from approximately 0.4 for low 
normalised constraint (1.0) to approximately 0.5 for a normalised constraint level of 2.5. Then, 
demand satisfaction increases considerably to 1.0 for the highest possible level of normalised 
constraint (4.0). 
--------------------------- 
Insert Figures 6a-b here 
---------------------------- 
5.3. Development of social networks over time 
Our third series of analyses targeted the development of the previously presented measures over 
time. To better understand the dynamics of the development of effectual social networks, we 
tracked the development of degree, and betweenness centrality as well as efficiency and 
constraint for each time step of each simulation run. Figures 7 and 8 capture the average values 
of the aforementioned measures per time step. 
As reflected in Figures 7a and b, over time, the average degree centrality increases from an initial 
value of approximately 0.05 to 0.35 at time step 18. The average betweenness centrality 
decreases from an initial value of 0.03 to 0.015 at time step 18. All values are constant after this 
time, indicating the stabilisation of the simulation. 
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--------------------------- 
Insert Figures 7a-b here 
--------------------------- 
Figures 8a and 8b indicate that over time, average efficiency decreases from its initial value of 
approximately 0.3 to 0.15 at time step 18. The average normalised constraint increases from an 
initial level of 1.0 to 2.5-3.0 at time step 18. 
--------------------------- 
Insert Figures 8a-b here 
--------------------------- 
6. Discussion and implications 
Although the creation and utilisation of social networks are critical for entrepreneurs, the 
underlying theory regarding entrepreneurial social networks is still underdeveloped. Moreover, 
“classical” networking strategies are at odds with control-based entrepreneurship approaches 
such as effectuation. Focusing on the impact of network structure, we used an agent-based 
computer simulation of effectuation to understand how entrepreneurs using control-based logics 
benefit from network position and shape. Moreover, we analysed how these entrepreneurs re-
organise their social networks to increase performance. 
6.1. Performance impact of network position 
Our simulation experiments regarding network position reveal a significant performance impact 
of the network position in general and the initial position in particular. Moreover, the analysis of 
development over time reveals that control-based entrepreneurship actively improves the 
network position over time. However, these developments are captured to varying degrees by 
established centrality measures. Although degree centrality is positively correlated with demand 
satisfaction, betweenness centrality is negatively correlated with performance. 
6.1.1. Performance implications of final network position 
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Our simulation experiments indicate a strong correlation between degree centrality and demand 
satisfaction at the end of the simulation, which is implicitly predicted by effectuation theory: 
instead of predicting the market demand, entrepreneurs using control-based logic shape their 
market by actively including stakeholders in the creation of their artefacts. In turn, these joint 
artefacts meet the demand of the stakeholders, i.e., project members. Consequently, the 
increasing size of the stakeholder group drives both demand satisfaction and degree centrality. 
Degree centrality can be easily measured empirically and has been shown to have a positive 
impact on entrepreneurial venture performance before. However, the underlying reasons were 
different: for “classical” entrepreneurship high degree centrality increases the likelihood to 
acquire resources, such as market information or capital. For control-based entrepreneurship on 
the other hand, degree centrality is a proxy for successful control of the demand landscape. The 
difference in underlying reasons can best be captured with betweenness centrality, a measure that 
cannot easily be obtained empirically because a nearly complete disclosure of the network is 
necessary. Betweenness centrality captures the extent to which an actor serves as an “information 
hub” within a network. The role of the information hub is positively associated with performance 
in general entrepreneurship theory. Granovetter refers to the “strength of weak ties” 
(Granovetter, 1973), Burt’s “tertius gaudens” strategy relies on being an information hub, and 
several studies underline the importance of access to diverse information (Baum et al., 2000; 
Burt, 2004; Krackhardt, 1995; Zaheer & McEvily, 1999). Thus, high betweenness centrality 
should result in high venture performance. However, our simulation clearly reveals that the 
opposite is true for control-based entrepreneurship: successful entrepreneurs using control-based 
logic re-organise their network through the inclusion of actors and thereby “short circuit” the 
path that is necessary for information flow between unacquainted project members. In this 
manner, actors increase their degree centrality while decreasing their betweenness centrality. 
This explanation is supported by the development of degree and betweenness centralities over 
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time. Successful entrepreneurs using control-based logic manage to re-organise their networks by 
increasing degree centrality and decreasing betweenness centrality through their partnering 
approach. 
6.1.2. Performance impact of initial network position 
An important topic raised by practitioners is the initial impact of network position on future 
venture performance. Thus, we analysed the impact of initial degree and betweenness centrality 
on the final level of demand satisfaction. Although the general positive relationship between 
degree centrality and demand satisfaction holds, there is an important difference: our simulation 
reveals that beyond a certain threshold, additional centrality adds only infinitesimal levels of 
demand satisfaction for the agent. This result implies that a certain number of contacts is required 
to optimally apply control-based networking methods, but beyond a certain level, the initial 
“connectedness” of an entrepreneur using control-based logic does not significantly contribute to 
performance. 
Of particular interest is the counter-intuitive relationship between initial betweenness centrality 
and future performance, i.e., demand satisfaction. Although negatively correlated for stable 
environments, initial betweenness centrality is positively correlated with final demand 
satisfaction in our simulation. In conjunction with the development of betweenness centrality 
over time, this paradox can be explained by the fact that an initially high betweenness centrality 
constitutes a potential opportunity to acquire a diverse set of stakeholders. Entrepreneurs using 
control-based logic can only increase demand satisfaction if they manage to successfully realise 
this potential through collaboration and subsequent introduction, i.e., the creation of a direct 
network path. This behaviour, in turn, decreases betweenness centrality. 
6.2. Performance impact of network shape 
In addition to the effects of network position, theory regarding the performance impact of 
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network shape for control-based entrepreneurship logics, such as effectuation, is still 
underdeveloped. As discussed in the literature review, Burt (1992) and Obstfeld (2005) have 
proposed strategies for entrepreneurs to benefit from certain network shapes. Based on Simmel’s 
concept of “tertius gaudens” (1950), Burt developed an entrepreneurship approach that 
effectively employs networks rich in structural holes by actively keeping network contacts 
separate and benefits from brokering between these contacts. In 2005, Obstfeld proposed an 
opposing strategy called “tertius iungens”, which focuses on connecting actors in a social 
network. We contribute to these streams of research by affiliating control-based entrepreneurial 
logics, such as effectuation, with these tertius iungens strategy and by providing a performance 
analysis in a highly uncertain environment. 
6.2.1. Performance impact of efficiency 
The negative correlation between final demand satisfaction and efficiency indicates that highly 
efficient networks are not suitable for control-based entrepreneurship logics, such as effectuation. 
Moreover, control-based entrepreneurship logic actively reduces efficiency by introducing 
unacquainted new stakeholders. In effect, a network with low efficiency indicates that a control-
based entrepreneur succeeded to gather stakeholders and to shape market demand in his or her 
favour. 
These findings initially seem contradictory to Burt’s approach to entrepreneurial networking that 
deems efficient networks favourable for entrepreneurs. However, a closer analysis of Burt’s 
implicit assumptions reveals the reasons for these unexpected results. Burt’s tertius gaudens 
strategy proposes to identify good ideas stemming from known contacts and to combine them in 
innovative ways (Burt, 2004). However, this approach implies that 1) the environment allows for 
the identification of good ideas and that 2) a transactional relationship with network contacts is 
sufficient. These conditions are unfulfilled in environments suitable for control-based 
entrepreneurship: effectuation, for example, assumes an entrepreneurial design space dominated 
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by Knightian uncertainty, Marchian goal ambiguity, and isotropy. It is thus impossible to assess 
the quality of an idea in this environment. Moreover, control-based entrepreneurship requires full 
commitment and continuous involvement of each stakeholder; thus a transactional relationship is 
insufficient. Therefore, control-based entrepreneurs simply cannot employ the advantages of an 
efficient network. 
6.2.2. Performance impact of normalised constraint and structural holes 
In our simulation, normalised constraint exhibits a positive relationship with demand satisfaction. 
Moreover, our longitudinal analysis reveals that Entrepreneurs using control-based logic actively 
re-organise their network to increase normalised constraint. Again, these results seem to 
contradict Burt’s structural holes theory that proposes a negative impact of highly constrained 
networks. Once more, the juxtaposition of the tertius gaudens strategy and effectuation as an 
example of control-based entrepreneurship reveals the cause: transactional relationships with 
stakeholders as well as the application of arbitrage and brokering are not part of the effectual 
toolbox. Thus, effectuation has no means to profit from structural holes. Entrepreneurs using 
control-based logic rather actively include new potential stakeholders to decrease the number of 
structural holes around them. Although entrepreneurs using control-based logic thereby constrain 
themselves, they also constrain their partners and bind them to their projects. 
This is also reflected in the literature: Sarasvathy and Dew, for example, opposes the 
compatibility of the tertius gaudens strategy and effectuation (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a, 2005b). 
Given the necessity for co-creation and joint action, control-based entrepreneurship logics, such 
as effectuation, are conceptually closer to Obstfeld’s tertius iungens (Obstfeld, 2005).  
In addition to the inability to profit from structural holes, control-based entrepreneurship logics 
even suffer from them: in his analysis of constraint and “good ideas” (2004), Burt reveals that 
networks with low constraint enable entrepreneurs to generate superior ideas yet fall short to 
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implement them. As noted by Obstfeld (2005), action toward implementation is taken by 
entrepreneurs with rather constrained networks. Thus, an “action-based” (Brettel et al., 2012) 
approach such as effectuation, requires constrained networks to be successful. 
In effect, both efficiency and normalised constraint reveal that control-based entrepreneurship is 
a successful implementation of the tertius iungens strategy that actively re-organises networks to 
jointly shape market demand. While Burt’s proposed strategy may be incompatible with control-
based entrepreneurship logics, the proposed measures can successfully be applied to identify 
suitable network shapes for both approaches. 
6.3. Limitations and avenues for further research 
Our study has several limitations that signal avenues for further research which can be grouped 
into three categories: development of effectuation theory, empirical validation, and enhancement 
of our effectuation model. 
Our formalisation of effectuation contributes to a more precise definition of the effectual process 
and the entities involved. However, the current literature does not sufficiently examine the 
network-related aspects of effectuation. Further development of effectual networking theory 
requires additional case studies regarding the details of the networking process. Such studies 
should focus on negotiation yet include the termination of projects and the exclusion of 
stakeholders as well as a more detailed understanding of resource acquisition, distribution, and 
application.  
Empirical validation of our theoretical propositions is required to either support our findings or 
challenge and thereby improve our formal model. Moreover, a validation of the practical 
applicability of our normalised constraint measure could validate our findings and contribute to 
theory development. 
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Finally, our formal model provides a multitude of improvement opportunities. First, the inclusion 
of resources would enable access to a vast field of research opportunities. Second, the inclusion 
of competing strategies would foster the investigation on conditions for normative superiority. 
This way, entrepreneurs could make an informed choice regarding their (networking) strategy.
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7. Appendices 
Figure 1:8 
 
Based on (Dew et al., 2008; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a) 
 
Figure 2:8 
 
  
                                              
8 Taken from my paper “Individual vs. Collective Control in Effectual Social Networking” 
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Figure 4a, 4b: 
  
Figure 5a, 5b: 
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Figure 6a, b: 
Figure 7a, 7b: 
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Figure 8a, b: 
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Out of Thin Air? Simulating Entrepreneurial Opportunity Creation and the 
Impact of Environmental Complexity and Stakeholder Behavior 
Abstract 
In 2012, leading entrepreneurship researches reviewed the progress made on the 
development of entrepreneurship into “a science of the artificial”. They revealed significant 
need for further discoveries in three areas: the nature of opportunities, the processes applied 
by entrepreneurs and the interplay of opportunities, entrepreneurs and the environment. 
Besides the definition of an opportunity and the way it comes into existence – whether it is 
created or discovered – Venkataraman et al. propose further research regarding 
entrepreneurial transformation mechanisms as the applied processes, their key parameters 
and their exact definition is still unclear. Moreover, they encouraged research regarding the 
individual-opportunity-nexus and the precise mechanism at work when entrepreneurs 
create/discover their businesses. 
Our study contributes to the deeper understanding of these areas with an opportunity-
centric computer simulation study on the interplay of opportunity, individual and 
stakeholders, and the environment. We develop a formal model of an entrepreneurial logic 
applied by expert serial entrepreneurs – effectuation – and use it to investigate the impact of 
environmental complexity on opportunity creation and the development of opportunities 
over time. We reveal the pivotal importance of docile stakeholder behavior and explain 
why it is critical for successful opportunity creation in complex environments. Moreover, 
we show that opportunity creation using effectuation follows an implicit, but fixed order of 
phases: core completion, attribute completion, and stakeholder group completion. 
Keywords: opportunity creation, docility, entrepreneurship, effectuation, environmental 
complexity, agent-based simulation 
1. Introduction 
In 2012, leading entrepreneurship researchers (Venkataraman et al., 2012) discussed the progress 
made so far on developing entrepreneurship into a “science of the artificial” (Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000), i.e. move beyond the mere recognition of causal links towards allowing to 
carefully tailor the entrepreneurial method to specific problem spaces. The fulfilment of this 
promise of “entrepreneurship as a science of the artificial” yet hinges on the deeper 
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understanding of three key research areas: the nature of opportunities, the transformation 
methods applied by entrepreneurs, and the interaction of opportunities and entrepreneurs 
(Venkataraman et al., 2012). As a consequence, a lively debate regarding the definition and 
origin of opportunities as well as the action and interaction of opportunities and individuals 
sparked among leading entrepreneurship researchers. While one side proposed the enactment of 
opportunities through entrepreneurs (Alvarez & Barney, 2013), the other proposed the existence 
of opportunities independent of them (Shane, 2012). Consequently, both groups also differ in the 
exact definition of an opportunity. With respect to the interaction of individual and opportunity, 
Venkataraman et al. encourage research beyond “simple and direct relationships […] between 
individual and opportunity” (Venkataraman et al., 2012, p. 28). Proposing a thorough 
investigation on the interplay of opportunity, individual, and their context (Shane, 2012) – a call 
in line with other leading researchers (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011) as well. Proposing a 
shift from person-centric research towards a process-based view on entrepreneurship, 
Venkataraman et al. emphasize the research on transformational techniques as well. We therefore 
used effectuation, an entrepreneurial logic used by expert serial entrepreneurs, as a procedural 
basis for our studies. Effectuation is a non-predictive logic that strives to control future market 
development by shaping it. It relies on co-creation, collaboration and self-selection in order to 
jointly create a market (Dew et al., 2008; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a). Initial studies indicate a 
positive effect of these practices on venture performance (Read, Song, et al., 2009). 
Given the intertwined, complex longitudinal processes at work, we use computer simulation as a 
method to investigate on opportunity creation and the impact of environmental complexity and 
entrepreneurial behaviour as proposed by leading simulation researchers (Davis et al., 2007). 
With our study, we want to contribute to the deeper understanding of opportunity creation and 
the interplay of opportunities, entrepreneurs, and the environment they are interacting in, by 
answering two research questions: (1) How does environmental complexity influence the 
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creation of opportunities by entrepreneurs? (2) How do opportunities evolve over time and to 
what extent is opportunity evolution influenced by stakeholder behaviour? 
2. Literature review 
Based on a conceptual framework by Shane & Venkataraman (2000), the ideas regarding an 
“entrepreneurial method”, and the idea to see entrepreneurship as a “science of the artificial” 
(Sarasvathy, 2003, p. 203), Venkataraman et al. (2012) revealed significant demand for further 
research in three areas: the nature of opportunities, entrepreneurial transformation mechanisms, 
and the interaction of opportunities and entrepreneurs. Answering their call, we consequently 
provide an overview on these areas starting with the nature of opportunity and the nexus of 
individual and opportunity including the mechanisms of interaction termed “action-interaction 
nexus” (Venkataraman et al., 2012, p. 28). We conclude this chapter with a detailed review of a 
decision logic preferred by expert serial entrepreneurs – effectuation, as if forms the basis of our 
computer simulation. 
2.1. The nature of opportunities 
Initially, literature conceptualized two distinctive ways of how opportunities come into existence: 
opportunities exist and are discovered by entrepreneurs or opportunities are created by 
entrepreneurs (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Steyaert & Hjorth, 2003). While the former premise 
implies exogenously induced shocks as basis for entrepreneurial action, the latter proposes an 
endogenous impulse as basis for the creation of an opportunity. Initially seen as disjoint 
concepts, recent research joined both approaches and proposed a co-evolvement (Sarason et al., 
2006) of opportunity, entrepreneur and stakeholders (Dutta & Crossan, 2005; Gartner, 1994). 
Klein put it very beautifully as “opportunities are best characterized neither as discovered nor 
created, but imagined” as “the concept of opportunity imagination emphasizes that gains (and 
losses) to not come into being, objectively, until entrepreneurial action is complete” (Klein, 2008, 
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p. 12). Venkataraman et al. (2012) conclude that “opportunities in the world have to be made 
through the actions and interactions of stakeholders […] using materials and concepts found in 
the world”, hinting that the world or environment as well plays a role as well. While a generally 
accepted terminology is yet to be adopted (Alvarez & Barney, 2013), a preliminary review of the 
concepts of opportunities being “made” or “created” on one side and “found“ or “discovered” on 
the other revealed highly similar – to the extent of identical – meanings in both cases. Those 
rejoinders however, reveal a certain amount of vagueness in the definition of the term 
“opportunity”: if opportunities – much like the laws of physics – exist independently of the 
entrepreneur they cannot be made at the same time. Shane addressed this conundrum by splitting 
the “opportunity” in two parts: the “opportunity” as a metaphysical conceptualization that exists 
independently of the entrepreneur, i.e., the possibility to profitably transport passengers by means 
of air travel, and the “business plan” as the entrepreneurial implementation of an opportunity, 
whose specifics are negotiated by entrepreneurs and stakeholders (Shane, 2012, p. 15). While 
being criticised as “not testable” by Alvarez and Barney (Alvarez & Barney, 2013), the 
distinction of “opportunity” and “business plan” seems to provide a much needed clarification of 
the opportunity concept. It does however depend on a compatible concept of the market as 
subsequently discussed. 
Given the emphasis on creation and transformation of the effectuation approach, we conclude 
that the completion of the artifact as addressed in the former chapter rather refers to the “business 
plan”-aspect of an opportunity. However, a holistic implementation of the entrepreneurial 
process requires a metaphysical “opportunity”-aspect as well. We implemented this aspect as a 
“fitness landscape” as subsequently described in the “formal modelling” section. 
2.2. The interaction of opportunities and entrepreneurs 
Informed by Shane’s formulation of an “individual-opportunity nexus” (Shane, 2004) (earlier: 
Shane & Venkataraman, 2000), Venkataraman et al. (2012) sketch out the second area of 
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research as the investigation on a link between characteristics of entrepreneurs, their actions and 
interactions and the opportunities they pursue. Initially, Shane and Venkataraman (Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2004) proposed that while individual and opportunity are existing 
independently of each other, a special connection between these two entities was necessary 
enable the individual to transform this opportunity into reality (See fig. 1a). In further iterations, 
informed by the call for the study of inter-subjectivity (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011), and 
based on findings regarding entrepreneurial characteristics and actions and their impact on the 
pursued opportunities (Baker, Gedajlovic, & Lubatkin, 2005; Dencker, Gruber, & Shah, 2009), a 
deeper understanding of the action and interaction of opportunities on one side and entrepreneurs 
and stakeholders on the other was proposed as a research field in 2012 (Venkataraman et al., 
2012) (See fig. 1b). Venkataraman and Sarasvathy referred to it as “Action-Interaction nexus”. 
Moreover, they ascertain that “an opportunity [– not as defined by Shane –] consists of at least 
three things:[…] objective person-opportunity nexus, […]subjective interpretation of objective 
data, […] inter-subjective basis for a market” (Venkataraman et al., 2012, p. 26). In light of 
Alvarez and Barneys criticism that while “these “objective” conditions exist, [… this] does not 
deny that entrepreneurs sometimes enact the opportunities they intend to exploit” (Alvarez & 
Barney, 2013, p. 6), we propose to extend the action-interaction nexus further to include the 
market as well. While an opportunity can exist independently from an individual, it cannot exist 
independently of a market. Going back to the airline example, another individual could have 
taken Richard Branson’s place, but the founding of virgin airlines (or a similar airline) could not 
have happened without a mass of customers willing to use the airline. Moreover, it required 
generations of (involuntary) entrepreneurs preparing the market by fighting the notion that “If 
God had meant us to fly he’d have given us wings”. In conclusion, both literature stream arguing 
for the creation and the discovery have merit, but it requires a holistic perspective (such as an 
action-interaction-market nexus, see fig. 1c) to join and understand them. In this study, we take a 
first step and use a joint model of opportunities, entrepreneurs, stakeholders, and end customers 
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to research the effect of environmental (i.e. market) complexity. 
--------------------------- 
Insert figure 1 here 
---------------------------- 
2.3. Entrepreneurial transformation mechanisms 
Venkataraman et al. (2012), ascertain that recently discovered mechanisms applied by 
entrepreneurs transcend the Schumpeterian idea of new combinations and emphasize 
modification techniques that transform opportunities beyond their inherent boundaries. Building 
on Dew, Read, Sarasvathy & Wiltbank (Dew et al., 2010) and Goodman (1978) they reason that 
while combinations of ideas within their boundaries can lead to incremental innovation, 
entrepreneurs use exaptation to achieve technological and economic innovations beyond 
evolutional developments. Venkataraman et al. (2012, p. Table 1) list 11 mechanisms used in the 
interaction of opportunities and entrepreneurs. Roughly half of these can – to a certain extent – 
be directly or indirectly associated with effectuation. A deeper understanding of effectuation is 
therefore helpful for the development of entrepreneurship as a science of the artificial. 
Effectuation is a control-based logic (Wiltbank & Dew, 2006) that aspires to shape future market 
developments rather than to forecast them. Effectuation relies on four principles: keeping the loss 
of any action affordable, using available means, treating contingencies as opportunities and 
relying on partnerships (Sarasvathy, 2001). Since its introduction in 2001, effectuation has 
received significant attention from the research community. The core concepts were reviewed 
and enhanced (Dew et al., 2008; Dew, Read, et al., 2009; Sarasvathy, 2004a) including the 
networking process (Dew et al., 2008; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a) and introduced to adjacent 
research (Chiles et al., 2008; Goel & Karri, 2006; Read, Song, et al., 2009). Moreover, 
quantitative studies revealed increased venture performance for business angels’ investments 
(Wiltbank et al., 2009), R&D projects (Brettel et al., 2012), and “new venture creation” 
(Chandler et al., 2011). However, “the actions and interaction of entrepreneurs and their 
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stakeholders” “could be a viable line of empirical research” (Venkataraman et al., 2012, p. 28). 
The environmental preconditions for effectuation are characterized by three elements: Knightian 
uncertainty, Marchian goal ambiguity and isotropy (Dew et al., 2008). Knightian uncertainty 
(Knight, 1921) refers to an environment where both alternative implementations of an artifact – 
or an attribute thereof – and the probabilities for success are indeterminable. Marchian goal 
ambiguity (J. March, 1978) denotes the fact that neither the preferences of partners/stakeholder 
nor own preferences are completely known. Environmental isotropy “refers to the fact that in 
decisions and actions involving uncertain future consequences it is not always clear ex ante 
which pieces of information are worth paying attention to and which not” (Sarasvathy & Dew, 
2005a). 
2.4. Effectuation as a logic of expert entrepreneurs 
Besides “Who I am” and “what I know”, networks (“whom I know”) are a key resource for 
effectuators as it provides both access to “new means” and “new goals” (Dew et al., 2008; 
Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a). Despite the fact that “Inter-subjective interaction is the very essence 
of the effectual process” (Dew et al., 2008, p. 50), research on the network-related effects on the 
effectuation processes remains sparse. 
As illustrated in figure 2 – based on Dew et al. (2008) – effectuation literature refers to four 
occasions that include or imply the use of networks. Firstly, effectuators approach known 
contacts and present their current artifact to initiate negotiations (Dew et al., 2008; Sarasvathy & 
Dew, 2005a). Secondly, effectuators can relay information regarding the artifact of other 
effectuators acting as a source of contingency (Sarasvathy, 2001). Thirdly, effectuators engage in 
negotiations regarding pre-commitments and partnerships (Dew et al., 2008; Sarasvathy & Dew, 
2005a). Fourthly, effectuators transform their artifacts in multiple ways (Dew et al., 2010; 
Goldenberg, Lehmann, & Mazursky, 2001), triggered by external stimuli from their network. 
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--------------------------- 
Insert figure 2 here 
---------------------------- 
2.4.1. Presentation of artifacts 
In order to create or finalize an artifact, effectuators create a “project” (Dew et al., 2008, p. 50), 
approach known contacts and present their current artifact. While effectuation literature currently 
treats this action as a mere prelude to negotiation and transformation (Dew et al., 2008) it is an 
integral part of the market creation process. The persistence with which effectuators approach 
potential new stakeholders is a function of personality traits (“Who I am”) as well as the 
affordable loss constraint as networking requires both time and effort. 
2.4.2. Relay of information 
While not explicitly mentioned in effectuation literature, this behaviour represents both a well-
known way of information dissemination in networks (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973) as well as 
an important factor of the source of contingency principle, which is a core dimension of 
effectuation (Sarasvathy, 2001). 
2.4.3. Negotiation in effectual networks 
In order to create or finalize an artifact, effectuators initiate negotiations with known contacts. 
These negotiations lead to commitments of a twofold nature: pre-commitments that specify the 
nature of the emerging artifact as well as resource commitments to drive its finalization. Given 
that the market for the emerging artifact is only emerging as well, the negotiations will mostly 
focus “on the characteristics of the project […] rather than the type and quantity of returns” (Dew 
et al., 2008, p. 50) of it. Over time, the increase in number of stakeholders creates “two 
concurrent dynamic cycles” (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a, p. 1) leading to an increase in committed 
resources as well as the concretization of the joint artifact. 
Literature on the behaviour of effectuators during negotiations has determined that the docility of 
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an effectuator is “a fundamental behavioural construct” (Dew et al., 2008, p. 50). The concept of 
docility was introduced by Simon (1990) and portrayed as “the tendency to depend on 
suggestions, recommendations, persuasion, and information obtained through social channels as 
a major basis for choice“ (Simon, 1993b, p. 156). Simon later clarified that, “We are highly 
susceptible to social influence and persuasion, susceptibility that I will call docility. 1 use the 
term ‘docility’ here in its sense of teachability or educatability – not in its alterative sense of 
passivity or meekness” (Simon, 1997). 
2.4.4. Transformation of artifacts 
New market creation through effectuation is not restricted to the negotiation of pre-commitments 
with stakeholders. As a result of a case study, Dew et al. (Dew et al., 2010) listed 9 types of 
transformation that expert serial entrepreneurs apply to their artifacts in order to create new 
markets. Contrary to negotiations, this action does not lead to a contribution of new contacts or 
resources. 
For a formalized model of effectual networking, we focused on the types of transformation that 
can be triggered by stimuli from networks. These transformation types (“deletion and 
supplementation”, “composition and decomposition”) share a common theme: effectuators create 
a new artifact through transformation based on their old artifact as well as ideas provided by an 
externally induced stimulus. As the network is a key resource of information, we argue that the 
transformation can be triggered by the approach of other effectuators in search for potential 
stakeholders. 
We therefore include an abstract version of the aforementioned transformation type in our formal 
model and refer to it as “pick-up”. Moreover, we argue that the execution of this behaviour 
depends on the personality traits of effectuators, namely their docility, as “influence and 
persuasion” (Simon, 1997) is exercised in the presentation of artifacts, even if it does not lead to 
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successful negotiations of a joint project. 
3. Agent-based simulation as a method 
We employ agent-based simulation to examine our research questions. This “third way of doing 
science” (Axelrod, 2003) allows for unique insights in areas where theory is at an intermediate 
stage and complex, intertwined processes are at work (Davis et al., 2007). Simulation overcomes 
the inherent complexity limitations of empirical research (Harrison et al., 2007) and allows 
gathering data on all aggregation levels beyond empirical feasibility (McKelvey, 2004). The 
derived propositions will in turn help to design efficient studies for empirical verification. 
While simulation as a method is still underrepresented in management science, “several 
influential research efforts have used simulation as their primary method” (Harrison et al., 2007, 
p. 480). Organizational learning (J. G. March, 1991) and adaptation (Levinthal, 1997) problems 
as well as the balance of different kinds of search processes (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Rivkin 
& Siggelkow, 2003) and innovation diffusion (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1997) benefited from 
simulation. More recent examples include strategy (Davis et al., 2009) and characteristics of a 
company (Ganco & Agarwal, 2009). 
Following a well-known roadmap (Davis et al., 2007), we developed a comprehensive model of 
the effectual transformation process based on literature reviews and expert interviews. For 
implementation, verification, and validation of the model we used the acknowledged simulation 
framework Repast Simphony (North et al., 2007). This environment allows for the required 
longitudinal collection of data on agents and their stakeholders. Moreover, we employed Monte-
Carlo simulation (Davis et al., 2009) to ensure statistically relevant results and conducted 
comprehensive sensitivity analyses and robustness checks to ensure the validity of our findings. 
For verification we used well-published empirical and theoretical studies (Brettel et al., 2012; 
Read, Dew, et al., 2009; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a; Wiltbank et al., 2009). Following the ideas 
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of Dew et al. (Dew et al., 2010) and Goodman (1978) we also included transformation 
mechanisms beyond stakeholder negotiation in an abstract form. 
4. A formal model of effectual opportunity creation9 
Modelling effectual opportunity creation requires a formal representation of all relevant actors, 
objects, and processes of effectual opportunity creation. This includes effectuators and their 
artifacts as well as end customers both as potential stakeholders and as representation of the 
market the effectuators are creating. Effectuators and end customers form a network that allows 
effectuators to approach both end customers and other effectuators. According to literature (Dew 
& Sarasvathy, 2007), effectuators co-operate only with stakeholders – including end customers – 
that are willing to make pre-commitments. We paid special attention to the implementation of 
uncertainty as this is a major pre-requisite for effectuation (Sarasvathy, 2001).  
In a nutshell, the simulation works as follows: starting in time step 1 all effectual agents start 
presenting their artifacts to known contacts. On approach, these contacts can then decide to 
engage in negotiations with the presenting effectual agent. If an agreement is reached, both 
stakeholders agree on a joint artifact and continue their search for additional stakeholders 
together. If no agreement is reached, the engaged party can however decide to pick up some new 
attributes from the presented artifact. Over time, the artifacts are refined and the simulation 
converges into a setting of multiple stable stakeholder groups. It is determined when it reaches a 
stable state, usually after 30-60 ticks. 
  
                                              
9 Partly taken from my paper “Individual vs. Collective Control in Effectual Social Networking” 
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4.1. Objects and actors 
4.1.1. Artifact 
The artifact refers to a product, service, project or goal an effectuator is finalizing (Sarasvathy, 
2001). Following the product description of an arbitrary merchandise, e.g., a mobile phone, we 
formalized an artifact as a list of (attribute: variant)-tuples. A mobile phone could for example be 
described as: {(colour: red), (weight: 100gr), (connectivity: 3G), (battery capacity: 700mAh)}. 
Mathematically speaking, we formalize an artifact X as a set of (attribute, variant)-tuples of 
variable length as presented in equation (1). 
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Moreover, with equation (2) and (3) we define ways to mathematically access an artifact. 
Function v(a, X) retrieves the employed variant v of an attribute a in artifact X, if available. The 
set A(X) represents the set of all known attributes ai in X, e.g., colour, weight or connectivity. 
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4.1.2. Effectuator 
We modelled effectuators as agents pursuing the task of artifact finalization using their network. 
Every effectual agent has an artifact, which is partially pre-populated with randomly drawn 
(attribute: variant)-tuples during the initialization of the simulation. To focus on network-related 
behaviour, we simplified available theory in two points: extant literature implicates that effectual 
agents can “declare the effectual transformation complete and begin competing in alternative 
markets” (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a, p. 549). In contrast, we only study a single cycle of 
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effectual artifact finalization. Moreover, we assume that each stakeholder enters sufficient 
resources to drive transformations and negotiations. Therefore we omit an explicit modelling of 
resources and potential constraints. 
4.1.3. End customer 
End customers represent the market demand in our current model. Formalized as an active part of 
our model, they fulfil the important role of providing insights into what customers want and 
regard as useful. Effectuation literature mentions the important role of end customers often in 
examples, e.g., the customer-investors of U-Haul, that helped to both shape and grow a one-man 
one-truck company into Americas leading provider of “moving and storage resource” 
(Sarasvathy, 2001). More recent examples are the users of crowd funding platforms, e.g., 
kickstarter. These customers are representing the market demand to the entrepreneurs that ask for 
their funding. In part, this role is also assumed by the effectuators and their prior knowledge 
“What I know” themselves. 
We therefore formalize end customers as “passive” effectuators with two distinct properties: they 
can initiate the negotiation of pre-commitments upon reception of an artifact and represent the 
market demand including “subconscious desires” in these negotiations by being able to assess the 
differences in “usefulness” of two given artifacts.  
We formalized the usefulness using a well-known approach known as “fitness landscape” 
(Levinthal, 1997). The fitness landscape is a simple mathematical model that calculates a single 
“fitness value” for any given artifact, which represents the usefulness of an artifact for the 
market. Higher fitness values represent a more desirable product for the market. 
Like effectual agents, all end customer agents have an artifact representing their conscious 
demands. During the initialization it is partially pre-populated with (attribute: variant)-tuples. 
While the attributes are drawn randomly, the respective variant is drawn to probabilistically 
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represent the market demand. If, e.g., the artifact represents a life vest, the utility of a yellow-
coloured vest is much higher than of a black-coloured one. Therefore the “yellow”-variant is 
much more likely assigned to the colour attribute of an artifact than the “black” variant. 
4.1.4. Fitness landscape 
We formalized the representation of usefulness as an “NK-fitness landscape”, a well-known 
approach in management research employing simulation studies (Ganco & Agarwal, 2009; 
Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Levinthal, 1997). In accordance with effectuation theory, we 
implemented the simplest version of an NK-fitness landscape (K=0), which regards products as 
“near decomposable“ as demanded by theory (Sarasvathy, 2003). 
The fitness of an artifact X on our fitness landscape is defined in equation (4) as 
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As indicated in equation 4, we randomly initialize our fitness function fit((fi, vi)) for all possible 
(attribute: variant)-tuples. Moreover, we also assign a value to attributes not available in the 
artifact. The fitness of an artifact representing the aforementioned life-vest would for example be 
calculated by awarding points to known attributes, e.g., “colour” with high scores for “yellow” 
and low scores for “black”. Moreover we would also assign points for missing attributes, e.g., 
“entertainment system”, which might be useless in emergency situations – and therefore scoring 
points by absence – but could be considered extravagant for snorkelling trips. All points are then 
summed up to calculate the total fitness FIT(A) of an artifact. 
4.1.5. Network 
We initialize the network among effectual agents as well as between effectual and end customer 
agents as an undirected free-scale network according to generation procedures introduced by 
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Barabási and Albert (Barabasi & Albert, 1999). Numerous studies showed that free-scale 
networks best capture the structure of real-world networks (Aiello et al., 2001; Barabasi & 
Albert, 1999; Broder et al., 2000; Jeong et al., 2001; Newman, 2000) and the generation process 
of Barabási and Albert allow for a simple creation in two steps. Firstly, the algorithm creates a 
network of effectual agents, secondly the algorithm attaches end customer agents to the network. 
Our algorithm creates a network of effectuators by cycling through all effectuators and creating 
exactly one tie originating from this effectual agent i. The target agent j of the tie is 
probabilistically chosen as indicated in equation (5): 
jijDegreejp  ,1.0,1,)(~)(         (5) 
The function Degree(j) refers to the number of contacts the agent j knows. Secondly, all end 
customer agents are attached to the previously created network the same way. 
4.2. Simulation mechanics 
4.2.1. Behaviours of effectual agents 
An effectual agent can exhibit four behaviours in order to interact with their environment: 
approaching known contact in order to present the current state of his or her artifact, relaying 
information on artifacts of other effectual agents to known contacts, negotiating strategic 
alliances by exchanging pre-commitments, and pick up ideas of other effectual agents’ artifacts 
through transformation. These behaviours are controlled by the effectual agents’ persistence and 
docility. Both constructs are formalized as a variable representing low persistence and docility as 
0.0 and high persistence and docility as 1.0. 
4.2.2. Approaching known contacts 
Effectual agents can approach known contacts in order to present the current state of their 
artifact. We formalized this as passing on copies of the artifact. For each contact the effectual 
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agent executes this behaviour probabilistically using the persistence parameter as execution 
probability. The effectual agent can approach all known contacts – except for its stakeholders –
once per turn. This behaviour is executed in the beginning of the simulation and every time its 
artifact changes. The recipient processes the proposed artifact in the next time step. 
4.2.3. Relaying received artifacts to known contacts 
Effectual agents can relay information on other agents’ artifacts. We formalized this as 
probabilistically passing on unaltered copies of incoming artifacts to all known contacts, except 
stakeholders. The behaviour is triggered by every incoming artifact and is probabilistically 
executed using the persistence parameter as execution probability. Again, the recipient processes 
the relayed artifact in the next time step. In order to avoid multiple receptions of the same 
artifact, a list of previous recipients is passed along with the artifact to decline the reception if it 
had been received before. 
4.2.4. Negotiation of pre-commitments 
“Even the literature that is directly focused on negotiations has mostly neglected new venture 
creation processes” (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011). In spite of the absence of a concrete 
algorithm, literature (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a) implies multiple requirements for such a 
formalization: (a) allow the negotiation between two or more parties, (b) ensure that a position 
carried by a majority of participants is more likely to prevail (c) support individual acceptance or 
refusal of negotiation results to both ensure self-selection into a project as well as consideration 
of pre-commitments, and (d) negotiations are triggered by the approach of an effectual agent as 
described in the “effectual cycle” (Dew et al., 2008). 
As illustrated in figure 3, we formalized the negotiation process as a simple, three-staged 
probabilistic negotiation. Firstly, the algorithm determines all relevant stakeholders, i.e., project 
partners of the sending and receiving agent. Subsequently, the algorithm gathers information on 
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the artifacts of all involved agents. Secondly, the algorithm creates a joint list of occurring 
attributes and traverses it to create histograms of the frequency of the stakeholders’ preferred 
variants. Thirdly, the algorithm creates a proposed negotiation result that includes all known 
attributes. The variant of each attribute is determined probabilistically using the histograms as a 
non-normalized discrete probability mass function. If, e.g., 1 stakeholder prefers the “colour” to 
be “red” and 9 prefer it to be “blue” the artifact will be blue with a likelihood of 90%. Lastly, the 
algorithms proposed the negotiation result to each stakeholder to receive feedback. A negotiation 
result is accepted only if all stakeholders agree on the adoption. In the event of an adoption, the 
algorithm replaces the artifact of each stakeholder with the negotiation result and creates new 
network ties between all project partners. 
--------------------------- 
Insert figure 3 here 
--------------------------- 
After a negotiation result is created, each effectuator will individually compare it to the state of 
his or her own artifact and decide on the adoption. As “[e]ffectuation assumes docility as a 
fundamental behavioural construct” (Dew et al., 2008, p. 498), we propose a docility-based 
formalization of the acceptance process following a simple rule: the more similar the negotiation 
result is to the effectual agent’s own artifact, the less docility is required to adopt it. 
We formalized this rule as calculation of the share “conflicting” attributes in relation to the total 
number of attributes the artifact of the deciding effectual agent holds. A conflicting attribute is a 
different variant of the same property, e.g., a “red shell” instead of a “blue shell” or a “large 
battery pack” instead of a “small battery pack”. We assume that the larger the share of conflicting 
over known attributes is for an effectuator, the more docile an effectuator has to be in order to 
accept these changes. Therefore in our formal representation, an effectual agent accepts a 
negotiation result, if the relative share of conflicting attributes is lower than its docility. If an 
effectuator i with artifact X examines the negotiation result R, it can accept this result if equation 
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(6) is true. 
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4.2.5. Pick-up of attributes 
As presented in the literature review, we formalize artifact transformation as a single abstract 
behaviour that we refer to as “pick-up”. It is formalized as follows: the process is triggered by a 
previously unsuccessful negotiation with the owner of the proposed artifact. Initially, the 
algorithm compiles a list of attributes that are exclusive to the proposed artifact. Secondly, it 
randomly chooses one of these attributes. Thirdly, it includes the chosen attribute 
probabilistically into the receiving effectuator agent’s artifact using the effectual agent’s docility 
as execution probability. Lastly, the receiving agent initiates a negotiation for adoption with its 
stakeholders. 
This formalization implies the assumptions that a certain amount of docility is required to 
transform an artifact based on external information. Moreover, we assume that the adoption of a 
previously unknown attribute is significantly more likely than a change of a known attribute, 
which in all likelihood represents both the agent’s and its stakeholders’ preferences. 
4.2.6. End customer agents’ access to fitness landscape 
During the negotiation, end customers can access the fitness landscape representing the market 
demand just once. When confronted with the decision to adopt a negotiation proposal, end 
customer agents can interrogate the fitness landscape whether the proposal as a whole is meeting 
both their conscious and subconscious demands better than their current artifact. This restricted 
access formalizes the notion that “customers do not know what they want until they see it” which 
has been discussed as goal ambiguity. The access restriction is essential to maintain the state of 
the effectual environment. Knightian uncertainty is maintained as the number of design 
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alternatives and their respective success probabilities cannot be determined by the end customer 
agent. Goal ambiguity is maintained as end customers do not provide goals such as desirable 
attributes as they cannot search the fitness landscape to determine how desirable an attribute is. 
Lastly, isotropy is maintained as the market demand for variants of known attributes cannot be 
estimated beyond the individual demand of the end customers. In conclusion, end customer 
agents cannot search the fitness landscape to discover its optimum. 
4.2.7. Measurement of performance: demand satisfaction10 
The simulation environment calculates the degree of demand satisfaction (DS) of each effectual 
agent in each time step. The Measure is defined analogous to traditional performance measures 
(Narver et al., 2004; Vorhies & Morgan, 2005) taking into consideration all potential end 
customers. The closer an effectual agent’s demand vector is to an end customer agent’s vector, 
the higher the performance score. The total score DS(i) of an agent i is calculated as a sum over 
all comparisons with all end customer agents j as indicated in equation (8). The individual 
comparison ds(Xi, Xj) is calculated as the share of met demands of end customer j by effectuator 
i. 
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5. Results 
To investigate on the opportunity creation mechanisms of effectuation, we conducted a series of 
simulation experiments. Our simulation consisted of 30 effectual agents and 60 end customer 
agents. Their product vectors were randomly initialized with 5 (attribute, variant)-tuples. 
Moreover, we changed the level of collective docility between 0.1 and 0.95. The fitness 
                                              
10 Partly taken from my paper “Entrepreneurial Mingling Secrets” 
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landscape was initialized randomly. We gathered a total of ~12.7 GB of data running our 
simulation 500 times for each parameter combination. 
5.1. Impact of environmental complexity 
To answer our first research question regarding the impact of environmental complexity on 
effectual opportunity creation, we conducted two series of experiments. In both experiments we 
analysed the impact of one environmental complexity parameter as well as the level of collective 
docility on performance. We used the average level of demand satisfaction of all effectual agents 
as performance measure. We did exclude those agents that were not able to find any 
stakeholders. 
5.1.1. Impact of number of attributes (amax) 
As reflected in figure 4, the level of demand differs between ~0.6 and 1.0 depending on the level 
of collective docility. With increasing number of attributes amax, these levels stay mostly 
constant. 
--------------------------- 
Insert figure 4 here 
--------------------------- 
5.1.2. Impact of number of variants (vmax) 
As displayed in figure 5, our second series of experiments was concerned with the variation of 
the number of variants vmax. With respect to demand satisfaction, with only one existing variant 
of all attributes (vmax = 1) the average satisfaction is 1.0 regardless of the level of collective 
docility. With increasing number of variants, the level of demand satisfaction changes 
considerably. For high values of collective docility (≥0.6) the level of demand satisfaction stays 
at 1.0 or decreases only slightly down to ~0.7. For lower values of collective docility (≤0.5) the 
level of demand satisfaction decreases significantly down to ~ 0.1 – 0.3. 
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--------------------------- 
Insert figure 5 here 
--------------------------- 
5.2. Evolution of opportunities over time 
To investigate on our second research question regarding the development of opportunities over 
time, we observed the time to complete different “stages” of opportunity development over time. 
We tracked the share of agents that had finished a certain step of the opportunity development 
process. These steps are a) finalization of variant selection, i.e., when do variants of existing 
attributes stop changing, b) completion of attribute acquisition, i.e., when is the list of attributes 
complete, and c) completion of stakeholder group, i.e., when is the last stakeholder added to the 
group? We performed analyses for different levels of collective docility and persistence to detect 
possible influences of these key behaviour parameters. 
As reflected in figure 6, there is a clear order in which effectual agents complete these stages: 
firstly, agents finalize the variants of existing attributes, secondly, they complete their attribute 
sets and thirdly complete their stakeholder group. While figure 6 is a graphical representation of 
our results for a collective docility level of 0.2 and persistence level of 0.6, we provide a 
comprehensive overview of stage completion times in table 1 for all combinations of collective 
docility and persistence levels. As reflected in table 3, after 3-6 ticks all agents have finalized the 
variants of available attributes. After 3-6 ticks, all agents have finalized their attribute set. Lastly, 
after 6-11 ticks all stakeholder groups are complete. While the lengths of the phases vary 
significantly, the order is always kept. 
--------------------------- 
Insert figure 6 here 
--------------------------- 
--------------------------- 
Insert table 1 here 
--------------------------- 
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6. Implications 
In 2012 leading entrepreneurship researchers corroborated their goal to develop entrepreneurship 
into a “science of the artificial” (Venkataraman et al., 2012). They laid out three key research 
areas that required further substantiation in order to reach this goal: the constitution of 
opportunities, entrepreneurial transformation methods, and the “person-opportunity nexus” 
(Venkataraman et al., 2012, p. 26). With our simulation-based research on entrepreneurial 
opportunity creation, we contribute to a deeper understanding of the interplay of opportunity and 
entrepreneur, namely the impact of environmental complexity and behavioural parameters of 
entrepreneurial communities. Moreover, we provide new insights into the development of 
opportunities over time. We used the effectuation process – a decision logic applied by expert 
serial entrepreneurs – as an instantiation of entrepreneurship. While the theory is still in a 
“nascent/intermediate” state (Perry et al., 2012, p. 11) it is regarded as an important building 
block of entrepreneurship (see Venkataraman et al., 2012, p. Table 1) and provides a sufficiently 
concrete process description. Given the nascent state of effectuation theory and the amount of 
required data from different actors and points in time, we chose computer simulation as our 
research method. Simulation is well suited for the improvement of “underdeveloped theory” 
(Davis et al., 2007, p. 482) and is “particularly valuable when the theory seeks to explain 
longitudinal and processual phenomena that are challenging to study using empirical methods 
because of their time and data demands” (Davis et al., 2007, p. 495). 
6.1. Impact of environmental complexity 
Our simulation experiments regarding environmental complexity reveal a stark difference 
regarding different types of complexity. While the number of existing attributes has little to no 
impact on demand satisfaction across all levels of collective docility, the number of existing 
variants strongly affects demand satisfaction. Moreover, the impact of existing variants depends 
strongly on the level of collective docility. 
 231 
6.1.1. Impact of the number of existing attributes 
The number of existing attributes has little impact on both performance measures. Aside from 
some initial fluctuation the performance is solely depending on the level of collective docility. 
While environmental complexity is usually associated with negative impact on performance for 
start-ups (Aldrich, 1990; Brittain & Freeman, 1981), our simulations provides a partially contrary 
result. A close review of the effectuation process and our implementation however reveals the 
reasons for the “missing” decay in performance: our implementation of the negotiation process 
favours the inclusion of additional attributes. Without a resource constraint or the assumption of 
bounded reality, the inclusion of new attributes does not have any negative impact. Moreover, the 
active involvement of stakeholders, especially end customers, ensures that attributes with 
negative impact on the products usability (fitness) are not included. Ultimately, with respect to 
new attributes, our implementation of effectuation is not constrained by adverse effects of low 
docility. We argue that affection for innovation is a core quality of an entrepreneur so unless 
there is a good reason to refuse a new idea, it is included. We acknowledge however, that the 
research on effectual stakeholder negotiation is not yet conclusive enough and propose especially 
this part of effectuation as an avenue for further research. This detail of the effectual negotiation 
process also explains the slight decrease in demand satisfaction for, e.g., 6 existing attributes: 
The product vector of each agent is initialized with 5 attributes. For environments with only few 
more existing attributes, the result of a negotiation is likely an agent’s own product vector 
complemented with one new attribute. The likelihood of this new attribute being inferior to not 
having it at all is 1/3. Therefore the result is more likely to be turned down by end customer 
agents. For larger numbers of existing attributes the number of attributes added at once by a 
negotiation is likely larger, in sum rather positive, and therefore more likely to be acceptable for 
end customer agents. 
With respect to docility, a level of ≥0.5 delivers superior performance while lower levels deliver 
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inferior results. The positive impact of docility is in line with entrepreneurship literature. Initially 
theorized by Simon (1990), leading effectuation researchers (Dew et al., 2008; Sarasvathy & 
Dew, 2005a) regard it as crucial for the effectuation process. Prior simulation results (Jansen, 
2013a) also support the importance of collective docility. 
In conclusion, a “positivist attitude” towards new ideas, i.e. attributes, enables effectuators to 
incorporate large numbers of new product attributes without risking the loss of performance. 
They require however the input of external information via stakeholders, i.e., end customer 
agents, to prevent group thinking and ensure real product improvement. 
6.1.2. Impact of the number of existing variants 
Contrary to the number of existing attributes, the number of existing variants – per attribute – has 
significant impact on both demand satisfaction. While the demand satisfaction in the previous 
experiments only changed marginally at a level of 30 existing attributes (allowing 230 ≈ 1.07e9 
combinations), at a comparable value of 8 existing variants (allowing 810 = 230 ≈ 1.07e9 
combinations as well) the value of demand satisfaction has already changed significantly. 
Moreover, the impact of existing variants is moderated by the level of collective docility. While 
those environments with a level of collective docility ≥ 0.6 shows minor to no impact of the 
number of variants, environments with a collective docility < 0.6 reveal a significantly negative 
impact of increased levels of existing variants. 
We therefore propose that collective docility has a moderating effect with respect to 
environmental complexity: For high levels, environmental complexity has little to no negative 
impact on effectual performance, while for low levels environmental complexity has a 
significantly negative effect on effectual performance. In our experiments, the breaking point of 
docility was between 0.5 and 0.6. As there is no empirical measure of docility available11, the 
                                              
11 Unless one counts in cattle (Burrow et al., 1988) 
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interpretation of this value requires both further experimentation and empirical validation. 
These surprising results regarding collective docility warrant a reinterpretation of this parameter. 
Current literature on effectuation theory (Dew et al., 2008; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a) treats 
docility merely as a necessity. Prior simulation experiments (Jansen, 2013a) revealed positive 
impacts. In light of these results however, there seems to be a lower bound for collective docility 
that needs to be met especially in complex environments in order to ensure successful 
opportunity development. With respect to the “individual-opportunity nexus” (Sarason et al., 
2006; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2004; Venkataraman et al., 2012) the 
implementation of an opportunity (not its existence) is conditional on the availability of suitable 
stakeholders/partners. Coming back to the ”virgin airline”-example of Venkataraman et al. 
(2012, p. 29): the deal required both Branson as individual and Boeing as a docile stakeholder to 
implement the opportunity now known as virgin airlines. Given our results, we propose that the 
docility of both actual and potential stakeholders is a critical element of the mechanics of this 
nexus, depicted as “action-interaction-nexus” (Venkataraman et al., 2012, p. 28). These results 
also adds an interesting element to the analysis of the “inter-subjective” as demanded by leading 
effectuation researchers (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011, p. 125). 
6.2. Evolution of opportunities over time 
In our last series of experiments we investigated on the evolution of opportunities over time. Our 
findings reveal a stable order or “phases” of finalization the opportunity undergoes in the 
effectual process: firstly, the variants of known attributes are finalized, i.e. fixed (core 
completion). Secondly, the incorporation of new attributes is finalized (attribute completion) 
before lastly, the inclusion of additional stakeholders is finalized (stakeholder group completion). 
In numerous experiments under varying degrees of both collective docility and persistence the 
time differences in finalization varied, but never changed their order. 
 234 
This fact is noteworthy for two key reasons: this order is neither predefined by – usually actor-
centric – effectuation process literature (Dew et al., 2008; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a) nor even 
mentioned in the on-going discussion on created vs. discovered opportunities (Alvarez & Barney, 
2007; Dutta & Crossan, 2005; Gartner, 1994; Sarason et al., 2006; Steyaert & Hjorth, 2003). 
Moreover, it is contrary to the causation-based idea of entrepreneurship to rather start with target 
customers and define the core attributes of the product or service accordingly (Sarasvathy, 2003, 
p. Fig. 2). 
According to literature, “[o]pportunities emerge as a function of means”(Dew et al., 2008, p. 48) 
and they do so in a “usually path dependent fashion” (Sarasvathy, 2003, p. 214). Especially in 
environments with high docility this suggests that attributes and their respective variants and the 
involved stakeholders can change at any point in time. Again, a detailed review of the effectual 
negotiation process and the idea of docility reveal the reasons for the emergence this 
counterintuitive order in opportunity finalization. Simon (1997) defined docility as ”teachability 
or educatability – not in its alterative sense of passivity or meekness”. We therefore argue that 
during a negotiation highly docile stakeholders are more willing to accept a contrary position, yet 
they are not without an opinion on it. Taken the iterative effectuation process into account, this 
leads to an opportunity development along the lines of our results: Initially, in 1-to-1 
negotiations, the negotiation power between incumbent and potential stakeholders is even. 
Therefore the negotiation result is likely to contain conflicting variants for known attributes for 
both parties. In order to accept these, sufficient docility is required on both sides. In subsequent 
negotiations, the balance of power shifts: The incumbent stakeholders outnumber the new 
potential stakeholders and even while the incumbent stakeholders may be highly docile, it 
becomes more and more unlikely that a negotiation result will change the variant of an 
established attribute. From an effectuation theory perspective this can be regarded as the exercise 
of control. While changing the variant of an established attribute gets more and more unlikely, 
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stakeholder groups are still open for new/unknown attributes. As long as these do not conflict 
with established ones or lead to an inferior outcome there is no opposition to them and they can 
easily be included into the opportunity. After a while however, all relevant, i.e. existing, 
attributes are included. At this point in time, additional stakeholders are still welcome to join a 
project; however, it is very unlikely that they will be able to influence the opportunity. Given the 
overwhelmingly skewed balance of negotiation power, joining a project becomes a “take it or 
leave it” decision. 
In effect, our opportunity-centric research approach revealed two key aspects of effectuation: 
docility is more than a mere “free parameter”, it is paramount when acting in a complex 
environment. Moreover, timing is of the essence as the evolution of opportunities follows its own 
schedule: key attributes of opportunities are usually implemented in the early phases of 
development and are unlikely to be changed, regardless of the docility of the involved 
stakeholders. 
6.3. Limitations and further research 
The presented study holds several limitations that pose avenues for further research in the 
following areas: empirical validation, scale development, theory development, and model 
enhancement. 
All our propositions are derived from a computer simulation based on current literature on the 
effectuation processes. Therefore, our results require empirical validation to both verify the 
results as well as the theory they were built on. We hope that the derived propositions will foster 
empirical research to reason their hypotheses efficiently and reduce the amount of work as they 
now “know where to look”. 
As docility plays a crucial role in this and our prior paper (Jansen, 2013a) as well as in key 
process descriptions of effectuation, the development of a docility scale is imperative to 
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understand and validate the mechanisms at work in effectuation. 
With respect to theory development, the deeper understanding of the effectual negotiation 
process, tactics and influential parameters is paramount. Being declared a “hot topic” of 
effectuation research12, we see the understanding of effectual inter-subjective processes as a key 
building block for further theoretical and computer-simulation-based studies. 
Lastly, our simulation model holds important limitations that provide further avenues for 
research. Using all available process descriptions available, we realize the shortcomings – 
besides negotiation – especially with respect to resources. Future simulation work should include 
a resource-based model to analyse the impact of the affordable loss principle and the interplay of 
resource constraints and the effectual process.  
                                              
12 By Sarasvathy during a talk at the “Entrepreneurship Research and Teaching Conference 2013”, Lyon 
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Appendices 
     
Individual-opportunity  action-interaction  action-interaction-market 
Figure 1a,b,c: development of nexuses and proposal of an action-interaction-market nexus 
 
 
Based on (Dew et al., 2008; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005a) 
Figure 2: Effectuation process including transformation13 
 
 
                                              
13 Taken from my paper “Individual vs. Collective Control in Effectual Social Networking" 
Means:
 Who I am
 What I know
 Whom I know
What can we 
as a project 
do?
Transformation 
of artifact 
triggered by 
external 
stimulus
Negotiation 
with current 
stakeholders
New goals: 
Concretion of 
artifact
Interaction with known contacts
 Present artifact
 Relay information
4
New means:
 Contacts
Negotiation 
with potential 
stakeholders
3
1
2
Gather artifacts of 
all relevant 
stakeholders
Create histogram 
of occurring 
variants
Create 
negotiation 
proposal
Artifacts Variants
Feature A1 A2 A3 A4 v1 v2 Proposal
1 1 1 1 1 4 0 1
2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1
5 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
8 2 2 2 1 1 3 2
9 - - - 1 1 0 1
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Figure 3: Example of probabilistic negotiation algorithm13 
 
Figure 4: Impact of number of existing attributes on demand satisfaction 
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Figure 5: Impact of the number of variants on demand satisfaction 
 
Figure 6: Finalization stages of opportunities over time  
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Time [ticks] Level of collective 
persistence 
  
Level of collective 
docility 
0.2 0.6 0.9 
0.2 4 
6 
7 
5 
6 
11 
4 
5 
8 
0.6 6 
6 
10 
3 
4 
8 
3 
3 
6 
0.9 6 
6 
9 
3 
4 
7 
3 
3 
6 
Table1: Changes in phase completion time 
 
Variant changes complete 
Attribute acquisition 
complete 
Stakeholder group 
complete 
